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Abstract
Financial incentives to improve adherence to antipsychotic
maintenance medication in non-adherent patients: a cluster
randomised controlled trial
Stefan Priebe,1* Stephen A Bremner,2 Christoph Lauber,3
Catherine Henderson4 and Tom Burns5 on behalf of the FIAT
(Financial Incentives for Adherence to Treatment) research team
1Unit for Social and Community Psychiatry, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for
Mental Health Services Development, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
2Division of Primary Care and Public Health, Brighton and Sussex Medical School, Mayfield House,
University of Brighton, Brighton, UK
3Services Psychiatriques, Jura bernois, Bienne-Seeland, Bellelay, Switzerland
4Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
5Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Warneford Hospital, Oxford, UK
*Corresponding author s.priebe@qmul.ac.uk
Background: Poor adherence to long-term antipsychotic injectable (LAI) medication in patients with
psychotic disorders is associated with a range of negative outcomes. No psychosocial intervention has been
found to be consistently effective in improving adherence.
Objectives: To test whether or not offering financial incentives is effective and cost-effective in improving
adherence and to explore patient and clinician experiences with such incentives.
Design: A cluster randomised controlled trial with economic and nested qualitative evaluation.
The intervention period lasted for 12 months with 24 months’ follow-up. The unit of randomisation was
mental health teams in the community.
Setting: Community teams in secondary mental health care.
Participants: Patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis or bipolar illness,
receiving ≤ 75% of their prescribed LAI medication. In total, 73 teams with 141 patients (intervention
n = 78 and control n = 63) were included.
Interventions: Participants in the intervention group received £15 for each LAI medication. Patients in the
control group received treatment as usual.
Main outcome measures: Primary outcome: adherence to LAI medication (the percentage of received out
of those prescribed). Secondary outcomes: percentage of patients with at least 95% adherence; clinical
global improvement; subjective quality of life; satisfaction with medication; hospitalisation; adverse events;
and costs. Qualitative evaluation: semistructured interviews with patients in the intervention group and
their clinicians.
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Results: Primary outcome: outcome data were available for 131 patients. Baseline adherence was 69% in
the intervention group and 67% in the control group. During the intervention period, adherence was
significantly higher in the intervention group than in the control group (85% vs. 71%) [adjusted mean
difference 11.5%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 3.9% to 19.0%; p = 0.003]. Secondary outcome: patients
in the intervention group showed statistically significant improvement in adherence of at least 95%
(adjusted odds ratio 8.21, 95% CI 2.00 to 33.67; p = 0.003) and subjective quality of life (difference in
means 0.71, 95% CI 0.26 to 1.15; p = 0.002). Follow-ups: after incentives stopped, adherence did not
differ significantly between groups, neither during the first 6 months (adjusted difference in means –7.4%,
95% CI –17.0% to 2.1%; p = 0.175) nor during the period from month 7 to month 24 (difference in
means –5.7%, 95% CI –13.1% to 1.7%; p = 0.130). Cost-effectiveness: the average costs of the financial
incentives was £303. Overall costs per patient were somewhat higher in the intervention group, but the
difference was not significant. Semistructured interviews: the majority of patients and clinicians reported
positive experiences with the incentives beyond their monetary value. These included improvement in the
therapeutic relationship. The majority of both patients and clinicians perceived no negative impact after the
intervention was stopped after 1 year.
Conclusions: Financial incentives are effective in improving adherence to LAI medication. Health-care costs
(including costs of the financial incentive) are unlikely to be increased substantially by this intervention.
Once the incentives stop, the advantage is not maintained. The experiences of both patients and clinicians
are largely, but not exclusively, positive. Whether or not financial incentives are effective for patients
with more favourable background, those on oral mediation or for shorter or longer time periods
remains unknown.
Trial registration: Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN77769281.
Funding: This project was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Technology
Assessment programme and will be published in full in Health Technology Assessment; Vol. 20, No. 70.
See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.
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Plain English summary
People with schizophrenia are often prescribed medication to help control their symptoms. This is oftengiven as an injection that lasts up to 4 weeks. Some patients struggle to attend appointments for their
injections and may become unwell or need emergency treatment. It is important to find a way to
encourage such patients to regularly receive their injections. Offering money can enhance other health
behaviours such as losing weight, quitting smoking or stopping drug or alcohol use. However, we do not
know whether or not it would help people to regularly attend injection appointments.
In this study, half of the participants were offered £15 each time they attended an appointment to receive
their injection. Patients who were offered money attended more often and reported a better quality of life.
When the money was stopped, they returned to missing their appointments as before. Both patients and
mental health staff felt mostly positive about the money offer and its effects, which included a better
relationship between patients and staff. A few felt guilty about accepting the money.
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Scientific summary
Background
Poor adherence to long-term antipsychotic injectable (LAI) medication for patients with psychotic disorders
remains a significant problem within mental health care, with the cost of non-adherence having
implications on both an individual (relapse, rehospitalisation, increased suicide risk and poorer subjective
quality of life) and societal levels (increased health-care costs).
Despite interventions developed to improve adherence, there is little evidence suggesting which
intervention is most effective. Financial incentives have demonstrated some effectiveness in improving
adherence to medication/treatment in both general and mental health care. Furthermore, a recent pilot
study within the UK found financial incentives to be effective in improving LAI medication adherence and
reducing the number of hospital admissions. So far, no wider research on the use of financial incentives to
improve LAI medication adherence has been investigated.
The use of financial incentives to improve adherence levels to LAI medication is a contentious issue, with a
range of concerns. To address these concerns, focus groups with stakeholders (including patients and
patient forum representatives, carers, consultant and trainee psychiatrists, nurses, occupational therapists,
social workers, psychologists, mental health team managers, voluntary organisation representatives and
health economists) were carried out prior to the trial. High consensus of concerns was identified across
groups. Among other concerns, such as the practicalities of the practice, the impact on the therapeutic
relationship or issues of ethical nature such as fairness, or coercion, stakeholders felt that it is crucial that
research evaluates whether or not offering financial incentives is effective. Furthermore, it is important
to understand the experiences of the clinicians and patients offering the incentives to determine whether
or not the concerns highlighted by these groups would be borne out if financial incentives were offered
in practice.
Objectives
l To test the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of offering financial incentives to patients with
psychotic disorders who demonstrate poor adherence to LAI medication (i.e. receiving ≤ 75% of LAI
medication out of all the LAI medication that a patient was prescribed).
l To test the short- and long-term impact of being offered financial incentives once those were
discontinued, that is, 6 months and 24 months after the end of the intervention.
l To establish the views and experiences of both patients and clinicians with offering financial incentives
to improve adherence to LAI medication.
Method
The study was a cluster randomised controlled trial. Mental health teams [assertive outreach teams (AOTs)
and Community Mental Health Teams] were recruited and identified patients with schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders who showed poor adherence to their LAI medication (≤ 75% adherence). After patients
were recruited, teams were randomly allocated to the intervention group, in which patients received financial
incentives (£15 per LAI medication) over a 12-month period, or to continue treatment as usual with no
incentives, with equal probability to the intervention or control group, and stratified by levels of socioeconomic
deprivation as it was assumed that teams in areas with higher deprivation would have more eligible (and more
challenging) patients.
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Participants
Patients were eligible for the trial if they were aged between 18 and 65 years, had an established
diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis or bipolar illness (according to the International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition), were cared for by a mental health team for at least 4 months,
had the capacity to give informed consent, were being prescribed LAI medication and had shown poor
adherence to LAI medication (≤ 75% adherence). Patients were not included in the trial if they had a
learning difficulty or poor command of English.
Procedure
Community Mental Health Teams and AOTs were approached and teams interested in the study were
visited by research assistants (RAs). Written informed consent was provided by the team manager,
consultant psychiatrist, or both. Once a team consented to take part in the study, patients’ responsible
clinicians approached eligible patients. If patients expressed interest to learn more about the study, a
meeting was arranged in which a RA explained the study in more detail. If written informed consent was
provided, patients completed a short questionnaire rating their subjective quality of life. After all eligible
patients in a team had been contacted and consent obtained, the team was randomised and a researcher
later informed them of their allocation.
For teams allocated to the intervention group, RAs visited the teams to further explain the procedure of the
incentives and to provide the required money for the intervention period. Over the course of 12 months,
patients within the intervention group received £15 each time they attended an appointment for their LAI
medication, which was signed for by both the nurse administering the medication and the patient. Teams
allocated to the intervention group received treatment as usual, with no incentives.
Data were collected from electronic databases or patients’ paper notes at baseline, at the end of the
intervention and 6 months after the intervention ended. In addition, patients and clinicians were contacted
at the end of the intervention to rate their subjective quality of life and to complete the Clinical Global
Impression (CGI) scale, respectively. Qualitative interviews were carried out with a convenient sample of
patients in the intervention group. Attempts were made to contact all clinicians of patients in the
intervention group to complete a semistructured interview about their experiences with the intervention.
Outcome measures
The study aimed to assess outcomes at baseline (up to 12 months prior to randomisation), at the end of
the 12-month intervention and at the 6-month follow-up. These were as follows:
l Primary outcome: adherence to LAI medication – defined as the percentage of LAI medication received
out of those prescribed over a 12-month period. Calculating adherence also took into account periods
when LAI medication would not be received in the community (e.g. hospitalisation or imprisonment).
This was assessed at baseline (up to 12 months prior to intervention), at the end of intervention and at
the 6-month follow-up.
l Secondary outcomes: percentage of patients with adherence of at least 95%; time slippage; patients’
clinical improvement (using the CGI scale); patients’ subjective quality of life (using the DIALOG scale);
satisfaction with medication; hospitalisation; and adverse events. All secondary outcomes were assessed
at baseline and at the end of intervention, with all but clinical global improvement, subjective quality of
life and treatment satisfaction also being assessed at the 6-month follow-up.
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l Cost-effectiveness: incremental cost per patient of improving adherence by 20% and incremental cost
per patient of achieving at least 95% adherence over the intervention period. Health-care costs were
calculated at baseline (costs over the prior 12 months), end of intervention (costs over the prior
12 months) and at a 6-month follow-up (costs over the prior 6 months).
l Interviews: interviews with clinicians of patients allocated to the intervention group were carried out
during the intervention (at 6 months and 12 months), and at the 6-month follow-up to assess their
experiences with offering financial incentives. Interviews with patients allocated to the intervention
were conducted at the end of the intervention to explore the experiences of receiving
financial incentives.
Follow-on study
The trial was granted permission by the Health Technology Assessment programme to extend the project
for a further 19 months to assess whether or not financial incentives were continued with patients and to
examine the longer-term impact of the financial incentives on adherence and other outcomes. This
extension included following up teams and patients for a further 18 months after the 6-month follow-up
period that was part of the original protocol (i.e. 24 months after the end of the intervention). Outcomes
measured included the primary outcome (adherence) and fewer secondary outcomes (patients with at least
95% adherence, hospitalisation and adverse events only). Follow-up interviews were conducted with
patients at 24 months to address how the incentives influenced adherence in the long term, and how
patients experienced the use of financial incentives and their ending after the intervention period.
Follow-up interviews were conducted with clinicians at 24 months to assess whether or not financial
incentives had been continued, reasons for/against continuation and the long-term impact of
the incentives and the stopping of the incentives on patient adherence, the therapeutic relationship and
other outcomes.
Statistical analyses
The primary outcome was analysed using a linear mixed-effects model with a random effect for mental
health team. In the main analysis, patients who had at least 4 months’ complete adherence data at
baseline and at end of intervention were included. Separate analyses were carried out excluding patients
not meeting this inclusion criterion, for patients with protocol violations for diagnoses or who were found
to be at least 75% adherent in the 4 months prior to screening for eligibility.
Further sensitivity analyses were conducted without adjusting for baseline adherence, for patients only with
a diagnosis of schizophrenia and excluding patients who were at least 75% adherent throughout the
whole baseline period (as opposed to at least 4 months prior).
Secondary outcomes (i.e. achieving adherence of at least 95%) were analysed using mixed-effects logistic
regression models. Subjective quality of life was analysed using a random-effects model fitted by
generalised least squares. Hospital admissions and adverse events were reported descriptively as these
were expected to be infrequent. For all regression analyses, all models adjusted for the deprivation
stratification variable, average time in weeks between prescribed LAI medication at baseline and where
possible, for baseline measures of outcomes (excluding clinical global improvement which was assessed at
end of intervention only).
Cost-effectiveness analyses fitted multilevel multivariate models with a random effect for mental
health team.
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Results
In total, 73 mental health teams (24 assertive outreach, 48 community mental health and one recovery team)
across 29 different NHS trusts were recruited and 141 patients across these teams were consented into the
trial. Thirty-seven teams were randomised to the intervention (n = 78 patients) and 36 teams were
randomised to the control condition (n = 63 patients). Patients in the trial had a mean age of 43.7 years
(standard deviation 9.8 years), 74% were male and 80% of patients had been diagnosed with schizophrenia.
End of intervention
Primary outcome data were available for 35 intervention teams with 75 patients and for 31 control teams
with 56 patients.
Primary outcome
The average adherence level at baseline was 69% in the intervention group and 67% in the control
group. At the end of the intervention, adherence was 85% in the intervention group and 71% in the
control group. Adherence was significantly higher in the intervention group than in the control group
during the 1-year intervention period [adjusted difference in means 11.5%, 95% confidence interval (CI)
3.9% to 19.0%; p = 0.003].
Secondary outcome
Adherence levels of at least 95% were achieved in 28% of the intervention group and 5% of the control
group (adjusted odds ratio 8.21, 95% CI 2.00 to 33.67; p = 0.003). Patients in the intervention group
reported significantly less of time slippage (mean difference –19.5%, 95% CI –29.8% to –9.3%;
p < 0.001); more favourable subjective quality of life (adjusted difference in means 0.71, 95% CI 0.26 to
1.15; p = 0.002). No statistically significant differences in the clinical improvement scale. Satisfaction with
medication, hospital admissions and adverse events were found to be similar between groups.
Six-month follow-up
Primary outcome data were available for 106 patients. Adherence in the intervention group had fallen to
71% compared with 78% in the control group; however, the difference between groups was not
statistically significant (adjusted difference in means = –7.4%, 95% CI –17.0% to 2.1%; p = 0.127).
There were no statistically significant differences between groups in the proportion of patients reaching
adherence levels of at least 95% or in time slippage. No differences were found in the number of hospital
admissions and adverse events.
Twenty-four-month follow-up
Primary outcome data were available for 116 patients. Adherence in the intervention group was 68%
compared with 74% in the control group. The difference between the two groups at the 24-month
follow-up was not statistically significant (difference in means –5.7%, 95% CI –13.1% to 1.7%; p = 0.130).
Cost-effectiveness
Costs and outcome data were available for 117 patients at baseline and end of intervention. The average
cost of the financial incentive was £303 (standard error £12). At the end of intervention, the total costs
(including the costs of the financial incentive), adjusted for covariates and clustering, of patients in the
intervention group were not significantly higher than costs of patients in the control group (adjusted cost
difference £598, 95% CI –£4533 to £5730; p = 0.818).
Patient interviews
Interviews were conducted with 45 of the 78 patients allocated to the intervention group, with 11 patients
interviewed both at the end of intervention and at the 24-month follow-up. All patients felt that the
incentives acted as a motivator or reward for receiving their LAI medication; however, many patients
highlighted a range of personal dilemmas that arose for them as a result of being offered the incentives.
The majority of patients felt that the incentives being discontinued did not have a negative impact on them.
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Clinician interviews
Interviews were conducted during the intervention period (at 6 months and at 12 months) with
59 clinicians for 73 out of 78 patients allocated to the intervention. For 77% of the patients, clinicians
reported the benefits of the incentives on clinical management through improved adherence, contact,
patient monitoring, communication and trust. Clinicians also reported improvements in insight, mental
health and social functioning. For 33% of patients, clinicians reported problems in patient management
as a result of the incentives, such as increased drug and alcohol use and the monetisation of the
therapeutic relationship.
Interviews after the end of the intervention (6- and 24-month follow-ups) were conducted with 57 clinicians
of 59 of the 78 patients. No clinicians continued to use the incentives with patients who had participated
in the trial, or with any new patients, with financial constraints being the most common reason as to why
the incentives were discontinued. The majority of clinicians reported no negative impact once the incentives
were stopped; however, there were reports of a small number of patients whose adherence and mental
health, and their relationship with clinicians, had deteriorated as a result. The majority of clinicians
expressed positive opinions over the use of financial incentives, both before and after the intervention
ended. Around one-fifth had negative opinions over the use of incentives and another one-fifth had
mixed opinions.
Conclusions
Offering financial incentives was an effective and cost-effective method of improving adherence in patients
with psychosis who demonstrate poor adherence to LAI medication. However, once the incentives were
discontinued, patients’ adherence returned to the original pattern. Patients’ views of and experiences with
the intervention were somewhat more positive than those of clinicians. However, both patients’ and
clinicians’ reports were largely positive and extended beyond the monetary value of the incentives.
However, some problematic experiences both during the intervention period and afterwards were also
found and often coexisted along with positive views. Whether or not financial incentives are effective for
patients with more favourable background, those on oral mediation or for shorter or longer time periods
remains unknown.
Trial registration
This trial is registered as ISRCTN77769281.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Technology Assessment programme of the National
Institute for Health Research.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Background
Non-adherence to medication and treatment programmes by people with mental health problems is a
common problem,1–4 associated with a range of negative outcomes. In the case of schizophrenia,
non-adherence is believed to increase the probability of relapse and subsequent rehospitalisation and
contribute to significantly higher health-care costs. Non-adherence is defined as the ‘extent to which a
person coincides with medical or health advice’5 or ‘the degree of conformity between treatment
behaviour and treatment standards’.6
Non-adherence and the effect on the individual
The range of negative outcomes for non-adherence with treatment can, in some cases, be severe. It has
been suggested that non-compliance with treatment is a feature of at least one-quarter of suicides and
homicides by people with mental health problems7 and has been found to be related to an increased
potential for assault and dangerous behaviours, particularly during periods of psychosis.1
Non-adherence and health-care costs
Aside from the effect of non-adherence on the individual, the health-care costs of patients with
schizophrenia who do not adhere to medication are reportedly higher than the costs for those who do
adhere.8 It has been estimated that non-adherence accounts for 40% of rehospitalisation costs for patients
with schizophrenia in the 2 years after their discharge from inpatient treatment.9 Knapp and colleagues10
make the argument that given that between 25% and 80% of patients at some point in their treatment
fail to take their medication correctly,11 total system-wide costs are likely to be substantial. These authors
also found that patients who failed to adhere to their medication regimen were over one and a half times
more likely than patients who did adhere to it to report use of inpatient services. Non-adherence can
increase external service costs by a factor of three.
Interventions to reduce non-adherence in psychosis patients
Several strategies to help reduce non-adherence for psychotic patients have been developed in recent years.
Newer atypical antipsychotic medications, which generally have different side effects, may make adherence
easier to achieve and maintain; however, non-adherence can still be substantial, even with newer drugs.12
Psychoeducation, which aims to inform patients about their condition, as well as family therapy have been
found to be largely unsuccessful in promoting adherence.13–16 In fact, for some patients, increasing their
knowledge of their illness, medication and its side effects, may be disturbing and may reduce adherence.17
Other interventions such as telephone prompting and compliance therapy have been found to have, at best,
a very small effect.18 Adherence therapy, a client-centred approach, which aims to improve adherence with
medication by using a cognitive–behavioural approach, is specifically not recommended for people with
schizophrenia, as it has been found to have no clear benefits for patients.19,20
Currently, there is no consistent evidence for any intervention to significantly improve medication
adherence in non-adherent patients with psychotic disorders.3,18 It is against this background that financial
incentives have been considered for increasing adherence to medication in non-adherent patients.
Financial incentive research
A great deal of research exists within general health studies which tend to support the effectiveness of financial
incentives in shaping and improving behaviour. A systematic review found that 10 out of 11 randomised
controlled studies21–31 using financial incentives described positive results for antituberculosis drugs, dental care,
weight reduction, cocaine dependence and antihypertensive treatment.32 The review found that a
non-financial method of increasing compliance achieved a better result in only one study.21
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Carey and Carey33 tested the hypothesis that attendance at a day treatment programme could be
increased by offering small incentives to patients with mental illness and substance abuse and found a
modest increase in attendance over time. In 2006, Post and colleagues34 examined the attendance of 50
low-income African Americans with depression at therapy appointments without incentives for 12 weeks,
followed by tracking 12 weeks during which US$10 payments were given at regular appointments. They
found patients had better adherence when payments were attached to appointments. Roll and
colleagues35 investigated the feasibility of using monetary reinforcement to promote abstinence from
cigarette smoking in adults with schizophrenia. Abstinence was significantly greater when receiving money
than when not.
Tidey36 conducted a review of studies evaluating incentive-based treatments for promoting tobacco and
other drug abstinence, treatment attendance, medication use and increased physical activity. They
concluded that given the medical and psychosocial costs of tobacco and other drug use, treatment
non-compliance and physical inactivity and the efficacy of incentive-based treatments for improving these
behaviours, incentive-based treatments should be further developed and integrated into behavioural
treatment programmes for people with serious mental illness.
While these studies all show the benefits of financial incentives within mental health research, none of
these studies investigated financial incentives and adherence to medication.
Evidence for financial incentives in mental health care
In psychiatric care, there are few well-designed studies that investigate how financial incentives are used to
improve medication adherence. Tentative evidence does exist suggesting that financial incentives are
effective at increasing adherence. A systematic review by Burton and colleagues37 focusing on mental
health treatments found that the use of incentives was effective in encouraging attendance at therapeutic
sessions and adherence to substance abuse programmes. In half of the included studies, the improvement
was maintained even after the incentive had finished. There are, however, serious methodological
problems with these studies. Only four of them were randomised controlled trials. Only one was
conducted outside the USA, which means there is practically no evidence on the effectiveness of incentives
within the unique setting of the NHS community psychiatric care system.
Two small sample observational studies have provided anecdotal evidence for the effectiveness of financial
incentives for adherence to antipsychotic medication. A small study by Claassen and colleagues38 explored
the practice of administering direct financial incentives to improve adherence in assertive outreach teams
(AOTs) in England. Financial incentives were offered to five assertive outreach patients in east London.
One patient declined the offer. Of the four in the scheme, three patients were not hospitalised after the
introduction of the financial incentives. All four patients on the scheme were able to retain their
independent accommodation and had fewer problems with their neighbours and the police than before.
Only one patient on the scheme asked for the incentive to be increased. This was declined and the patient
remained on the scheme. A further observational study was conducted by Staring and colleagues39 in the
Netherlands, in which five patients with schizophrenia under an assertive community treatment team were
offered financial incentives over the course of 1 year. All five patients’ adherence increased to 100% and
only one patient was readmitted to hospital over the course of the year. Two patients in the study asked to
receive their medication before their due date, but no problems arose when these requests were denied.
While these results suggest financial incentives are effective, such results are anecdotal and few
generalised conclusions can be drawn because of the lack of trial data.
Research within behavioural economics have found that financial incentives can lead to changes, or
‘spillovers’ in other behaviours not intended to be the target of the incentives; such as ‘crowding in’ or
‘promoting spillovers’, for which an increase in behaviour target by the incentives also leads to increases in
other behaviours, or ‘crowding out’, whereby the likelihood of a behaviour being performed is worse as a
result of being offered the incentives, as any intrinsic motivation has been removed.40,41
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The ethics of financial incentives
While there is little evidence for the effectiveness of financial incentives, there also is the question whether
or not they are ethical. This is a contentious issue and has been debated widely with financial incentives
being named as the key to improving health outcomes by those for incentives, and by critics as a form of
bribery and rewarding people for unhealthy behaviour. Critics of financial incentives have argued that they
are a form of coercion, which remove freedom of choice and autonomy from the patient who is forced to
act out of financial need rather than personal motivation. Shaw42 has for instance argued that financial
incentives place health professionals in a coercive role and can lead to the loss of a patient’s personal
dignity and privacy.
Burns43 explored this argument, stating that the current debate on financial incentives uses oversimplified
generalisations of concepts such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘coercion’, arguing that negotiation between the
health professional and patient is a constant reality within mental health care. Financial incentives, rather
than being an unethical manipulation of vulnerable patients, in fact offer a new model of respectful and
mutual exchange. Ashcroft44 has argued also that too hasty a dismissal of incentives overlooks their
potential benefits and may rely too heavily on a naive conception of the individual and their freedom of
choice to accept or decline the incentive.
Surveys of clinicians have shown a general distrust towards financial incentives. An online survey
conducted separately in the USA and the UK found that financial incentives were judged less acceptable
and to be less fair than medical interventions (such as a weekly pill or injection).45 There was a similarity in
negative attitudes in both the UK and the USA. Claassen46 conducted a similar study in which team
managers of AOTs were asked about their opinion of financial incentives. A total of 53 out of 70 managers
mentioned concerns and expressed a negative attitude towards giving money for adherence to long-term
antipsychotic injectable (LAI) medication also known as depot injections. Claassen’s paper makes a number
of recommendations including receiving informed consent from the patient, an operational policy for the
use of incentives, and randomised controlled trials as well as qualitative studies to evaluate their impact.
A focus group study by Priebe and colleagues4 among different stakeholder groups in the UK identified a
number of issues or concerns relating to the use of financial incentives in improving adherence to
antipsychotic medication. These concerns fell under four main themes:
1. Wider concerns: the value of antipsychotic medication, whether or not other services may suffer
financially if health-care budgets were spent on incentives, how the incentives would be spent by
patients and whether or not there were government motives underlying the use of incentives.
2. Problems requiring policies: the practicalities involved in implementing the incentives and how they can
be incorporated as part of a clinician’s toolkit.
3. Inherent dilemmas: whether or not offering financial incentives are coercive or whether or not they are
fair on others not receiving incentives.
4. Challenges for evidence and experience: whether or not the incentives would perversely incentivise
patients to become intentionally non-adherent to qualify for the incentives or whether or not the
incentives would affect the therapeutic relationship.
Despite controversial discussions in most groups, all talked about the importance of establishing solid
evidence on whether or not financial incentives are effective and emphasised the need for systematic
research on the issue. Overall, the debate over the ethics of using financial incentives would be greatly
enhanced by more knowledge on whether or not incentives in fact work and how they are experienced by
patients and clinicians.
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Justification for the current study
In the light of the lack of effective methods to improve adherence to antipsychotic medication, anecdotal
evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives for medication adherence and the views of
stakeholders, there is a need to provide systematic research evidence over whether or not the use of
financial incentives would be effective in improving adherence to antipsychotic medication. The Financial
Incentives for Adherence to Treatment (FIAT) study therefore aimed to:
l examine the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of offering financial incentives to patients with
psychotic disorders who demonstrate poor adherence to LAI medication (i.e. adherence ≤ 75%)
l examine the views and experiences of both patients and clinicians with offering financial incentives to
improve adherence to LAI medication to inform the concerns raised by focus groups4
l evaluate the long-term outcomes of financial incentives on adherence and other outcomes; two
follow-up studies were conducted at 6 and 24 months after the end of the intervention.
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Chapter 2 Methods
This chapter describes the design and conduct of the FIAT study, including its cost-effectiveness andqualitative examinations. Sections of this chapter have been adapted from Priebe and colleagues47,48
and Henderson and colleagues49 and reproduced from Highton-Williamson and colleagues.50
Design
The FIAT study was a cluster randomised controlled trial. The trial protocol is accessible in the public
domain.48 The study tested the hypothesis that offering financial incentives to patients who agree to their
treatment but who have difficulties adhering sufficiently to it (i.e. have adherence ≤ 75%) would lead to
improvements in their adherence.
The teams recruited were randomly allocated to an intervention group or a control group. Initially AOTs
were approached; however, owing to slow recruitment, the trial was extended to include Community
Mental Health Teams (CMHTs) and recovery teams (a new term for similar teams that was introduced in
some services during the study period). The allocation of teams and not individuals to treatment conditions
was designed to prevent contamination of practice within teams. A 1 : 1 allocation ratio was used to
randomly assign mental health treatment teams in the community to either the intervention or
control arm.
Eligible patients within the team were given a £15 incentive for every LAI medication received in the
intervention arm or treatment as usual in which eligible patients within the team received no financial or
any other incentive for taking their LAI medication in the control arm.
Setting
The study was co-ordinated through the Unit for Social and Community Psychiatry at Queen Mary University
of London. There were three study sites from which recruitment and data collection were organised,
namely Queen Mary University of London, the University of Oxford and the University of Liverpool.
Eligibility criteria
Inclusion criteria
The inclusion criteria for AOTs and CMHTs were that they care for patients with psychotic disorders and
had patients who had problems adhering to LAI medication. The exclusion criteria were a lack of
willingness to participate and an already existing practice of giving financial incentives to patients.
For the patients in the teams, the inclusion criteria were:
l being cared for by an AOT or a CMHT for at least 4 months
l aged between 18 and 65 years
l capacity to give informed consent to participate in the study and actual written informed consent
l established diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis or bipolar illness according to
International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition51
l being prescribed LAI medication
l poor adherence to antipsychotic medication, that is, having received ≤ 75% of prescribed LAI
medication, over the 4 months prior to screening
l failure of all other methods available to the team to ensure adherence to medication.
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Exclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria were:
l an intellectual disability
l poor command of English so that clinical communication and discussion of agreements is impaired.
Participant withdrawal criteria
No formal withdrawal procedures were defined for the study. Patients were informed while giving consent
that they were free to withdraw their consent and discontinue their involvement in the study at any stage
they wished. Research assistants (RAs) attempted to collect outcome data for all participants.
Intervention
Control group
Patients in teams allocated to the control arm received treatment as usual with no financial or other
incentive for taking their medication. The type, frequency and dosage of the medication and other
interventions were not affected by participation in this study.
Intervention group
Patients in the teams that were allocated to the intervention were offered a financial incentive for each LAI
medication they received for a 12-month period, which was received either at the CMHT or in the patient’s
home. Patients received £15 per injection. The total sum that a patient could receive could not exceed
£60 for 1 month, as the maximum number of injections is four per month. The administering clinician gave
the money in cash directly after the injection and patients signed a receipt on receiving the incentive.
There are several reasons why the sum of £15 was chosen as the incentive payment:
i. A fixed sum per injection simplifies the practice and makes it transparent for all clinicians and
patients involved.
ii. The sum of £15 is in line with the successful pilot study run in east London.46
iii. The sum is below the £20 per week limit, which would interfere with patients’ disability benefits.
Most patients eligible for the study receive Disability Living Allowance, Income Support with Disability
Premium or Incapacity Benefit. In all of these cases, patients are not entitled to have a separate income
of > £20 without having their benefits reduced. That includes therapeutic earnings and income made
through research participation.
iv. £15 per injection is intended to be an incentive, helping motivate otherwise ambivalent patients. It is
important to limit the total sum to a maximum of £60 per month so that patients do not become
financially dependent on the additional income. The money was intended to provide an incentive but
not lead to financial dependence on the scheme.
Implementation of screening and recruitment procedure
Patients were recruited from CMHTs and AOTs across England and Wales between March 2010 and
November 2011. As stated in the published protocol48 the intention was to recruit from only AOTs, but
during the recruitment process this was expanded to include CMHTs. Since the publication of the original
protocol the landscape of community mental teams providing mental health care had changed. In various
NHS trusts, AOTs had been decommissioned and CMHTs had taken over the original function of AOTs.
Focusing the study exclusively on AOTs would have introduced a substantial bias in the study.
METHODS
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An inclusion criterion was originally set at a maximum adherence of 50% in the 4 months prior to
screening. We changed this to 75% adherence for the following reasons:
1. We had many discussions with AOTs when presenting the study. These discussions showed that the
clinical problem of poor adherence begins at a much higher percentage threshold than the originally
envisaged 50%. AOTs follow up patients so intensively and assertively that patients commonly receive
almost all medication, although there may be delays. In this context missing 25% reflects a significant
failure in achieving treatment adherence.
2. Patients treated by AOTs are at particular risk of relapse with consequences for other types of clinical
risks (e.g. self-harm or danger to others). AOTs (unlike ordinary CMHTs) therefore respond with
immediate and drastic interventions (e.g. voluntary or involuntary hospital admission) when a patient’s
adherence drops < 75%. When the study protocol was written, Community Treatment Orders had not
been implemented and were envisaged by the Department of Health to be used for a maximum of
400 patients in England; since then they have changed clinical practice in AOTs. As a result, there are
very few patients with a much lower adherence than 75% over several months (based on the data of
11 AOTs including teams in deprived inner city areas). If financial incentives are to be tested as an
intervention that is relevant to clinical practice, patients who would realistically be offered financial
incentives and who have adherence levels between 50% and 75% over a few months should
be included.
3. The very few patients with adherence levels < 50% are usually those with whom AOTs have failed to
establish regular or any contact at all. Such patients were unlikely to be recruited to a research study. If
financial incentives are to be implemented, it would be very difficult to offer the incentives to patients
with very little contact with the AOT. The patients who can realistically be offered financial incentives
would have some more regular contact and commonly have adherence levels > 50% (although
still < 75%).
A standardised screening procedure was used across all three study sites. A total of 540 mental health
teams were approached (387 CMHTs and 153 AOTs). Teams approached were all based within reasonable
distance of study sites so that frequent travel to each team was practical and achievable.
Research assistants made contact with team managers of CMHTs and AOTs through letters and telephone
calls. Teams that expressed an interest were visited by researchers to check the team’s eligibility and to
discuss the study further. Clinicians and managers in all teams received a structured presentation
addressing the research background, the design of the trial and the ethical and practical implications of
the study. Written informed consent was obtained from team managers and/or consultant psychiatrists
from teams that agreed to take part.
All eligible patients in participating teams were approached by a clinician. If they agreed to take part in the
study they were contacted by a researcher (or a Clinical Studies Officer from the Mental Health Research
Network) in order to obtain informed consent and complete the quality-of-life and satisfaction with
treatment questionnaire. After this initial contact with patients, there was no requirement for further
contact with patients in either group throughout the 12-month intervention period. This non-intrusive
procedure was meant to minimise the number of non-consenting patients and avoid a selection bias as far
as possible. Only if patients volunteered to be contacted at the end of the trial did a researcher attempt
such contact to ask the 11 questions on quality of life and satisfaction with treatment.
All participants provided signed written informed consent before taking part in the trial. Once written
informed consent had been received from all eligible patients at the team, the team was randomised to
either the intervention or the control arm and was informed of their allocation by a RA.
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Issues encountered during patient recruitment
The patient recruitment was slower than foreseen because of a number of issues.
1. Owing to efficient work of the AOTs, few patients were found to have missed ≥ 25% depot injections
in the period prior to screening. This issue might have been prevented by carrying out a pilot study,
rather than merely relying on clinicians’ estimations.
2. Obtaining research and development approvals in participating trusts took longer than originally
estimated, in a few cases even months. The procedure was made difficult by different trusts following
different procedures in issuing the research and development approval and researchers’ letters of access.
3. In some teams, researchers were not allowed to screen for eligible patients or access medical records,
despite having obtained the letter of access. A member of stuff would have to be asked to carry this
out, which, again, contributed to difficulties in timely recruitment and data collection.
4. Obtaining AOTs’ and CMHTs’ consent for participation in the study proved to be a lengthy and rather
complicated procedure. This required booking an initial 30- to 60-minute slot in a team meeting to
present the research study and answer teams’ concerns regarding financial incentives. Thereafter, the
team would meet without researchers and discuss any issues openly before agreeing or rejecting to
participate in the study. Often, teams had to be followed up by researchers several times, and obtaining
a team’s decision could take several months.
5. As patients recruited in the study were difficult to engage, they often found it problematic to attend
appointments with the research team. This would result in the team’s repeated attempts to see patients
before the informed consent was obtained. Reminding patients by sending out letters and telephone
calls proved to be helpful to some extent.
6. The teams recruited to the study were from across England and Wales, which required a substantial
amount of travelling from the research team, along with the associated costs and time.
Sample size
It was initially assumed three patients in each AOT and CMHT would provide data, that cluster size would
vary little and that the intracluster correlation coefficient (ICC) of adherence would be 0.05. To detect a
shift in mean adherence from 65% to 85% [standard deviation (SD) of 30% at baseline] with 90% power
at the 5% significance level, it was calculated that 47 patients were required per group. This was then
inflated to 68 patients per group (four patients in each of 17 clusters) to allow for clustering and drop out,
that is a total of 136 participants from approximately 68 teams.
During the trial it became clear that average cluster size was smaller with a mean of only two individuals
per cluster, but cluster sizes were more variable. In addition, the SD of the baseline adherence of patients
was smaller than that assumed in the original sample size calculation. The sample size calculation was
reviewed in the light of these changes. However, when all the changes in the inputs to the calculation
were considered, the sample size required was virtually unchanged and so no changes were made. It was
therefore planned to recruit 136 participants in total from approximately 68 teams.
Randomisation
Randomisation was carried out at the Pragmatic Clinical Trials Unit at Queen Mary University of London by
a senior statistician who had no other involvement with the trial. The statistician was entirely independent
of patient recruitment. Cluster randomisation was carried out with AOTs and CMHTs allocated as the
clusters. Teams were stratified according to their national Mini Mental State Examination (MINI) score,
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high or low;52 the MINI score measures aggregate social isolation, poverty, unemployment, permanent
sickness and temporary and insecure housing. It was assumed that teams in areas with higher deprivation
would have more eligible patients, and potentially more challenging ones. A sequence of allocations in
each stratum was generated using the ‘ralloc’ command in Stata (versions 10.1 and 12; StataCorp LP,
College Station, TX, USA).53 Sixty group allocations were generated for each stratum arranged in blocks of
random length (2, 4 or 6) with a randomisation ratio of 1 : 1.
Allocation concealment mechanism
All clusters were identified and recruited prior to randomisation to minimise selection bias. Randomisation
of clusters took place only once all participating patients identified from each CMHT had been recruited.
Blinding
It would have been impossible to blind participants and the clinicians delivering the financial incentives to
the intervention group. The primary outcome (percentage of prescribed LAI medication taken) and
secondary outcomes, with the exception of the clinical global improvement, were obtained objectively
from the medical records and should therefore not be influenced by lack of blinding. The trial statistician,
responsible for analysing the data became unblinded shortly after receiving the data, on learning that two
patients withdrew from the trial as soon as their teams were randomised.
Safety evaluation
The trial intervention was non-medical with no expected serious adverse reactions. It was anticipated that
financial incentives would improve adherence to antipsychotic medication. However, any serious adverse
events were recorded as follows:
l death
l hospitalisation as a result of non-adherence
l any patients based at teams allocated to the intervention group who were not involved in the study
asking to receive incentives or threatening to stop receiving LAI medication unless included in the
incentive scheme.
Ethical opinion and research governance
The study received a favourable opinion by the Ealing and West London Research Ethics Committee on
13 July 2009, Research Ethics Committee reference number 09/H0710/35. Research and development
approval was obtained from each participating NHS trust. The trial was conducted in accordance with
legislation from the Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care.54 A Trial Steering
Committee (TSC) and Data Monitoring and Ethics Committee (DMEC) were established and involved
throughout the design and implementation of the FIAT trial.
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Patient and public involvement
Patients and members of the public were involved in the design and management of the FIAT study as
members of the User Research Advisory Group of East London NHS Foundation Trust and the FIAT TSC.
This led to specification of the practice for offering incentives, such as offering incentives for each depot
received rather than on a monthly basis as originally foreseen; limiting patients’ monthly income from
financial incentives to £60 so that patients’ benefits were not put at risk; and or the ways of disseminating
the study’s findings to ensure they reach service users. Patients’ involvement was also reflected in
conducting qualitative interviews with patients involved in the intervention arm of the trial.
Outcome measures
Primary and secondary outcome measures were collected at baseline (up to 12 months prior to
randomisation) and at the end of the 12-month intervention, with all but clinical global improvement,
subjective quality of life and treatment satisfaction also assessed at the 6-month follow-up.
Primary outcome
The primary outcome was the percentage of prescribed LAI medication taken in the community within the
12-month trial period. In calculating the primary outcome, periods of hospitalisation were discounted.
Their inclusion would likely inflate adherence under the assumption that patients cannot avoid taking their
LAI medication while in hospital. Adherence during imprisonment is less certain, as patients may have the
right to refuse their medication. Periods of hospitalisation or imprisonment were therefore excluded,
except if the period out of the community was less than the duration of one LAI medication treatment
cycle, assuming that patients absent for relatively short periods had a high chance of receiving their
prescribed LAI medication in the community.
Secondary outcomes
The secondary outcomes were as follows:
1. The percentage of patients achieving at least 95% adherence, calculated as a dichotomous outcome
from the percentage of prescribed LAI medication actually received by the patient during the 12-month
study period, again based on electronic and paper records of patients’ receipt of LAI medication.
2. Time ‘slippage’ of taking LAI medication, which is defined as the percentage of the time interval
following the day of the prescribed LAI medication that has elapsed before the LAI medication is taken.
3. Patients’ clinical global improvement at the end of the 12-month study period. This was rated by asking
the consultant psychiatrist or other clinician overseeing the care of each patient to complete the clinical
improvement component of the Clinical Global Impression (CGI) scale.55 This single-item observer-rated
scale asks clinicians to rate the extent of their patient’s improvement with a score ranging from
1 (very much improved) to 7 (very much worse). The score was then dichotomised to give a binary
outcome of ‘improved’ or ‘no change, or worse’. CGI scale global improvement scores have been shown
to correlate highly with change in depression scores during the course of antidepressant treatment56,57
and discriminate treatment responders from non-responders,58 indicating good convergent validity.
4. Patients’ subjective quality of life, which was assessed at the end of the 12-month study period using
the DIALOG scale.59 The scale consists of 11 items asking patients to rate their satisfaction with eight
life domains and three treatment aspects, one of which is medication, on a scale ranging from
1 (lowest satisfaction) to 7 (highest satisfaction). The subjective quality-of-life subscale has been shown
to have good psychometric properties60 including high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71), a
meaningful factor structure and good convergent validity with the Manchester Short Assessment of
Quality of Life61 (r = 0.95) and divergent validity with the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale62
(r = –0.37). The treatment satisfaction subscale has been shown to have acceptable internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.57) and to have good convergent validity with the Client Satisfaction
Questionnaire63 and divergent validity with the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale.62
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5. Satisfaction with medication.
6. The number of involuntary and voluntary hospital admissions.
7. Adverse events:
i. attempted and completed suicides
ii. incidences of physical violence
iii. police arrests.
8. Use and costs of inpatient care, outpatient and community mental health care and other health services
during the 12-month treatment period, including the cost of the intervention, and in the subsequent
6-month post-intervention period.
Patient interviews
To explore the immediate and long-term impact of receiving the incentives, interviews were conducted
at two time points, that is, at the end of the intervention and then 24 months after the end of the
intervention. To be interviewed, patients had to receive financial incentives at least once, have a good
command of the English language and have the capacity to consent to interview. Patients were not
interviewed if they had not received any incentives throughout the intervention, spent the majority of
time of the intervention period out of the community (e.g. hospitalised or imprisoned) or did not have
the capacity to consent to interview. As the aim of the interviews at the end of the intervention was
to explore patients’ views and experiences with the intervention, only those patients who completed
the intervention within the previous 4 months were interviewed. No time requirement was used for the
follow-up interviews.
An interview schedule consisting of open-ended questions was used at both time points. Questions posed
at the end of the intervention included patients’ opinions about receiving financial incentives; whether
or not receiving financial incentives affected their relationship with the clinician; whether or not the
incentives changed the frequency of patients’ LAI medication appointments; how patients used the money;
how they experienced the incentives having stopped; and how that affected them. Questions at the
24-month follow-up interviews included exploring the long-term impact of having received financial
incentives. These included long-term changes in attitudes to treatment, relationship with family and friends
and attitudes to receiving financial incentives.
At both time points, probing questions were employed for further development or clarification of a topic
or a point. All participants were interviewed individually and the interviews were transcribed verbatim by
an independent professional; the transcripts were checked for accuracy and any identifiable information
was removed.
Clinician interviews
Semistructured interviews were carried out with the clinicians of patients in the intervention arm of the
FIAT study. Interviews with clinicians were conducted at four time points to determine the immediate and
long-term impact of offering the incentives, that is, 6 and 12 months into the intervention, and 6 months
and 24 months after the end of the intervention. Clinicians were eligible for interview if they were involved
in the patient’s care throughout the intervention period (e.g. team manager, consultant psychiatrist, care
co-ordinator or nurse in LAI medication clinic). However, for interviews at 6 and 24 months’ follow-up, a
number of clinicians or patients had transferred to other teams after the end of the intervention; therefore,
it was not possible to interview all of the clinicians interviewed during the intervention period. To
overcome this, other clinicians not originally interviewed but who were involved in the patient’s care
during the intervention, or who had been involved since the intervention finished but knew the patient
well enough during the trial itself to be able to answer questions, were interviewed.
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An interview schedule with a mixture of yes/no questions and room for further unstructured responses
was used at all time points. For interviews at 6 and 12 months into the intervention, questions included how
clinicians thought patients spent the money, whether or not patients asked for more money or more frequent
LAI medication appointments, the experiences of patients outside the trial (e.g. asked for incentives or
become non-adherent to qualify) and the effect of the incentives on both the patient outcome and the
interaction with the team. For interviews at the 6- and 24-month follow-ups, questions included whether or
not clinicians continued using the incentives with patients within the trial or any new patients, whether or not
patients within or outside the trial had asked for the incentives again or had become non-adherent to qualify,
the long-term impact of offering/discontinuing the incentives on patient outcomes and interaction with the
team, their opinions of the incentives before and after the intervention and the mechanisms underlying how
the incentives worked. All responses recorded were written in shorthand.
Settings for data collection and interviews
Primary and secondary outcome data were collected from electronic and paper patient records and
medication charts kept at the CMHTs and AOTs. Data on subjective quality of life and medication
satisfaction were collected in person through interviews with patients either in their home or at their
mental health team base. Qualitative interviews with patients were conducted either within their homes or
with their mental health team base. Clinician interviews were conducted over the telephone, by e-mail or
in person by a RA.
Time period for recruitment and data collection
The different stages of the study are presented in Figure 1. On the day of screening, adherence data for
the previous 12 months were collected. Other relevant data were collected for the 12 months prior to the
date of randomisation. Taken together, these data are referred to as ‘baseline’ data. The intervention
period began 7 days after randomisation. Subsequent data collection was carried out 372 days after
randomisation (referred to as ‘end of intervention’ data and covering the 12 months of the intervention),
and then again 6 months after the end of the intervention (referred to as the 6-month follow-up).
Recruitment took place between March 2010 and November 2011. Baseline data were collected from
October 2011 (when the study recruitment period was due to finish). The end of intervention for teams
took place between March 2011 and November 2012 and the 6-month follow-up period ran from
September 2011 (i.e. 6 months after March 2011) to May 2013. Data from both periods were collected
between May 2012 and May 2013.
Intervention,
months 1–12
7-day window
Follow-up,
months 1–6
Follow-up study,
months 7–24
Time
Randomisation
Baseline
12 months
FIGURE 1 Timeline of data collection in the different stages of the study.
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Amendments to the study following commencement
All amendments to the study were carried out following consultation with the Research Ethics Committee.
Three amendments were made to the original study protocol. The first was confirmed by the Ealing and
West London Research Ethics Committee on 24 February 2010. The changes to the original protocol are
as follows:
1. The first amendment involved the widening of recruitment to include not only AOTs but also CMHTs.
Since the publication of the original study protocol, the landscape of CMHTs providing mental health
care in the NHS had changed. In a number of services, AOTs had been decommissioned and CMHTs
had taken over their function. During recruitment it became apparent that focusing the study
exclusively on AOTs would have introduced a substantial bias to the study, as areas providing care for
the same patients in CMHTs would have been excluded. The approval allowed for the recruitment of
participants from both teams.
2. The amendment also allowed for a change of participant inclusion criterion. Originally, participants
needed to have ≤ 50% adherence to be recruited to the study. This was changed to 75% for reasons
explained in Implementation of screening and recruitment procedure.
3. The amendment also rectified an inconsistency between the patient consent form and the patient
information sheet. On the information sheet patients were told that filling in any questionnaire was
entirely optional. The original version of the consent form did not mention the term ‘optional’, which
was corrected.
On the 22 October 2011, a minor amendment to the original study protocol was received from the
National Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee London – Harrow, North East London NHS Foundation
Trust. The following amendment was made:
1. Participants were offered the opportunity to participate in a short semistructured interview on their
experience of the trial to be offered at the same time as the quality-of-life questionnaire at the end of
the intervention. The amendment outlined that patients were to be offered £20 for participating in
the interview, which would last no longer than half an hour. The interview was in a semistructured
format, covering the patients’ ideas about and experiences of the trial and how it impacted on
them individually.
The study was granted a 10-month, time only, cost-neutral extension by the Health Technology
Assessment programme on the 30 August 2011. The prolonged recruitment period meant that data
collection was delayed. The extension of 10 months therefore allowed for the successful collection and
analysis of data. Permission was sought from the NRES Committee London – Harrow to extend and collect
data for the study until 30 September 2013. This request was granted by the committee on the
17 October 2011.
Follow-on study
The FIAT study was granted a 19-month extension in November 2012 by the Health Technology
Assessment programme to investigate the impact of the intervention in the longer term. This extension
included following up teams and patients for a further 18 months after the 6-month follow-up (i.e.
between months 7 and 24 after the end of the intervention; this period is referred to as the 24-month
follow-up). Data for the primary outcome as originally defined and secondary outcomes including the
percentage of patients with adherence at least 95%, hospitalisations and adverse events were collected at
24 months post intervention, that is, between May 2013 and November 2014.
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The extension allowed the opportunity to investigate the long-term impact of the incentives from the
perspective of both patients and clinicians. We aimed to interview the clinicians of patients allocated to the
intervention group to determine their experiences of implementation if financial incentives were continued
and to explore the longer-term impact on patient outcomes, the therapeutic relationship and any
consequences for other patients as a result of the incentives being continued or discontinued. We also
planned to conduct in-depth interviews with 30 patients allocated to the intervention group to address
how the incentives influenced their adherence, whether or not improvements in adherence had any impact
on their outcomes, how patients experienced the role of incentives in their care and their opinions on the
use of financial incentives.
Permission was sought from the NRES Committee London – Harrow in February 2013, which did not
consider the follow-up study to be a substantial amendment and informed us that the follow-up could be
implemented without the need for a full committee procedure.
Statistical analyses
Each outcome was analysed using all available cases, following the intention-to-treat principle, that is,
analysing the patients in the groups to which their teams were randomised. Patients were included in any
particular analysis where that outcome was measured or computed both at baseline and the end of the
intervention, and at 6 months after the end of the intervention. At a TSC meeting held on 21 January
2013, it was decided that one additional analysis would be undertaken, for the primary outcome only,
from which patients from the following categories were excluded:
i. those with diagnoses excluded by the inclusion criteria
ii. those who were found to have been adherent (i.e. > 75%) during the 4-month screening period.
Owing to the logistics of patient recruitment, there was usually a substantial gap between patient screening
and team randomisation. As periods spent out of the community were recorded for the 12 months before
randomisation (rather than screening), any baseline LAI medication card data older than this were ignored
for the purpose of calculating baseline adherence, as otherwise such absences could not be handled
correctly because they were missing data. Treatment cycle (weekly, fortnightly, every 3 weeks or every
4 weeks) determines the number of LAI medications prescribed. The denominator of the adherence
outcome also factored in number of LAI medications prescribed according to treatment cycle, periods out of
the community longer than a treatment cycle, changes in LAI medication treatment cycle and periods only
on oral medication.
Issues arising from long-term antipsychotic injectable medication card data
The baseline adherence data were asynchronous with all other baseline data that were collected for the
year before team randomisation. However, the LAI medication data were collected for 365 days back from
the screening date. This means, when there was a gap between screening and randomisation (mean gap
was 61 days, SD 45 days), the earliest LAI medication data collected during the screening period did not
coincide with the rest of the baseline data. This was problematic for calculating adherence, as it takes into
account periods out of the community greater than one LAI medication treatment cycle. If hospitalisations
or imprisonments were unknown for the early part of the screening period, they could not be handled
correctly. This issue was addressed by delaying the start of the baseline period to 365 days prior to the
point of randomisation for patients with gaps. This was to ensure that the baseline period, although
shorter than 1 year, would be contemporaneous with the other baseline data. Figure 2 shows an
illustration of the problem with the gaps in LAI medication data and the solution.
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Defining the primary outcome
The primary outcome was adherence to LAI medication defined as the percentage of prescribed LAI
medication actually taken during a 12-month period. This was defined as the following:
Adherence as a percentage= (number of LAI medication received=number of LAI medication prescribed)
×100%.
(1)
The analysis population, which is available cases following intention-to-treat principles, for the primary
analysis of the primary outcome was defined as all randomised patients, in the group to which they were
randomised subject to having one continuous period of at least 4 months in the community in both
baseline and intervention periods for which depot data were available. Patients who had died or moved
away were included providing they met these criteria and had not withdrawn/been withdrawn from the
study. Those who had withdrawn from the study or had been withdrawn were excluded.
Definitions:
1. In the community implies neither in hospital (either psychiatric or general hospital admission) nor
in prison.
2. Periods out of the community that span less than one cycle are treated as in community.
The treatment cycle possibilities are defined as follows:
1. 1/52: weekly
2. 2/52: fortnightly
3. 3/52: every 3 weeks
4. 4/52: every 4 weeks.
The periods of analysis were:
1. Baseline: the period from 365 days prior to team randomisation date to screening date.
2. Intervention: the period from the intervention start date (i.e. period from team randomisation
date + 7 days) to the end of intervention (i.e. intervention start date + 365 days).
3. Six-month follow-up: defined as 1 day after the end of intervention date + 183 days (covering the
6 months after the end of the intervention).
4. Twenty-four-month follow-up: this time period was defined as 24 months after the end of the
intervention; however, this also included the 6-month follow-up period. Therefore, this analysis period
only included 18 months after the 6-month follow-up, which was defined as 1 day after the end of the
6-month follow-up date + 548 days (covering month 7 to month 24 after the end of the intervention).
Primary outcome
The effect of the intervention on percentage adherence was estimated using a linear mixed-effects
regression model with a random effect for mental health team, adjusting for baseline adherence, MINI
score category (low vs. high) and average number of weeks between prescribed LAI medication during the
baseline period. The main analysis used data from all individuals who had at least 4 months of continuous
data during both the baseline and the intervention periods, on an intention-to-treat basis whereby those
who did not receive any incentive as intended were also included in the analysis. A per-protocol analysis
was also conducted in order to identify the effect of the incentive on adherence in those who received the
intervention, using the same model specification as described in Defining the primary outcome. Finally, a
sensitivity analysis without adjustment for baseline adherence was conducted, although still adjusting for
MINI score category and average number of weeks between prescribed LAI medication during the baseline
period, and with a random effect for clinical treatment team.
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The effect of the intervention on the primary outcome at the 24-month follow-up was modelled using a
simple linear regression model including only a fixed effect for treatment group. The ICC for adherence
across mental health teams was negative (–0.05); therefore, including a random effect would have biased
the standard error (SE) of the treatment effect upwards. Sensitivity analyses were conducted, with
treatment group being the only fixed-effects variable.
Secondary outcomes
Models assessing the effect of the intervention on the secondary outcomes were adjusted for MINI score
category and average number of weeks between prescribed LAI medication, and had a random effect for
clinical treatment team.
The effect of the intervention on the binary secondary outcomes was modelled using mixed-effects logistic
regression (i.e. achieving vs. not achieving at least 95% adherence and improved vs. unchanged or worse
on the CGI scale). For each of these models the baseline value of the relevant outcomes was included as
a covariate in addition to those described, with the exception of the analysis of clinical improvement,
as a baseline assessment with the CGI scale was not conducted.
The effect of the intervention on the continuous secondary outcome satisfaction with treatment was
estimated using a linear mixed-effects model, while subjective quality of life was estimated using a
random-effects model fitted by generalised least squares, since the mixed model did not converge.
In addition to the covariates described, both models adjusted for the baseline score on the outcomes.
Secondary outcomes in which low frequencies were expected, that is, hospital admissions and adverse
events, were summarised descriptively only.
Economic evaluation: cost-effectiveness analysis
The cost-effectiveness analyses were conducted from a NHS perspective. The study was powered to detect
a 20% improvement in adherence; therefore, for the purposes of the economic analysis, the outcome
measure was defined as the incremental cost to achieve a 20% increase in adherence to prescribed LAI
medication taken over the 12-month intervention period. The incremental cost of achieving ‘good’
adherence (achieving at least 95% adherence to prescribed LAI medication) over the intervention period
was also calculated. The modelling approach was also applied to the secondary outcomes of subjective
quality of life and clinical improvement (treated as a binary variable as in the clinical analyses).
Service use and costs
Service use considered in the economic evaluation included inpatient, outpatient and community mental
health services, general hospital and primary care services, prescribed oral medications and prescribed and
received depot medications. The cost-effectiveness analyses examined costs and outcomes at the end of
the 12-month intervention period. In addition, health-care resource use over the 6 months after the end of
the intervention was collected for descriptive analysis only. All data on service use were collected by the
study RAs via the case report form (CRF), from a combination of electronic and paper health records.
Unit costs
Established unit costs (for the 2010–11 year) from national representative and other published sources64–67
were used to estimate the costs of direct health care. Costs of a contact in any setting (office/service and
home/community settings) were calculated, as opposed to the duration of contact with a mental health
professional, as little duration data were available, drawing on unit costs taken from the NHS reference
costs for England.65 Oral and LAI medication costs were calculated using the prescription cost analyses.68
The cost of the intervention itself was calculated as the total number of £15 incentive payments given over
the study period, while contacts with nurses, including nurses giving LAI medication, were tracked as part of
the data collection via the CRF. Feedback from researchers working with the participating teams indicated
no other resources were consumed in providing the financial incentives. The number of incentive payments
was variable, depending on the number of LAI medication appointments attended by patients. Unit costs
are shown in Table 1.
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Missing data
Cases treated as missing for the adherence outcome were treated the same way in the economic analysis.
Cases were also counted as missing when all hospital or community service utilisation data were missing.
The economic analyses drew on complete cases only.
A gap in the LAI medication data arose between randomisation and screening, necessitating imputation
of LAI medication costs between the dates of screening and entry into the trial. So that the costs of the LAI
medication would be in step with other costs, the period between the 12 months pre screening and the
12 months pre randomisation and the gap between the dates of the last LAI medication cycle and
randomisation were calculated. The extra LAI medication cycles occurring in the gap were imputed by last
observation carried forward. LAI medication unit costs were attached to the LAI medication units occurring
over the pre-randomisation period and to the imputed LAI medication units in the gap, if the gap was as
long as or longer than one LAI medication cycle. The total LAI medication cycle costs (including any
imputed costs) were then adjusted by applying the proportion of prescribed LAI medication that had been
taken over prior 12 months to screening.
TABLE 1 Unit costs
Resource item
Unit cost, range
(£, 2010–11) Unit of measurement
Hospital use
Mental health inpatient service use
Mental health outpatient attendances (A&E, day and
outpatient appointments)
97–185 Per attendance65
Mental health inpatient bed-days 327–633 Per day65
Mental health residential and hospital alternativesa 92–279 Per day64,66,67, (Dr B Barrett, King’s College
London, 25 February 2013, personal communication)
General hospital inpatient service use
General hospital all outpatient attendances (A&E and outpatients) 111–117 Per attendance65
General hospital inpatient bed-days 424 Per day65
Community and primary health services
Family support worker 46 Hour64
Vocational worker 53 Per contact64
Substance abuse worker 116 Per contact65
Counsellor 60 Per consult64
CMHT contactb 126 Per contact65
AOT contactb 121 Per contact65
GP home visit 82 Per visit64
GP surgery 25 Per visit64
Medicationsc Various Standard quantity units68
A&E, accident and emergency; GP, general practitioner.
a Includes crisis team beds, clinical crisis house, non-clinical alternatives to inpatient admission, residential rehabilitation for
people misusing drugs and alcohol.
b Team staff assumed to include the following workers: mental health nurse/community psychiatric nurse, mental health
support worker, occupational therapist, psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker.
c Depot medications: cost of units of mg/ml ampules. Oral medications: cost per units of mg, µg or ml.
Source: reproduced from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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Cost-effectiveness analyses
The financial incentive intervention should be considered cost-effective if it is more effective and less costly
than the treatment as usual received by the control group or if it is more effective and more costly than
treatment as usual and the purchaser is willing to pay the extra cost in order to gain the associated
benefit. If the financial incentive strategy is more effective but also more costly, the additional cost per
additional benefit produced [the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)] would have to be less than the
purchaser is willing to pay.
Incremental outcomes and costs were estimated through multilevel multivariate regression models,
adjusting for the following covariates: intervention allocation, baseline measure of outcome (except in the
case of the CGI scale, measured at end of intervention only), total costs in the pre-baseline year, high/low
MINI score category and average LAI medication treatment cycle over the baseline period. The average
number of weeks between prescribed LAI medication was controlled for, as some patients’ treatment
cycles changed over the period. The modelling allowed costs and outcomes to be correlated both within
and between clusters, with random effects for the participating teams as clusters.
Error terms for costs and outcome equations were assumed to be normally distributed. The coefficients on
the allocation term in the costs and effects equations (giving the cost and outcome differences, respectively,
between groups) were used to derive net monetary benefit values over a range of willingness to pay
(£0–30,000) for the additional benefit associated with the intervention. The 95% confidence intervals (CIs)
for the ICER were calculated from the model estimates using Fieller’s method.69 Cost-effectiveness
acceptability curves were constructed from the regression results, depicting the probability of the ICER
being less than each willingness-to-pay value in the range.
Sensitivity analyses were also employed to examine the impact of altering key assumptions on the
cost-effectiveness of achieving both adherence outcomes. The first analyses explored the impact of when
patients ‘did not attend’ (DNA) an appointment, either through failing to turn up to an appointment or by
not being in during a community visit (planned or unplanned). No data on the duration of contact for
DNAs were available, and thus DNAs were excluded from the main analysis. However, it is possible that
DNAs could consume a substantial amount of health professionals’ time, and to account for this, DNA
costs were incorporated into total costs in a sensitivity analysis, assigning these visits the same unit costs as
actual contacts with patients. Another sensitivity analysis explored the impact of the varying level of
skill-mix of mental health professionals within teams. As a result of using national reference costs for
contacts with professionals from CMHTs and AOTs, the costs may not reflect the variability in skill-mix
within these teams or the actual duration of contact that patients had with particular mental health
professionals. Therefore, to explore the impact of over- or underestimating these costs and their
contribution to the ICER, unit costs of AOT and CMHT contacts were varied by 25%, 50% and 150%.
Qualitative analyses
Patient interviews
The analysis of the patient interviews followed a thematic analytical approach as described by Braun and
Clarke.70 Transcripts from the interviews conducted at the end of the intervention were subject to initial
coding by researchers (Alexandra Forrest, Hana Pavlickova and Nicola O’Connell). Based on these codes, a
provisional framework was devised capturing the similarities, differences and initial themes. The framework
allowed for the addition of codes throughout the process. Data were then independently recoded by
the researchers into this framework, which was continually refined and recoded reflecting the iterative
discussion.
The interviews conducted 24 months after the end of the intervention were analysed in a similar fashion,
with researchers performing initial coding of the transcripts (conducted by Adam Ziecik, Hana Pavlickova
and Katherine Moran). An initial coding framework was drawn up based on these codes and recoded in
line with this framework. However, throughout the analysis, the research team felt that the codes and
DOI: 10.3310/hta20700 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2016 VOL. 20 NO. 70
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Priebe et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
19
themes arising were similar to those of the interviews conducted at the end of the intervention and,
following extensive discussions, a decision was made to merge together the interviews conducted at
both time points for analysis. The interviews from both time points were revisited, previous coding
frameworks discarded and a new coding framework was devised capturing the best fit of the data at
both time points. The data were recoded into this framework, which was continually refined and recoded
into. This process occurred until all identified themes were internally homogenous and
externally heterogeneous.
The research team comprising research psychologists and an academic and clinical psychiatrist were
involved in conducting the iterative process of analysis and interpretation. All team members had been
involved in implementing the FIAT trial at different points. Throughout the analysis at both time points, at
least 60% of the data were coded by two or more researchers to establish inter-rater reliability. All data
were imported, analysed and managed using NVivo (version 10; QSR International, Warrington, UK)
qualitative analysis software.
Clinician interviews
The clinician interviews were analysed at two different time points, that is interviews conducted at 6 and
12 months of the intervention were analysed together for experiences during the intervention period and
interviews conducted at 6 and 24 months after the end of the intervention were analysed together for
experiences after the end of the intervention.
Electronic interview transcripts from all time points were then imported and analysed using the NVivo
software (version 10) for qualitative data analysis.
Interviews at months 6 and 12 of the intervention were analysed based on a per-patient as opposed
to per-clinician or per-interview approach. This was to minimise the possibility of falsely inflating the
frequency of theme endorsement. To achieve this, the data on each patient across both time points
was collapsed to gain an overall picture of clinician experiences with each patient. The yes/no
responses were descriptively analysed whilst the more qualitative unstructured responses were
thematically coded within NVivo. As the interview questions were formatted with the anticipation of
yes/no responses, they were required to be topic specific (i.e. ‘did offering financial incentives influence
the quality of the therapeutic relationship?’ and ‘did offering financial incentives have any other
influence on treatment of the patient e.g. attending of the day hospital, contacts with the [general
practitioner] etc.?’). Therefore, the analysis of the detailed responses was inductively driven, with
themes arising directly from the very nature of the question (e.g. ‘therapeutic relationship’ or ‘other
management’). During the original stages of coding, the research team worked together to discuss the
application of a preliminary coding framework to each interview. Once a coding framework had been
provisionally developed, the first and second authors independently coded the interviews. The authors
then collaborated further to refine the emergent coding framework, by either collapsing or expanding
codes to encompass emergent themes. Once the second stage framework had been agreed upon,
the researchers continued to code independently. This was completed until the authors believed
the themes to be internally homogenous and externally heterogeneous. Inter-rater reliability was
established by researchers working together on the refinement of the coding framework at the
two collaborative stages.50
Reproduced from Highton-Williamson and colleagues50
under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 3.0
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The interviews at 6 and 24 months after the end of the intervention were analysed in a similar fashion.
Data were collapsed into one time point and analysed on a per-patient approach. However, questions
relating the clinician opinions on the use of financial incentives were analysed using a per-clinician
approach to avoid artificially inflating any numbers. All yes/no responses were analysed descriptively and
the unstructured answers were thematically coded within NVivo. Prior to coding, a coding framework was
developed by researchers with the themes resembling the nature of the questions (e.g. responses for ‘did
discontinuation of financial incentives have an impact on the quality of the therapeutic relationship?’ were
coded into ‘therapeutic relationship’). After initial coding, researchers collaborated with each other to
discuss and refine the themes from the analysis; this process was continued until all themes were believed
to be internally homogenous and externally heterogeneous.
Data from the clinician interviews at 6 and 12 months during of the intervention were collated, coded and
analysed by Elizabeth Highton-Williamson, Kirsten Barnicot and Tarrannum Kareen. Data from the clinician
interviews at month 6 and month 24 after the end of the intervention were collated, coded and analysed
by Katherine Moran and Adam Ziecik. Both teams of researchers were regularly supervised by SP. The
research team consisted of two psychologists and one clinical and one clinical/academic psychiatrist for the
interviews at month 6 and month 12 of the intervention, and two psychologists and one clinical/academic
psychiatrist for the interviews at 6 and 24 months after the end of the intervention.
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Chapter 3 Results
This chapter reports the results of the intervention period, the 6- and 24-month follow-up and thecost-effectiveness analysis. Finally, findings from patient and clinician interviews carried out during and
after the intervention period are also reported. Sections of this chapter have been adapted from Priebe
and colleagues47 and Henderson and colleagues,49 and reproduced from Highton-Williamson and
colleagues50 under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 3.0.
Study recruitment
In total 540 teams were approached, 184 (34%) of which consented to meet with the RAs to receive
further information about the study. From these meetings, 73 (40%) teams were recruited, with
141 consenting patients, and randomised between 16 April 2010 and 15 November 2011. The number of
AOTs, CMHTs and recovery teams (a new term for similar teams that was introduced in some services
during the study period) that were recruited can be found in Table 2. Ninety-three consenting teams had
no eligible patients, and a further 18 teams did not yield any patients for recruitment. The patient flow
through the study and at the 6- and 24-month follow-up is reported in the Consolidated Standards of
Reporting Trials diagram (Figure 3).
Of the 141 patients who were randomised, nine were lost to follow-up by the end of the 18-month
intervention and follow-up period. Of the 132 remaining, the primary outcome could be defined for 106.
However, only 99 had the primary outcome defined at both baseline and the end of the 6-month
follow-up. Therefore, from the total of 132 patients total, 33 patients were excluded because they had no,
or insufficient, depot data during baseline or 6-month follow-up, or both periods.
At 24 months post intervention, 131 patients remained out of the 132: an additional five patients were
lost from the 6-month follow-up, while four patients who were lost to the 6-month follow-up returned to
the study [i.e. two patients, who had moved away, and two who had been out of the community or
discharged to their general practitioner (GP)]. The primary outcome could be defined for 116 patients.
Therefore, in total, 15 patients were excluded because they had no, or not sufficient, depot data during
the 18-month follow-up period.
TABLE 2 Number of types of teams recruited
Type of team recruited
Intervention (N= 37) Control (N= 36) Totals (N= 73)
n % n % n %
Assertive outreach 14 38 10 28 24 33
Community mental health 22 60 26 72 48 66
Recovery 1 2 0 0 1 1
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Allocation
Analysis
Teams approached for participation
(n = 540)
• AOTs, n = 153
• CMHTs, n = 387
91 eligible teams
276 patients
Teams consented
(n = 184)
Randomisation at cluster level
• 73 teams
• 141 patients
Teams excluded
(n = 356)
• Did not respond, n = 102
• Trusts or teams declined, n = 198
• Teams did not collaborate, n = 38
• Teams restructured, n = 5
• Screening not organised, n = 11
• No patients on depot, n = 1
• Unknown, n = 1
Teams with no eligible patients
(n = 93)
Allocated to treatment as usual
• 36 teams
   Mean cluster size = 1.8, range 1–4
• 63 patients
Allocated to financial incentives
• 37 teams
   Mean cluster size = 2.1, range 1–7
• 78 patients
1-year follow-up
Lost to 1-year follow-up
• Teams, n = 2
• Patients, n = 3 
Reasons for team loss to follow-up
• All patients were lost to follow-up 
Reasons for patient loss to follow-up
• Withdrew on learning allocation, n = 2
• Was withdrawn, n = 1
Lost to 1-year follow-up
• Teams, n = 0
• Patients, n = 0
Clusters analysed
• 30 teams
   Mean cluster size = 1.7, range 1–4
• 56 patients with primary outcome
   (89% of randomised)
• 52 patients analysed with primary outcome 
Excluded from analysis
• Teams, n = 6
• Patients from seven teams, n = 8 
Reasons for exclusion
• Not sufficient baseline data, n = 4
• Not sufficient intervention data, n = 3
• Not sufficient both periods, n = 1
Clusters analysed
• 32 teams
   Mean cluster size = 2.2, range 1–7
• 75 patients with primary outcome
   (96% of randomised)
• 71 patients analysed with primary outcome 
Excluded from analysis
• Teams, n = 5
• Patients from six teams, n = 7 
Reasons for exclusion
• Not sufficient baseline data, n = 4
• Not sufficient intervention data, n = 1
• Not sufficient both periods, n = 2
(a)
Patients and 18 teams excluded
(n = 135)
• Lacked capacity, n = 6
• Patient declined, n = 31
• Clinician declined/unco-operative 
   clinician, n = 13
• Could not be contacted, n = 25
• DNA, n = 9
• Hospitalised, n = 18
• Become ineligible, n = 19
• Discharged, n = 1
• Poor command of English, n = 2
• Imprisoned, n = 1
• Unknown reason, n = 10
FIGURE 3 Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials diagram showing participant flow at baseline, end of the
intervention, 6 and 24 months’ follow-up. GP, general practitioner. Source: adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47
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Analysis
Follow-up at 18 months
OR 6-month follow-up
study OR 6 months
post intervention
Lost to follow-up
• Teams, n = 1
• Patients, n = 5 
Reasons for team loss to follow-up
(only patient was lost to follow-up) 
Reasons for patient loss to follow-up
• Withdrawn (baseline), n = 1
• Withdrew (baseline), n = 2
• Moved abroad (during 6-month 
   follow-up), n = 1
• Not in community (all of 6-month 
   follow-up), n = 1
Control
Lost to follow-up
• Teams, n = 0
• Patients, n = 4 
Reasons for patient loss to follow-up
• Dead (during intervention 
   period), n = 1 
• Discharged from services, n = 3
   • (two during intervention period)
   • (one during follow-up period)
Incentives
(b)
58 patients available for analysis 
Clusters analysed
• 29 teams
   Mean cluster size = 1.4, range 1–3
• 45 patients with primary outcome
   (71% of those randomised)
• 41 patients analysed with primary
   outcome 
Excluded from analysis
• Teams, n = 5
• Patients from 15 teams, n = 17 
Reasons for exclusion
• No depot data in one or both 
   periods, n = 5
• Not sufficient baseline data, n = 1
• Not sufficient follow-up data, n = 9
• Not sufficient both periods, n = 1
• Oral medication only, n = 1
74 patients available for analysis 
Clusters analysed
• 30 teams
   Mean cluster size = 1.9, range 1–5
• 61 patients with primary outcome
   (78% of those randomised)
• 58 patients analysed with primary
   outcome 
Excluded from analysis
• Teams, n = 7
• Patients from 15 teams, n = 16 
Reasons for exclusion
• No depot data in one or both 
   periods, n = 5
• Not sufficient baseline data, n = 3
• Not sufficient follow-up data, n = 6
• Not sufficient both periods, n = 2
FIGURE 3 Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials diagram showing participant flow at baseline, end of the
intervention, 6 and 24 months’ follow-up. GP, general practitioner. Source: adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47
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Participant follow-up
Data were available for 138 of the 141 patients at the end of the intervention: two patients withdrew and
one was withdrawn directly after randomisation to the control group. One intervention patient died during
the intervention period of natural causes. Data for this patient until death were used in the study. All four
patients were lost to the 6-month follow-up (i.e. leaving 137 patients available). An additional five patients
were also lost at the 6-month follow-up: three patients in the intervention group were discharged from
services, one patient in the control group moved abroad and another was no longer in the community
(i.e. hospitalised or imprisoned). This meant that 132 patients remained at the 6-month follow-up.
At the 24-month follow-up, 131 patients remained. Three patients, one in the intervention group and two
in the control group, were discharged from services, one patient died during the follow-up period and one
patient was no longer in the community (both in the control group). However, four patients who were lost
to the 6-month follow-up returned to the study: two patients who had moved away and two who had
been out of the community or discharged to their GP.
Follow-up at 36 months
OR 18-month follow-up
study OR 24 months
post intervention
Lost to follow-up
• Teams, n = 0
• Patients, n = 4 
Reasons for patient loss to follow-up
• Discharged to GP, n = 2
• Died, n = 1
• Not in community, n = 1
Control
Lost to follow-up
• Teams, n = 0
• Patients, n = 1 
Reasons for patient loss to follow-up
• Discharged to GP, n = 1
Incentives
(c)
Analysis
55 patients (33 teams) available 
for analysis 
Clusters analysed
• 31 teams
   Mean cluster size = 1.6, range 1–4
• 49 patients analysed with primary 
   outcome (89% of those at start of 
  18-month follow-up) 
Excluded from analysis
• Teams (all patients lost), n = 2
• Patients from 6 teams, n = 6 
Reasons for exclusion
• No depot data, n = 1
• Not sufficient follow-up data, n = 2
• Oral medication only, n = 3
75 patients (37 teams) available 
for analysis 
Clusters analysed
• 34 teams
   Mean cluster size = 1.9, range 1–6
• 66 patients analysed with primary 
   outcome (88% of those at start of 
  18-month follow-up) 
Excluded from analysis
• Teams (all patients lost), n = 3
• Patients from 8 teams, n = 9 
Reasons for exclusion
• No depot data, n = 3
• Not sufficient follow-up data, n = 3
• Oral medication only, n = 3
FIGURE 3 Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials diagram showing participant flow at baseline, end of the
intervention, 6 and 24 months’ follow-up. GP, general practitioner. Source: adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47
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During baseline data collection it was found that one patient recruited to the control group had not been
prescribed LAI medication at the time of recruitment and was therefore deemed ineligible. In total,
four patients did not meet inclusion criteria for diagnosis but were included in the analysis.
The original screening information on adherence in the previous 4 months was taken from a range of
sources. When it was later checked against the records, seven patients in the intervention and four in the
control group were found to be adherent. These patients were included in the primary analysis but,
together with the four with excluded diagnoses, were removed for the per-protocol analysis. Table 3
outlines the available data in calculating the primary outcome at baseline and end of intervention.
TABLE 3 Data availability during baseline and during the intervention period
Participant flow
Intervention Control Total
n of patients
(teams) %
n of patients
(teams) %
n of patients
(teams) %
Randomised 78 (36) 100 63 (37) 100 141 (73) 100
Withdrew 0 0 2 (2) 3 2 (2) 1
Was withdrawn 0 0 1 (1) 2 1 (1) 1
Potentially available for analysis 78 100 60a 95 138 98
Non-qualifying diagnosisa 2 3 2 3 4 3
Was adherent at baseline 7 9 4 7 11 8
Died during interventiona 1 2 0 0 1 1
Was discharged from servicea 2 3 0 0 2 1
Moved during study perioda 2 3 4 7 5 4
Has a completed baseline CRF 78 100 60 100 138 100
Has a completed intervention CRF 78 100 58 97 136 99
No baseline LAI medication data 1 1 3 5 4 3
< 4 months’ eligible LAI medication data during
baseline
5 6 2 3 7 5
No intervention period LAI medication data 3 4 3 5 6 4
< 4 months’ eligible LAI medication data during
intervention
0 0 2 3 2 1
Primary analysis population (available cases) 71 (32) 91 51 (29) 85 122 88
a Data from these patients were used in analyses when available.
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Participant baseline characteristics
During the intervention period, 35 intervention group teams with 75 patients and 30 control group teams
with 55 patients provided primary outcome data. Of those, 32 teams with 71 patients from the
intervention group and 29 teams with 51 patients from the control group had sufficient data on
adherence during the baseline and intervention periods and were included in the primary analysis.
Sociodemographic baseline characteristics are described in Table 4 and clinical characteristics of the
baseline group are described in Table 5.
TABLE 4 Baseline sociodemographic characteristics of sample
Sociodemographic characteristics
Missing
data
Total (N= 141)
Intervention
group (N= 78)
Control group
(N= 63)
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Demographics
Age (years) 0 43.7 9.8 44.4 9.6 42.7 10.2
Male 0 105 74% 59 76% 46 73%
Years of education 29 11.0 1.6 10.9 1.7 11.2 1.5
Ethnicity 3
White 83 60% 49 63% 34 57%
Black 31 22% 17 22% 14 23%
Asian 9 7% 5 6% 4 7%
Mixed and other 15 11% 7 9% 8 13%
Living situation
Married/cohabiting 3 18 13% 8 10% 10 16%
Independent accommodation 4 102 74% 53 68% 49 83%
Living alone 20 75 62% 41 62% 34 62%
Paid employment (any) 3 4 3% 3 4% 1 2%
Receiving benefits 7 134 99% 76 99% 58 100%
Source: adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47 This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the Creative
Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon
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Primary outcome
Primary outcome result
The unadjusted difference in adherence, using data from all 131 patients with primary outcome data was
14% (85% in the intervention group vs. 71% in the control group). Adherence to medication was
significantly higher in the intervention group than in the control group [adjusted difference in means (β)
11.5%, 95% CI 3.9% to 19.0%; p = 0.003], representing on average 11.5% greater adherence in the
incentives group after adjustment for covariates. See Table 6 for the primary outcome results.
Table 7 shows only those patients with at least 4 months’ LAI medication data at baseline and follow-up.
Table 8 shows the distribution of cluster size for clusters in which at least one patient had data at baseline
and at the intervention period and Table 9 shows the summary statistics for LAI medication data cohort.
TABLE 5 Baseline clinical characteristics of sample
Clinical characteristics and history
Missing
data
Total (N= 141) Incentives (N= 78) Control (N= 63)
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Mean
or n
SD
or %
Clinical diagnosis (according to International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition51)
0
Schizophrenia (F20.0–F20.9) 113 80% 61 78% 52 82%
Schizoaffective disorders (F25.0–F25.9) 17 12% 9 12% 8 12%
Bipolar disorder (F30.0) 7 5% 6 8% 1 2%
Other psychosis (F33.3) 3 2% 2 2% 1 2%
Other diagnosis (F60.0–F69.0) 1 < 1% 0 0% 1 2%
Clinical history
Duration of illness (years) 14 17.8 8.5 18.2 8.6 17.3 8.5
Number of psychiatric hospitalisations in the
last 2 years
4 0.8 2.2 0.9 2.7 0.6 1.4
One or more hospital admissions in past
year
3 32 23% 20 26% 12 20%
Recreational drug use during baseline 5 104 76% 57 74% 47 80%
Criminal convictions during baseline 4 2 1% 1 1% 1 2%
Imprisonment during baseline 3 4 3% 1 1% 3 5%
CTO at time of randomisation 4 7 5% 3 4% 4 7%
CTO, Community Treatment Order.
Source: adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47 This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the Creative
Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon
this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly
cited and the use is non-commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
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Sensitivity analyses
The analysis excluding those with incorrect diagnoses or > 75% adherence in the 4 months prior to
screening (adjusted difference in means 10.7%, 95% CI 3.0% to 18.5%; p = 0.006), and the sensitivity
analysis without adjustment for baseline adherence (adjusted difference in means 11.6%, 95% CI 3.7% to
19·5%; p = 0.004) gave similar results. Excluding all patients with > 75% adherence in the previous
12 months gave an effect estimate of 15.7% (95% CI 5.7% to 25.6%; p = 0.002), and restricting the
analysis to only patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia gave an estimate of 10.7% (95% CI 3.0% to
18.5%; p = 0.006).
Secondary outcomes
The effect of financial incentives on the secondary outcomes is shown in Table 10. The percentage of
patients achieving at least 95% adherence during the intervention period was significantly higher in the
intervention than in the control group, adjusted odds ratio (OR) 8.21 (95% CI 2.00 to 33.67; p = 0.003).
Patients in the intervention group were found to rate their quality of life significantly higher (β = 0.71,
95% CI 0.26 to 1.15; p = 0·002), and also showed significantly less time slippage (β = –19.5%, 95% CI
–29.8% to –9.3%; p < 0.001). Differences on clinician-rated clinical improvement were not statistically
significant, although the odds of being rated as improved were 2.73 times greater in the intervention
group (95% CI 0.64 to 11.59; p = 0.174) than in the control group. There were no differences in
medication satisfaction between the groups. Number of hospitalisations and adverse events were low in
both groups and did not show substantial differences.
TABLE 8 Distribution of cluster size for clusters in which at least one patient had data at baseline and in the
intervention period
Cluster size
Intervention (N= 32) Control (N= 30) Total (N= 62)
n % n % n %
1 13 41 17 56 30 48
2 11 34 6 20 17 28
3 3 9 5 17 8 13
4 1 3 2 7 3 5
5 2 6 0 0 2 4
6 1 3 0 0 1 2
7 1 3 0 0 1 2
TABLE 9 Summary statistics of cluster size for LAI medication data cohort
Cluster size
Intervention Control
n Mean SD Range n Mean SD Range
Teams 32 2.2 1.6 1–7 30 1.7 1.0 1– 4
DOI: 10.3310/hta20700 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2016 VOL. 20 NO. 70
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Six-month follow-up outcomes
Fewer patients were assessed at the 6-month follow-up (1–6 months after the end of intervention), with
adherence calculated on 106 of the 132 patients available at the 6-month follow-up. Alongside the six
patients lost to follow-up, adherence data were missing for a number of reasons including refusal, patients
being taken off LAI medication and switched to oral medication, poor record keeping by clinicians or
insufficient adherence data (< 4 months’ worth). While these data were therefore missing from the
analysis, they could be accounted for and thus were not missing at random.
Adherence in the intervention group was 71% and 78% in the control group. The difference in adherence
between both groups was not statistically significant [adjusted difference in means (β) = –7.4%, 95% CI
–17.0% to 2.1%; p = 0.175]. The percentage of patients achieving at least 95% adherence during the
follow-up was not significantly different between groups (adjusted OR = 0.42, 95% CI 0.11 to 1.61;
p = 0.205), neither was the time slippage of taking LAI medication [adjusted difference in means
(β) = 6.1%, 95% CI –5.3% to 17.5%; p = 0.293]. The number of hospitalisations and adverse events at
the 6-month follow-up were low in both groups and did not show substantial differences.
The effect of financial incentives on the primary and secondary outcomes at the 6-month follow-up can be
found in Table 11.
Sensitivity analyses
Adherence in the intervention group was somewhat lower than the control group but failed to reach
statistical significance. Sensitivity analyses led to the same conclusion.
During the 6-month follow-up there was evidence of patients refusing medication. For the purposes of
analysis, these patients were given an adherence level of 0%. When including patients who refused in the
analysis, data were available for 112 patients; adherence in the intervention group was not significantly
lower than the control group (β = –4.9%, 95% CI –14.3% to 4.6%; p = 0.312). When excluding refusers,
data were available for 108 patients. Again, there was no significant difference in adherence between
both groups (β = –6.2%, 95% CI –13.1% to 0.1%; p = 0.078).
A number of patients had less than the required 4 months’ worth of adherence data. Adherence data for
all patients, regardless of whether or not they had at least 4 months’ worth and including patients refusing
medication was available for 127 patients; adherence in the intervention group was not significantly lower
than in the control group (β = –5.4%; 95% CI –15.0% to 4.2%; p = 0.274). In other cases, adherence
data were not available as some patients had been taken off LAI medication. In these instances patients
were assumed to achieve 100% adherence. Adherence data for all patients with any adherence data, and
including those assumed to have 100% adherence, were available for 130 patients. No significant
differences in adherence was found between groups (β = –5.0%; 95% CI –14.7% to 4.7%; p = 0.316).
In some cases, adherence data were missing over the course of the follow-up which could not be
accounted for. Single imputation was performed with last observation carried forward. As a result, data
were available for 134 patients; adherence in the intervention group was not significantly lower than in
the control group (β = –3.6%, 95% CI –13.3% to 6.2%; p = 0.475).
RESULTS
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Twenty-four-month follow-up outcomes
Primary outcome data were available for 116 patients. Adherence in the intervention group was 68%,
compared with 74% in the control group. Medication adherence between the two groups at 24-month
follow-up was not significantly different (β = –5.7%, 95% CI –13.1% to 1.7%; p = 0.130). A graphical
representation of adherence in the intervention and the control groups throughout the intervention and
follow-up periods is shown in Figure 4.
There were a higher number of hospital admissions in the intervention group than in the control group,
but no differences in the number of adverse events.
Sensitivity analyses
At the 24-month follow-up, there were cases of patients being were discharged back to primary care
services (i.e. under the care of GPs) which is normal practice for patients no longer in need of intensive
input from secondary services. Adherence in these cases was therefore assumed to be 100%. Data were
available for 119 patients; adherence in the intervention group was not significantly different compared with
the control group (β = –6.2%, 95% CI –13.6% to 1.1%; p = 0.097). There was also evidence of patients
refusing medication and being switched to alternative medication as a result. Adherence for refusers was
assumed to be 0%. Data were available for 124 patients; adherence in the intervention group was not
significantly lower than in the control group (β = –6.4%, 95% CI –15.0% to 2.1%; p = 0.14).
The descriptive statistics of adherence between the two groups at the 24-month follow-up can be found in
Table 12. The results of the main analysis and sensitivity analysis for the primary outcome are shown in
Table 13. Other secondary outcomes (arrests, incidents of violence, suicide attempts and hospitalisations)
are shown in Tables 14 and 15.
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FIGURE 4 Adherence by treatment group throughout the intervention and follow-up periods.
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Serious adverse events
Known serious adverse events are as follows:
l One patient was unhappy with being allocated to the control condition and refused all LAI medication
as a result. This patient was subsequently hospitalised because of non-compliance with medication.
l One patient outside of the trial refused all LAI medication after knowing that another participant
(in the trial and allocated to the intervention group) was receiving financial incentives for their medication.
This patient was subsequently placed on a Community Treatment Order and was reported to have died a
few weeks after this incident. However, it was decided that this death was unrelated to the FIAT trial itself.
Cost-effectiveness
A summary of the resources used by patients in each group can be found in Tables 16 and 17. There were
few notable differences in resource use between groups over the intervention period. Patients in the
intervention group experienced fewer days in a psychiatric inpatient bed and more days in a general
hospital inpatient bed than patients in the control group. Of the patients with admissions to psychiatric
TABLE 13 Main analysis and sensitivity analysis of primary outcome at the 24-month follow-up
Analysis population n
Difference in mean
adherence (%) 95% CI (%) p-value
Main analysis: all participants with ≥ 4 months’ depot dataa 116b –5.7 –13.1 to 1.7 0.130
All participants as above, setting adherence to 100% for those
discharged to GPa
119 –6.2 –13.6 to 1.1 0.097
All participants as above but setting adherence to 0% for
refusersc
124 –6.4 –15.0 – 2.1 0.142
a Simple linear regression model including only a fixed effect for intervention versus control. Clustering by team ignorable
as the ICC was –0.05.
b Sixty-six patients from 37 intervention group teams and 50 patients from 36 control group teams.
c Linear mixed-effects model including only a fixed effect for intervention versus control. This model-based ICC
was < 0.001.
TABLE 14 Numbers (%) of participants with at least one record of arrest, violent act or suicide attempt during the
24-month follow-up
Untoward incidents
Intervention (N= 75) Control (N= 58)
n % n %
Arrested 14 19 10 17
Violent act 11 15 7 12
Suicide attempt 5 7 3 5
TABLE 15 Numbers (%) of participants with at least one psychiatric admission during the 24-month follow-up
Intervention (N= 77) Control (N= 60)
n % n %
Psychiatric admission 24 31 10 17
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TABLE 16 Resource use between groups over the 12-month intervention period
Resource item
Intervention
(n= 78)
Control
(n= 59)
Raw difference (95% CI)Mean SE Mean SE
Mental health inpatient service use
Mental health inpatient admissions 0.37 0.10 0.4 0.11 –0.03 (–0.33 to 0.26)
Mental health outpatient attendances (including A&E and
day services)
0.29 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.18 (–0.11 to 0.47)
Mental health inpatient bed-days 8.49 2.63 9.98 4.14 –1.49 (–10.76 to 7.77)
General hospital inpatient service use
General hospital inpatient admissions 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 (–0.04 to 0.08)
General hospital outpatient attendances (including A&E) 0.47 0.29 0.18 0.06 0.29 (–0.4 to 0.98)
General hospital inpatient bed-days 0.47 0.42 0.02 0.02 0.46 (–0.51 to 1.42)
Community health services
Service settings, mental health professionals
Mental health nurse/community psychiatric nurse 16.23 1.58 11.33 1.64 5.21 (0.96 to 9.47)a
Occupational therapist 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.11 –0.23 (–1.2 to 0.74)
Psychiatrist 1.58 0.26 0.61 0.19 –0.2 (–1.05 to 0.64)
Social worker 1.3 0.84 2.49 0.86 0.93 (–1.02 to 2.89)
Mental health support worker 1.84 0.91 1.69 0.99 0.93 (–1.34 to 3.2)
Psychologist 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.02 –0.12 (–0.8 to 0.57)
Family support worker 0 0 0.04 0.03 0
Vocational worker 0 0 0 0 –0.04 (–0.1 to 0.03)
Substance abuse worker 0.49 0.20 0 0 0.43 (–0.04 to 0.91)
All contacts in service settings 21.96 2.46 16.16 2.36 7.03 (0.41 to 13.65)a
Community settings, mental health professionals
Mental health nurse/community psychiatric nurse 11.01 1.46 0.15 0.11 –0.32 (–4.68 to 4.04)
Occupational therapist 0.5 0.24 0.61 0.19 0.35 (–0.24 to 0.95)
Psychiatrist 0.58 0.16 2.49 0.86 –0.03 (–0.51 to 0.46)
Social worker 2.05 0.88 1.69 0.99 –0.44 (–2.94 to 2.06)
Mental health support worker 3.58 1.2 0.02 0.02 1.89 (–1.34 to 5.12)
Psychologist 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0 (–0.05 to 0.04)
Family support worker 0 0 0 0 –0.04 (–0.08 to 0.01)
Vocational worker 0 0 0 0 0
Substance abuse worker 0.11 0.08 16.16 2.36 0.11 (–0.07 to 0.28)
All contacts in community settings 17.85 2.72 11.33 1.64 1.69 (–5.69 to 9.07)
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TABLE 16 Resource use between groups over the 12-month intervention period (continued )
Resource item
Intervention
(n= 78)
Control
(n= 59)
Raw difference (95% CI)Mean SE Mean SE
Contacts with CMHT and AOT in any setting
CMHT contactsb 35.11 2.86 26.9 4.10 8.21 (–1.42 to 17.84)
AOT contactsc 50.3 6.74 40.53 5.85 9.77 (–8.68 to 28.22)
Primary care
GP (home) 0.03 0.02 0 0 0.03 (–0.02 to 0.07)
GP (surgery) 2.14 2.03 0.4 0.20 1.74 (–2.93 to 6.4)
Counsellor (service setting) 0 0 0.07 0.05 –0.07 (–0.16 to 0.01)
Counsellor (community setting) 0 0 0 0 0
A&E, accident and emergency.
a p< 0.05 on a t-test.
b Mean contacts, of participants seen by CMHT staff (available cases: 40 control, 54 intervention).
c Mean contacts, of participants seen by AOT staff (available cases: 17 control, 20 intervention).
Source: adapted from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0 licence), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
TABLE 17 Number of DNAs for community mental health services at end of intervention, all settings
Resource item
Intervention
(n= 78)
Control
(n= 59)
Raw difference (95% CI)Mean SE Mean SE
Mental health nurse/community psychiatric nurse 1.86 0.4 3.23 0.52 –1.36 (–2.65 to 0.08)a
Occupational therapist 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13 –0.06 (–0.33 to 0.21)
Psychiatrist 0.22 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.09 (–0.11 to 0.29)
Social worker 0.22 0.15 0.73 0.44 –0.51 (–1.34 to 0.32)
Mental health support worker 0.69 0.47 0.11 0.06 0.58 (–0.51 to 1.67)
Psychologist 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.01 (–0.2 to 0.21)
Family support worker 0 0 0 0 0
Vocational worker 0 0 0 0 0
Substance abuse worker 0.03 0.03 0 0 0.03 (–0.04 to 0.09)
a p < 0.05 on t-test.
Source: adapted from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0 licence), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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wards, patients in the intervention group had shorter stays on average than patients in the control group
(27 days for 16 participants vs. 30.4 days for 14 participants), a difference of 3.4 days (95% CI –30.7 to
23.8 days). However, none of these differences was statistically significant.
The majority of patients were treated by CMHTs over the study period (40 control and 54 intervention
participants were seen by 26 and 24 teams, respectively); a smaller number were under the care of AOTs
(9 and 13 teams seeing 17 control and 20 intervention participants, respectively). Intervention patients had
significantly more contacts than control patients with community mental health nurses in service settings
(5.2 more contacts, 95% CI 0.96 to 9.5 more contacts; p = 0.02). This finding appears consistent with the
significantly greater number of LAI medications received by intervention participants over the period [20.2
intervention vs. 14.9 control, a difference of 5.2 (95% CI 2.8 to 7.6; p < 0.001)]. DNAs associated with
community mental health nurses in any setting were also fewer in the intervention group [1.9 intervention
vs. 3.2 control (difference: –1.4, 95% CI –2.6 to –0.1; p = 0.04)].
Most patients received relatively low-cost medication throughout the intervention period, although a
substantial minority in both groups received risperidone (Risperdal Consta®, Janssen) LAI medication. The
proportions within drug category did not generally differ substantially by group; however, somewhat larger
proportions of intervention than control patients received flupenthixol (Depixol, Lundbeck) LAI medication
on a 2-week treatment cycle in the intervention periods (21.2% vs. 12.3%, respectively). A larger
proportion of control patients than intervention patients received LAI medication on a 4-week treatment
cycle [18/56 (32%) vs. 13/75 (17%), respectively]. A summary of the LAI medication, treatment cycles and
costs of each medication can be found in Table 18.
Community mental health service costs were significantly higher in the intervention than in the control group.
The median number of financial incentives given over the study period was 21 (mean 20.2, interquartile
range 8); the average cost of the incentive itself was £303 (SE £12). Total costs of intervention patients,
including the cost of providing the financial incentive, were somewhat higher than those of control patients
(£9350 vs. £8651), a difference of £699 (95% CI –£3535 to £4932). Community mental health services
made up almost half (48%), hospital costs more than one-third (37%) and medication costs 12% of the total
costs across the follow-up sample for which data were available for all cost categories. The average cost of
the incentive itself made up only a small proportion (2%) of total intervention group costs. A summary of
total costs between groups including costs from the sensitivity analyses can be found in Table 19.
From the multilevel multivariate regressions, there was an adherence difference of 12.2% (95% CI 4.6% to
19.8%). The proportion of participants achieving adherence of at least 95% over the treatment period was
26.5% (95% CI 11.7% to 41.2%) higher in the intervention group than in the control group. The adjusted
cost difference between groups was £598 (95% CI –£4533 to £5730; p = 0.818) on the continuous
adherence outcome and £780 (95% CI –£4419 to £5979; p = 0.767) on the binary adherence outcome.
The ICER, or incremental cost for an increase in adherence to LAI medication of 20%, was £982 (95% CI
–£8020 to £14,000), and the probability that the incentive treatment was cost-effective on this measure
exceeded 97.5% at willingness-to-pay values over £14,000 (the upper confidence limit for the ICER).69
The incremental cost of achieving good adherence was £2950 and the probability of cost-effectiveness
was over 97.5% at willingness-to-pay values for this outcome over £27,800.
In terms of data available for the analyses of the relationship of costs and the outcomes of clinical
improvement and subjective quality of life (see Table 19), data were missing in a number of cases (18% of
the control group and 19% of the intervention group for clinical improvement; 39% of the control group
and 21% of the intervention group for subjective quality of life). Quality-of-life scores indicated slightly
higher satisfaction in the intervention group (a difference of 0.698; p = 0.003). The proportion of patients
who clinically improved was higher in the intervention group, although this did not reach statistical
significance (a difference of 12.5%; p = 0.320). ICERs were not calculated because of the level of missing
data, which affected costs to the extent of reversing the direction of difference between groups.
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TABLE 18 Numbers of participants receiving LAI medication and average costs of injections, by British National
Formulary71 chemical name and treatment cycle at the end of the intervention
Patients’ LAI
medication
treatment
cycle
British National
Formulary
chemical name
Intervention group
(N= 75) Control group (N= 56) Total
n %
Average cost
of an LAI
medication
per cycle (£) n %
Average cost
of an LAI
medication
per cycle (£) n %
Average cost
of an LAI
medication
per cycle (£)
1 Flupentixol
decanoate
2 2.4 5.12 2 3.1 2.58 4 2.7 3.85
1 Pipotiazine
palmitate
1 1.2 26.65 0 0 – 1 0.7 26.55
1 Zuclopenthixol
decanoate
1 1.2 5.78 1 1.5 3.77 2 1.3 4.77
2 Flupentixol
decanoate
18 21.2 8.37 8 12.3 4.69 26 17.3 7.23
2 Fluphenazine
decanoate
5 5.9 31.00 2 3.1 3.31 7 4.7 23.09
2 Haloperidol
decanoate
1 1.2 8.88 1 1.5 5.59 2 1.3 7.24
2 Missing medication
name
1 1.2 58.98 1 1.5 58.98 2 1.3 58.98
2 Paliperidone 0 0 – 2 3.1 307.94 2 1.3 307.94
2 Pipotiazine
palmitate
2 2.4 34.79 3 4.6 39.65 5 3.3 37.71
2 Risperidone 22 25.9 112.54 12 18.5 134.55 34 22.7 120.31
2 Zuclopenthixol
acetate
1 1.2 23.93 0 0 – 1 0.7 23.93
2 Zuclopenthixol
decanoate
8 9.4 5.52 9 13.8 4.11 17 11.3 4.77
3 Flupentixol
decanoate
3 3.5 5.66 0 0 – 3 2.0 5.66
3 Missing medication
name
2 2.3 20.48 0 0 – 2 1.3 20.48
3 Pipotiazine
palmitate
2 2.4 26.65 3 4.6 42.94 5 3.3 36.42
3 Zuclopenthixol
decanoate
1 1.2 5.78 2 3.1 4.77 3 2.0 5.11
4 Flupentixol
decanoate
4 4.7 9.76 4 6.2 6.05 8 5.3 7.91
4 Fluphenazine
decanoate
2 2.4 9.20 3 4.5 13.61 5 3.3 11.84
4 Haloperidol 0 0 – 1 1.5 3.18 1 0.7 3.18
4 Haloperidol
decanoate
0 0 – 1 1.5 17.76 1 0.7 17.76
4 Paliperidone 0 0 – 1 1.5 367.85 1 0.7 367.85
4 Pipotiazine
palmitate
7 8.2 32.91 5 7.7 36.72 12 8.0 34.50
4 Zuclopenthixol
decanoate
2 2.3 2.17 4 6.2 4.95 6 4.0 4.02
Source: adapted from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0 licence), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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TABLE 19 Total costs 12 months prior to baseline and at the end of the intervention for patients with at least
4 months’ adherence data
Cost category
Intervention Control
Raw mean difference
(95% CI)n Mean (SE) n Mean (SE)
Baseline (N = 78) (N = 60)
Total mental health hospital costs 78 3342 (1173) 60 4048 (1686) –706 (–4648 to 3236)
Total general hospital costs 78 262 (207) 60 252 (219) 10 (–592 to 611)
Total primary care costs 75 47 (36) 57 8 (3) 39 (–43 to 121)
Total community mental health care
costs
78 5041 (443) 59 3644 (375) 1397 (201 to 2594)a
Total LAI medication costs 72 714 (108) 55 861 (174) –147 (–535 to 241)
Total oral medication costs 76 479 (149) 56 313 (129) 166 (–242 to 574)
Total costsb 72 8058 (1024) 54 9274 (1993) –1217 (–5355 to 2921)
Total costs, including cost of DNA
contacts
72 10,088 (1059) 54 10,511 (2004) –423 (–4622 to 3777)
End of intervention (N = 78) (N = 59)
Total mental health hospital costs 78 3407 (1101) 59 5105 (1787) –1698 (–5661 to 2266)
Total general hospital costs 76 254 (181) 57 27 (13) 227 (–188 to 642)
Total primary care costs 74 48 (43) 57 14 (6) 34 (–63 to 130)
Total community mental health care
costs
74 4964 (353) 57 3859 (426) 1105 (17 to 2192)a
Total LAI medication costs 75 787 (132) 56 759 (188) 28 (–413 to 470)
Total oral medication costs 76 364 (76) 57 216 (68) 149 (–61 to 358)
Total costs including financial
incentive costsb
71 9350 (1189) 54 8651 (1890) 699 (–3535 to 4932)
Financial incentives intervention costs 75 303 (12) 56 0 303 (277 to 329)c
Total costs excluding financial
incentive costs
71 9043 (1189) 54 8651 (1890) 392 (–3842 to 4625)
Total costs excluding oral medications
and financial incentives
71 8721 (1191) 54 8476 (1855) 245 (–3944 to 4433)
Total costs excluding medications and
financial incentives
74 8680 (1324) 57 9050 (2030) –370 (–4987 to 4248)
Sensitivity analyses
Total including DNA contact costs 71 10,162 (1221) 54 9610 (1881) 552 (–3715 to 4819)
Total, varying unit cost of contacts
with CMHT/AOT
at 25% 71 5991 (1098) 54 6118 (1769) –127 (–4069 to 3814)
at 50% 71 7381 (1131) 54 7282 (1801) 99 (–3931 to 4129)
at 150% 71 12,943 (1337) 54 11,938 (1982) 1005 (–3567 to 5576)
a p< 0.05 on t-test.
b Costs of participants for whom both community mental health service data and depot medication data were available.
c p< 0.001 on t-test.
Source: adapted from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0 licence), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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The results of the cost-effectiveness and sensitivity analyses can be found in Table 20 and the
cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for both adherence outcomes can be found in Figures 5 and 6.
Six-month follow-up
Resource use over the 6-month follow-up (in cases where data were also available at baseline) is shown
in Table 21.
There were few differences in resource use between groups in the 6 months after the end of the
intervention. The mean number of visits from community psychiatric nurses in service settings were
marginally higher in the intervention group (6.5 visits) than the control group (6.0 visits) (95% CI –1.6
to 2.6 visits), and in community settings (intervention 6.3 visits, control 6 visits, 95% CI –2.9 to 3.6 visits).
The number of visits from mental health support workers in both community and service settings and the
number of DNA appointments for community psychiatric nurses and psychiatrists were somewhat lower in
the intervention group. While the number of inpatient admissions between groups did not differ
significantly, the mean number of days spent in psychiatric hospital care was somewhat higher in the
intervention group (3.7 days) than the control group (0.6 days) (95% CI –0.4 to 6.5 days).
TABLE 20 Results of the cost-effectiveness analyses: costs and outcomes
Costs and outcomes
Intervention (n= 68) Control (n= 49)
Difference (95% CI) or ICERaMean SE Mean SE
Costs prior to baseline (£) (raw) 7780 976 9755 2184 –1974 (–6292 to 2344)
Costs over intervention period (£) (raw) 9212 1234 9309 2061 –97 (–4600 to 4406)
Achieving 20% adherence
Proportion adherent (raw) 85.8 14.3 71.6 21.7 14.2 (7.6 to 20.8)b
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 85.6 2.9 73.4 3 12.2 (4.6 to 19.8)c
Costs over study period (£) (adjusted) 9681 1740 9083 1931 598 (–4533 to 5730)
ICER (£) (20% increase adherence) 982 (–8020 to 14 000)d
Achieving at least 95% adherence
Adherence ≥ 95% (raw) 29.4 45.9 6.1 24.2 23.3 (9 to 37.5)c
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 31.3 10.3 4.9 10.9 26.5 (11.7 to 41.2)b
Costs over study period (£) (adjusted) 9724 1766 8944 1954 780 (–4419 to 5979)
ICER (£) (achievement ‘good’ adherence) 2950 (–19,400 to 27,800)d
Sensitivity
Including costs of DNAs
Costs over study period (£) (raw) 10,290 1288 10,410 2052 –120 (–4694 to 4454)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 85.6 2.9 73.4 2.9 12.2 (4.7 to 19.8)c
Costs over study period (£) (adjusted) 10,486 1755 9755 2184 432 (–4747 to 5611)
ICER (£) (20% increase adherence) 9309
Unit costs: at 25% of estimate
Costs over study period (£) (raw) 6271 1169 71.6 21.7 –559 (–4803 to 3686)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 85.7 2.9 73.4 3 12.4 (4.8 to 20)c
Costs over study period (£) (adjusted) 6480 1577 9083 1931 90 (–4593 to 4774)
ICER (£) (20% increase adherence) 706 (–8300 to 13,540)
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TABLE 20 Results of the cost-effectiveness analyses: costs and outcomes (continued )
Costs and outcomes
Intervention (n= 68) Control (n= 49)
Difference (95% CI) or ICERaMean SE Mean SE
Unit costs: at 50% of estimate
Costs over study period (£) (raw) 8023 1968 7611 1202 –412 (–4748 to 3923)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.3 2.9 85.7 2.8 12.3 (4.8 to 19.9)c
Costs over study period (£) (adjusted) 7369 1833 7663 1635 294 (–4555 to 5144)
ICER (£) (20% increase adherence) 476 (–7900 to 12,120)
Unit costs: at 150% of estimate
Costs over study period (£) (raw) 12,797 2158 12,970 1398 172 (–4705 to 5050)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.5 3 85.6 2.9 12.1 (4.5 to 19.7)c
Costs over study period (£) (adjusted) 11,325 2075 12,397 1874 1072 (–4448 to 6592)
ICER (£) (20% increase adherence) 8023 1968 1770 (–7880 to 16,380)
a ICER rounded to nearest 10.
b p< 0.001.
c p< 0.01.
d The negative lower limit of the ICER CI indicates dominance (the intervention is less costly and more effective).
Source: adapted from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0 licence), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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FIGURE 6 Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve and willingness-to-pay values to achieve at least 95% adherence.
Source: reproduced from Henderson and colleagues49 © 2015 Henderson et al. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0 licence), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are
credited. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
TABLE 21 Resource use over the 6 months after the end of the intervention
Resource item
Control (n= 43) Intervention (n= 60)
Raw difference (95% CI)Mean SE Mean SE
Mental health inpatient service use
Mental health inpatient admissions 0.14 0.08 0.31 0.09 0.17 (–0.08 to 0.43)
Mental health outpatient attendances
(including A&E, day services)
0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.03 (–0.13 to 0.19)
Mental health inpatient bed-days 0.63 0.50 3.67 1.40 3.04 (–0.36 to 6.45)
General hospital inpatient service use
General hospital inpatient admissions 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 (–0.02 to 0.09)
General hospital outpatient attendances
(including A&E)
0.02 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.16 (–0.03 to 0.34)
General hospital inpatient bed-days 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.13 (–0.14 to 0.4)
Community health services
Service settings, mental health workers
Mental health nurse/community psychiatric nurse 6.02 0.76 6.49 0.71 0.47 (–1.63 to 2.57)
Occupational therapist 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.05 (–0.02 to 0.12)
Psychiatrist 1.12 0.29 0.98 0.15 –0.13 (–0.74 to 0.47)
Social worker 0.77 0.26 0.46 0.25 –0.31 (–1.05 to 0.43)
Mental health support worker 1.19 0.80 0.54 0.41 –0.65 (–2.29 to 1)
Psychologist 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 (–0.04 to 0.11)
Family support worker 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE 21 Resource use over the 6 months after the end of the intervention (continued )
Resource item
Control (n= 43) Intervention (n= 60)
Raw difference (95% CI)Mean SE Mean SE
Vocational worker 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Substance abuse worker 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 (–0.04 to 0.11)
All contacts in service settings 9.09 1.27 8.59 1.04 –0.50 (–3.74 to 2.73)
Community settings, mental health workers
Mental health nurse/community psychiatric nurse 5.95 1.25 6.33 1.07 0.37 (–2.9 to 3.65)
Occupational therapist 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.09 (–0.11 to 0.3)
Psychiatrist 0.33 0.13 0.43 0.13 0.1 (–0.27 to 0.47)
Social worker 1.95 0.85 1.43 0.58 –0.53 (–2.5 to 1.44)
Mental health support worker 2.37 1.72 1.33 0.53 –1.04 (–4.17 to 2.08)
Psychologist 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 (–0.04 to 0.11)
Family support worker 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vocational worker 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Substance abuse worker 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 (–0.04 to 0.11)
All contacts in community settings 10.63 2.70 9.69 1.93 –0.94 (–7.35 to 5.47)
CMHT and AOT contacts in any setting
CMHT contactsa 16.47 3.23 13.38 1.40 –3.09 (–9.27 to 3.09)
AOT contactsb 27.23 5.30 36.08 6.80 8.85 (–8.95 to 26.64)
Primary care
GP (home) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 –0.02 (–0.06 to 0.02)
GP (surgery) 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.08 (–0.18 to 0.33)
Counsellor (service setting) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Counsellor (community setting) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medications
Number of depot medications taken 9.40 0.54 9.35 0.51 –0.05 (–1.55 to 1.44)
Number of oral medicationsc 0.83 0.18 0.85 0.15 0.02 (–0.45 to 0.49)
A&E, accident and emergency.
a Mean contacts, of participants seen by CMHT staff (available cases: 30 control, 48 intervention).
b Mean contacts, of participants seen by AOT staff (available cases: 13 control, 13 intervention).
c Assumed 6 months’ duration.
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Patient experiences of financial incentives
Recruitment
Out of the potential 78 participants, 26 patients consented to be interviewed at the end of the
intervention and 32 patients consented to be interviewed at the 24-month follow-up, with 11 patients
interviewed at both time points. At the end of the intervention, reasons for not participating included
ineligibility (n = 23), not being contacted as sample size had been reached (n = 14), deceased (n = 1), not
being contactable (n = 7) or refused to take part (n = 7). Out of the 26 participants who consented to be
interviewed, one refused to be interviewed with a recording device and was therefore not included
in analysis.
Reasons for not participating in an interview at the 24-month follow-up included ineligibility (n = 8), the
sample size had been reached (n = 12), refused to participate (n = 8), having deceased (n = 4), not being
contactable (n = 10) and failing to attend an arranged interview (n = 4). Of the 32 patients interviewed, one
patient was interviewed despite having received no incentives and was removed from the final analysis.
Patient characteristics
Patient characteristics for 45 patients whose interviews were analysed are reported in Table 22. Twenty-one
interviews were carried out on the premises of mental health teams and four in patients’ homes at the
end of the intervention, and 25 interviews took place on the premises of clinical teams and six were
interviewed in patients’ own homes at the 24-month follow-up. On average, patients were interviewed
5 weeks (between 1 and 12 weeks) and 27 months (between 19 and 40 months) after the end of
intervention and at the 24-month follow-up, respectively.
TABLE 22 Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of patients who completed qualitative interviews
Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics Mean (%)
Sex
Female 12 (27)
Male 33 (73)
Age
Years 46.5 (range 23–69)
Ethnicity
White British 26 (58)
Turkish British 2 (5)
Black British 2 (5)
White other 4 (8)
Black other 8 (18)
Asian 3 (6)
Clinical diagnosis
Schizophrenia 33 (73)
Bipolar disorder 7 (16)
Schizoaffective disorder 5 (11)
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Results
The analysis identified five general themes: ‘structuring the day of the appointment’, ‘relationship with
clinicians’, ‘extra expenditure’, ‘personal dilemmas’ and ‘impact once incentives had stopped’. The themes
were similar at the two time points, and those patients who were interviewed twice expressed consistent
views at both time points.
Structuring the day of the appointment
The most prominent theme concerned the structure of the day of the appointment, and how it impacted
on LAI medication adherence. Patients mentioned the difficulty in establishing a daily structure (such as
general forgetting, not being bothered or boredom) before being offered financial incentives. Patients
reported being more motivated to complete basic daily tasks as a result of the intervention and,
consequently, becoming more active and organised on the days of the appointment.
Participant: It wasn’t so much ain’t liking having it, it was remembering to have it all the time.
Patient 147, male
Participant: Yeah I really enjoy it [incentive]. It gives me some sort of structure (. . .) I need some sort of
structure for my day time so I don’t just lie in bed.
Patient 343, male
Participant: I used to be bored like but it got me up. I realise that it’s important to get my injection.
Now I’ve realised that.
Patient 211, male
A number of patients talked about having developed a routine structure around attending their
appointments. Some hoped that this would be sustained once financial incentives have been discontinued,
while others were less optimistic.
Participant: I fell into a routine of going for my injection even though it wasn’t about the money at
the end.
Patient 127, female
Participant: I can’t say that I’m going to be 100% sure that I’m going to remember to come here
on time.
Patient 147, male
Relationship with clinicians
Some patients stated that before the study they had felt apathetic in regards to their LAI medication
treatment. They were often lonely, and relationships with their clinician had been poor. This led to feelings
of being disrespected and devalued. Patients reported that financial incentives improved the relationship in
two ways. First, receiving £15 from the clinician was perceived as a sign of being valued. Second, the
higher frequency of attended appointments nurtured a better relationship and mutual feelings of trust.
Participant: Well Monday’s not alright because I’ve already got plans for that Monday you know so it
all seems to be on their terms and not anyone else’s.
Patient 127, female
Participant: I was lonely and I just thought I’m not going to have it, it doesn’t matter ‘cos I’m just
sitting in my room.
Patient 342, female
Interviewer: And about receiving the money, how did you see it?
RESULTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
50
Participant: Oh yeah, yeah. I saw it as being rewarded sort of for coming on time and being respected
for coming on time. I found it rewarding.
Patient 147, male
Participant: She can rely on me (. . .) She’ll know that I’ll come for it and that – she doesn’t have to
chase me like before.
Patient 342, female
Finally, two further aspects of improved relationships were reported, that is feeling happier in themselves,
or having a greater sense of worth which facilitated contacts with others, and the more frequent
opportunities for meeting with other people. These included clinicians and other patients at the
community teams, but also other casual social contacts during travelling to and from the appointments or
going for a cake and coffee afterwards.
Participant: It helps out, you know, it makes you more confident, just more relaxed. You know you go
and get your injection on time.
Patient 338, male
Participant: It’s a bit like a social event now coming here whereas before it was like oh I’ve got to go
for my depot. Now I actually enjoy coming and you meet people who come for their depot and you
talk to them.
Patient 126, male
Participant: But I don’t mind, it gets me out of the house to go there [clinic], a bit of therapy, to go
out, to get used to going out.
Patient 322, male
However, this change did not apply to all participants. Some stated their relationships with clinicians had
always been good and others expressed that the relationship remained as poor as before. Other patients
did not recall any relationship with an individual clinician, and subsequently did not experience
any change.
Participant: Yeah he’s a friend as well as a nurse, which is good. (. . .) He’s not just there to do his job
and leave me alone. He kind of acknowledges me after the injection as well.
Interviewer: And has that always been the case? Have you always got on well with him?
Participant: Yeah always got on well with [community psychiatric nurse name]. Always.
Patient 126, male
Interviewer: And you said that the relationship that you have with the [hospital’s name] and your
[community psychiatric nurse name] is not terribly good.
Participant: No I don’t think it is.
Interviewer: OK. Has it always been like that?
Participant: Yeah it’s always been like that.
Patient 127, female
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Extra expenditure
Patients described the incentives as a reward since it meant an extra expenditure, beyond what they would
otherwise have been able to afford. They reported to have used the money for practical daily needs (e.g.
paying for bills or buying lunches for their children) and for small treats. A minority, however, said that
they had spent the money on alcohol or gambling.
Participant: The money meant sugar in my tea, money to buy something, money meant a lot because
on a Monday I am skint really. It might be a little but it’s a lot to somebody like me and somebody on
benefits. It’s a lot.
Patient 149, male
Participant: That’s my bit of money for myself. So I keep that little bit of money for myself.
Patient 144, male
Participant: Oh I spent it on self-medicating myself. Drink. (. . .) When I drink it makes me calm.
Patient 120, male
Personal dilemmas
Some patients stated personal dilemmas about their decision to accept the incentives. These dilemmas
included a feeling of unease or guilt for being paid for doing something for one’s own health, being
negatively judged by the clinicians for accepting the incentives or feeling obliged or forced into taking their
medication despite their dislike for it or belief that their medication was not helpful. Some patients said
that the practice was unfair to those who adhered to their medication but were not offered any incentives.
Some suggested that the incentives should be given to all patients, whereas others preferred that the
incentives should be offered only to specific groups of patients.
Participant: It did make me feel uncomfortable yeah, yeah (. . .) like I was bribing people or that I was
getting something that I shouldn’t be getting but I still took it. Yeah but I did feel uncomfortable yeah
especially when it was in a brown envelope and you have to sign for it.
Patient 116, female
Participant: I thought that it’s grateful of them but the man who gave out the injection he said he
didn’t agree with this money and see no point in it, but . . .
Interviewer: What did you think of that?
Participant: I didn’t say anything to him.
Patient 150, female
Participant: I mean it seemed like a joke to be paid to have medication when it shouldn’t be a problem
like that. That shouldn’t be the issue.
Patient 154, female
Participant: I think you should just take the medication, if you’re getting the money or not, take the
medication, you shouldn’t have money persuading you to take it.
Patient 343, male
Participant: I felt it would be unfair (. . .) if he is on a depot and I say well I have been chosen to get
£15 every time I have my depot. How would you feel? You would feel like a mug.
Patient 149, male
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Impact once the incentives stopped
In the FIAT trial, financial incentives were offered to patients for a 12-month period. To our knowledge, no
team continued with the practice after the 12-month period. Most patients stated that the discontinuation
of incentives had no real impact on their lives, and that they quickly adapted to the fact the incentives had
been stopped. Some patients reported that they had known all along that the money would be available
for only a 12-month period and were therefore prepared for it. However, some disappointment, missing
the money or financial problems were also reported. Finally, some patients said their improved LAI
medication adherence was sustained after incentives have ended, while others felt they were less
motivated and their adherence was deteriorating as a result.
Participant: Because maybe £15 comes in handy but if you don’t get it you don’t get it so get on with
your life.
Patient 356, female
Participant: Because I knew the £15 I was able to get food because I don’t get a lot of money (. . .) But
now since I don’t have it I’m eating less and I’m getting skinnier and I’m getting more ill.
Patient 341, male
Participant: It’s better for me to take medication and it’s not because I want the money. It’s because
for me to get well and the money I was getting.
Patient 105, male
Participant: But now I haven’t got the incentive to have it so I don’t have it anymore. I haven’t had it
for 3 months now.
Patient 101, male
Clinicians’ experiences of financial incentives
Clinician interviews at 6 months and 12 months of the intervention
Fifty-nine clinicians were interviewed with regards to the effect of the incentives on 73 of the 78 patients
allocated to receive incentives during the FIAT trial. Twenty clinicians were interviewed about more than
one patient – and for 19 patients, a different clinician was interviewed at each timepoint. The number of
clinicians interviewed and the number of patients for whom interviews were obtained at each time point
are presented in Table 23.
TABLE 23 Total number of clinician interviews at each timepoint
Clinicians Patients
N of Team
Managers
Interviewed
N of Care-
coordinators
interviewed
N of Community
Psychiatric Nurses
interviewed
Total N of
interviews
N for whom a
clinician interview
was obtained
Mid-Point (6 months) 4 26 16 46 73
End-Point (12 months) 3 27 16 46 68
Source: reproduced from Highton-Williamson and colleagues50 under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 3.0.
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What did clinicians report about how patients spent the money?
The most common ways in which clinicians reported patients spending the money were on food
(n= 24 patients), alcohol (n= 21), illicit drugs (n= 17), household goods (n= 11), hobbies (n= 10) and
tobacco (n= 10).
Did clinicians report patients asking for more money or more frequent depot
injections?
Clinicians reported 6 patients across 5 teams having asked for the incentive to be increased above £15,
but clinicians said this was resolved quickly and did not cause problems for the remainder of the trial.
Six patients were reported to have asked to receive their depot more frequently; an additional 12 patients
were reported to have requested to have their depot days in advance of the due date, or to have turned
up for it a few days early. Clinicians stated that when these requests (sometimes delivered in a ‘joking’
manner) were refused there were no implications for the patient’s treatment.
Did clinicians report other patients in the team asking to receive payment for
depot injections – or becoming non-adherent to their medication in order
to qualify?
Twenty-two patients not in the trial across 10 teams were reported as asking to be paid for their depot
and/or asking why they were not being paid. Two patients were reported to have missed their depot as a
consequence, whilst another patient was reported to have threatened not to take his depot. These
problems were reported as being short-lived and rapidly resolved.
How did clinicians experience the effect of financial incentives on their
patient’s interaction with the team?
The clinicians of 65 patients reported qualitative information on how incentives had positively or negatively
influenced the interaction with the team. Clinicians for the remaining 8 patients reported no effect of
the incentives on patients’ interaction with the team.
Positive effects on clinical management and relationships
Positive effects on clinical management
For 53 patients, clinicians reported that the financial incentives had led to improvements in their ability to
effectively manage their patient’s care. The most obvious benefit, reported in the case of 47 patients,
was that their attendance of depot appointments improved:
The patient has become compliant and turns up for their medication religiously
Patient 1, clinician 1
It made a lot of difference to this patient - he is wavering and the only thing keeping him on depot is
the money
Patient 2, clinician 2
Twelve patients were reported as making extra efforts to ensure they received the depot on time
(and hence received the incentive):
He will call up to speak to the team and check his depot due date when before involvement in the
study he would never use a phone.
Patient 11, clinician 3
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The clinicians of 32 patients reported that the incentives had had knock-on effects in terms of other
aspects of clinical management. These benefits included allowing the clinicians to spend less time chasing
the patient (7 patients), increased contact facilitating monitoring of the patient’s health (17 patients),
increased engagement with the team (16 patients), and increased attendance of other meetings such as
with the psychiatrist, drug and alcohol services, or CPA reviews (10 patients):
The incentives have made it easier for me to know where he is – I used to have to chase and he
wouldn’t answer his phone . . . The financial incentive ensured the client would be there for
his appointment.
Patient 4, clinician 5
Care coordinators need to have contact to be aware of issues with the client. The financial incentive
eased this process as the client was forthcoming for their depot, therefore we were having face to
face contact regularly.
Patient 5, clinician 6
. . . Since the study and during it he has been happily involved with the service, whereas his
involvement fluctuated before
Patient 6, clinician 7
He is a lot more proactive about coming to the centre and engaging with the team than he used to
be . . . he has agreed to see a psychiatrist for the first time in a couple of years
Patient 8, clinician 9
He is engaging well with the substance misuse team
Patient 9, clinician 10
Positive effects on relationships
For 21 patients, clinicians linked the incentive to improvements in their relationships with their patients.
These improvements included increased trust and communication:
Before the start of this trial, the patient was very suspicious of the team and very guarded. This has
dramatically changed since being involved in the study. The patient has come to trust the team more
Patient 10, clinician 3
Some clinicians linked the improved relationship to the increased contact which the incentive
had generated:
The involvement in the study has given the team more access to patient. He engages a lot more with
the team and the relationship has built up hugely
Patient 11, clinician 3
Others linked this to the positive effect of depot medication on the patient’s presentation:
He is very pleasant to work with because he is taking his regular depot – I have more positive contact
with him. He is friendlier, more appropriate and there is less non-crisis contact than there had been
before . . .
Patient 12, clinician 11
. . . I think the relationship would have grown anyway as the level of trust increased, however the
incentive may have helped with this development as it meant that the client was getting the depot on
a regular basis and his symptoms subsided, which allowed our relationship to be given a chance
Patient 4, clinician 5
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Some emphasised that the improvement in their relationship made clinical management easier by
facilitating constructive communication with the client:
The patient comes to the CMHT more often – before I couldn’t talk to her, but now I get to talk more
with her about her plans for the future.
Patient 14, clinician 12
The linking with other services has increased. For example, the patient now asks for the team to be
present when meeting his probation officer and lets the team know more about what is going on with
the other services the patient is involved with.
Patient 10, clinician 3
Negative effects on clinical management and relationships
The clinicians of 19 patients reported negative effects of the incentives on the patient’s interaction with
the team.
Negative effects on clinical management
The clinicians of 5 patients reported negative effects on their ability to manage their patient’s care. In two
cases this was because they find the time and effort involved in providing the incentive was problematic:
I felt a bit of extra pressure – I don’t expect to be the banker. Sometimes I’d go to administer a depot
and forget the money – but because the client expected it, I would have to return with the money,
taking more time out of my day
Patient 16, clinician 14
In another three cases, this was because the patients disengaged with treatment, which the clinicians
attributed to spending the incentive on drugs and alcohol:
The patient has been spending the money – presumably – on drugs and has consequently been
discharged from the CMHT due to lack of engagement
Patient 17, clinician 15
Negative effects on the therapeutic relationship
The clinicians of 17 patients reported a negative effect of incentives on the therapeutic relationship.
The most commonly reported type of negative impact (reported for 10 patients) was a monetarisation of
the relationship:
The patient viewed receiving the depot as his ’pay day’ and there is no longer a rapport between
myself and the patient.
Patient 18, clinician 16
The relationship has become generally more focused on money, not the interaction. I feel he is only
interested in the money, not actually in interacting with staff . . .
Patient 19, clinician 17
In 5 cases, patients were reported to have become aggressive if the money was not delivered promptly:
The patient would get angry if the money wasn’t there and would become slightly threatening if he
did not receive it.
Patient 20, clinician 18
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For one patient management of this aggression required increased staff manpower:
The study used up more man-power as a second person had to come to give the financial incentive to
the patient because of the aggression experienced by the CPN
Patient 21, clinician 19
What direct and indirect effects of financial incentives did clinicians perceive
on patients’ health outcomes?
The clinicians of 42 patients reported qualitative information on how they perceived the effects of financial
incentives on patients’ outcomes. This incorporated health and social outcomes such as symptoms,
wellbeing, social functioning, insight and relationships with friends and family. The clinicians of the
remaining 31 patients did not report any effect.
Positive Effect on Patient Outcomes
A positive effect was reported for 33 patients. This theme was further broken down into 3 sub-themes:
Improved mental well-being; Improved social functioning; Insight.
Improved mental well-being
The clinicians of 15 patients reported that the incentives had had a positive effect on their patient’s
well-being, including an improvement in mental health and reduction in symptoms (11 patients) and a
reduction in drug and alcohol use (3 patients):
His mental health and presentation is better and he is less psychotic
Patient 22, clinician 20
He has been stepped down from CPA because he is doing well
Patient 23, clinician 21
He has had a major illness due to alcohol but has now stopped drinking.
Patient 24, clinician 22
The clinicians of 5 patients specifically linked the improvement in mental health to increased
depot adherence:
He’s a long-term drug user but his depot reduces the psychotic effects of these drugs, and now he is
coming for his depot on time, in the last 6 months we are noticing an improvement in his mental state
Patient 9, clinician 10
. . . The patient now attends regularly for their depot and has had no relapses which has helped
the team
Patient 25, clinician 23
Improved insight
Relatedly, the clinicians of 12 patients reported that their patients had improved insight into their illness
and into the beneficial effects of medication on their mental health:
The patient is gaining more of an insight into his illness and is recognising his symptoms, his dialogue
has improved and he is more involved with his treatment plan. He says he is ’hoping to move forward.
Patient 10, clinician 3
The client has acknowledged his year of stability as a result of taking his medication regularly – he sees
the benefit of the medication and being well is the incentive to take it. The financial incentive has
helped with this but is not the main driver
Patient 6, clinician 7
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Improved social functioning
The clinicians of 16 patients reported a positive effect of the incentives on the patient’s social functioning.
The most common improvements were reported as the regular medication and contact having a stabilising
effect on the patient’s lifestyle and improved family relationships:
He leads a very chaotic life and the money is providing him with more of a routine. He is including the
money in his budget now.
Patient 28, clinician 27
He uses less illicit substances as he was treated better and the team had less contact from the police.
He now has a less chaotic lifestyle… there are less problems with his family and the police.
Patient 29, clinician 28
Being on the study has helped because the regular contact and medication has given him stability and
a sense of satisfaction with his lifestyle, and his relationships are more stable
Patient 6, clinician 7
The patient has a new relationship with a partner and getting more regular medication has helped a
lot. I believe this is due to the FIAT money.
Patient 25, clinician 29
Other reported improvements included a more stable housing situation, finding a job, improved budgeting
ability and improved self-care:
The money motivated him to attend his depot injection . . . His self-care and hygiene has improved
massively . . . He continues to engage well with the home office about immigration and helps out at
the hostel/accommodation in cooking.
Patient 30, clinician 31
He is now working as a waiter and talking about moving out of parents’ home and getting a place
for himself.
Patient 31, clinician 8
Negative Effects on Patient Outcomes
The clinicians of 15 patients reported a negative effect of incentives on patient outcomes. These
experiences all concerned negative effects of the payment itself, and were sub-divided into two sub-themes:
Increased drug and alcohol use, and Other adverse effects of payment.
Increased drug and alcohol use
The clinicians of 8 patients said that the incentive was used to pay for drug or alcohol and therefore led to
patients increasing their substance misuse:
The patient was in hospital twice since I took over. The financial incentive has helped improve our
relationship but has also meant he can spend money on drugs.
Patient 32, clinician 33
The financial incentives have been beneficial with regard to adherence. However, in terms of impact
on his lifestyle, the incentives are not beneficial as this has not improved. There is generally no change
in his lifestyle, just increased substance misuse…. He has increased his alcohol and drug (crack) use . . .
Participant 33, clinician 4
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He already had a lot of money due to DLA and income support so the FIAT money was pocket money
for alcohol . . . he became less cooperative with the depot during the trial due to an increase in the
use of alcohol . . .
Participant 34, clinician 44
He was hospitalised due to an increase in alcohol use. I believe that FIAT was a contributing factor in
his hospitalisation due to the extra cash that he had. However I understand that the patient would
probably have got access to alcohol somehow regardless of the FIAT study
Participant 35, clinician 45
Other adverse effects of payment
Other adverse effects of payment were reported by the clinicians of 8 patients. These included becoming
dependent on the money, becoming secretive about the money, and being vulnerable to being taken
advantage of by others because of the money:
He came every 2 weeks and there was never any need to remind him to appear, in fact the he would
often come one or two hours early. Because of this I believe he is desperate for the money and has
become dependent on it.
Patient 36, clinician 45
The money is hidden from his family and spent on beer . . . He makes a point of hiding it from his wife
. . . However, this has not increased his drinking.
Patient 37, clinician 30
He started getting ‘hangers on’ i.e. people who took advantage of him and started camping out and
drinking in his flat. They turned up when he got his incentive.
Patient 34, clinician 46
Link Between Themes
Clinicians endorsed different combinations of themes for each patient as depicted in Table 24. This shows
that overall, for 77% of patients a positive effect on management and/or outcomes was reported,
whilst for 33% a negative effect on management and/or outcomes was reported. These figures overlap
because for some patients both positive and negative effects were reported.
TABLE 24 Combinations of themes endorsed by clinicians
Effects on patient interaction with the team
Total
Only positive
effect reported
Only negative
effect reported
Both positive
and negative
effects reported
No effect
reported
Effects on patient
health and social
outcomes
Only positive
effect reported, n
23 2 1 1 27
Only negative
effect reported, n
1 5 3 0 9
Both positive and
negative effects
reported, n
4 0 2 0 6
No effect
reported, n
18 5 1 7 31
Total 46 12 7 8 73
Source: reproduced from Highton-Williamson and colleagues50 under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 3.0.
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Clinician interviews at 6 months and 24 months after the end of
the intervention
Fifty-seven clinicians were interviewed for 59 of the 78 patients, with interviews for 25 of the 78 patients
conducted at both time points; however, in some cases the same clinician was not interviewed. The
clinicians for 19 patients were not interviewed because of clinician unavailability or because the clinician
and/or patient had transferred to different teams since the end of the intervention.
Continuation of incentives
No clinicians reported that they continued to use the incentives with patients involved in the trial nor did
they start using the incentives with any new patients within their team. Financial constraints or lack of
funding was the most commonly reported reason for not continuing with the incentives. This was closely
followed by issues with implementation (unaware that they were able to continue or practical issues) and a
small number of clinicians felt that the incentives were not effective and thus saw no rationale behind
continuing them.
Did patients ask for the incentive to be continued?
Fifteen patients were reported to have asked for the incentives to be continued but no major problems
occurred when these requests were denied. Reports for the clinicians of seven patients who were
interviewed at both time points gave different answers between the two time points and data for two
patients were missing. Seven patients were reported to have become intentionally non-adherent to qualify
for being offered the incentives again. Other patients were reported to show their disappointment over
the incentives discontinuing and expressed that they missed the money. Again, reports for the clinicians of
four patients interviewed at both time points differed and for two patients were missing.
Long-term consequences of the incentives being discontinued
Patient outcomes
The clinicians of 28 patients reported that there were no problems once the incentives were discontinued:
adherence and mental health continued to remain stable even after the incentives had stopped. However,
the clinicians of 20 patients reported problems as a result of the incentives stopping. These were largely
concerned with the patient’s adherence fluctuating or refusing medication, and as a result their mental
health deteriorated. In a minority of cases, this led to relapse, rehospitalisation or an increase in drug
and/or alcohol use.
Responses for the clinicians of 10 patients interviewed at both time points differed and for one patient,
a response was missing.
Therapeutic relationship
The majority of clinicians interviewed felt that the incentives stopping had no impact on their relationship
with patients, as was the case for 36 patients; the clinicians continued to remain engaged and maintain
a good relationship with their patients, some felt that communication within the team and with the
patient had improved, and in some cases patients were more proactive about in their efforts to receive
their LAI medication. Nevertheless, around one-third of clinicians interviewed felt that their relationship
with their patients had deteriorated as a result of the incentives stopping, primarily that patients became
disengaged with services/clinicians.
Responses for the clinicians of 11 patients interviewed at both time points differed and a response was
missing for one patient.
Consequences for other patients
The majority of clinicians interviewed reported that no patients outside of the trial asked to be offered the
incentives. However, six clinicians estimated that around 22 patients outside of the trial did ask to receive
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the incentives. In one case, a patient was reported to have been intentionally non-adherent to qualify
to be offered the incentives.
Clinician opinions of financial incentives
Before the intervention
When asked retrospectively, 40 clinicians believed that the use of financial incentives were a good idea,
primarily because they would be an effective method to improve adherence and would help patients in a
number of ways (e.g. financially). A number of clinicians also felt that financial incentives would be a good
idea but that they would be suitable for only certain patients.
Fourteen clinicians believed that prior to the intervention financial incentives were not a good idea, which
was largely a result of ethical concerns or questions over their effectiveness. Some clinicians believed
that financial incentives may be seen as coercive or a form of bribery, and that they would negatively
reinforce good adherence, would negatively impact on the therapeutic relationship or would be used to
fund drug/alcohol habits.
The opinions of three clinicians were missing.
After the intervention
After the intervention, 37 clinicians believed the incentives were a good idea and reported a number of
advantages over their use. These include the incentives being an effective method to improve adherence
and prevent relapse, being less costly than hospitalisation and allowing patients to develop an insight into
the importance of medication. Other clinicians felt that they made clinical management of their patient
easier and created more opportunities to communicate with their patients.
Other clinicians felt that financial incentives were an effective method, but felt that other forms of financial
incentives may be more appropriate as opposed to money itself, for example through the use of vouchers
or by redirecting their state benefits so that their entitlement to benefits was dependent on their
adherence. Some also said that while they agree with using financial incentives these would be suitable
for only certain patients.
Fourteen clinicians believed even after the trial that financial incentives were not a good idea because of
ethical concerns, practical issues and questions over their effectiveness. Ethical concerns included questions
over whether or not offering incentives is morally right, whether or not offering incentives would be unfair
to others, whether or not the money would be spent on drugs/alcohol and whether or not patients may
be reluctant to report side effects from medication if they are receiving the money for them. Some
clinicians noted practical issues, including feeling that providing the incentives was more effort than it was
worth. Other clinicians felt that financial incentives were not an effective method in improving adherence.
The opinions of four clinicians were missing.
Would clinicians consider using financial incentives again?
When asked if they would consider using financial incentives again, 40 of the 57 clinicians said that they
would consider using them in the future, whereas 12 would not. One clinician interviewed for a patient at
both time points gave different answers at both time points (i.e. said ‘no’ at the 6-month follow-up, but
‘yes’ at the 24-month follow-up), and the answers for four clinicians were missing.
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Changes in clinicians’ opinions of financial incentives
The frequency counts characterising changes in clinicians’ opinions of financial incentives before and after
the intervention are shown in Table 25. Please note that opinions of four clinicians who were interviewed
about more than one patient were mixed, that is, their opinions differed in the interviews. The answers
of four clinicians were missing. Thus, changes of opinions are presented for a total of 49 clinicians.
The majority of the 49 clinicians had a favourable opinion over the use of incentives before and after the
intervention, whereas one-fifth of clinicians had a negative opinion throughout. There were a greater
number of clinicians who were positive about the incentives prior to the intervention but changed their
opinion afterwards, compared with those who were negative prior to the intervention but then gave a
more positive opinion afterwards; however, the differences between these two groups were marginal.
TABLE 25 Opinions of clinicians on whether or not financial incentives are good idea before and after
the intervention
After
TotalYes No
Before Yes 28 7 35
No 4 10 14
Total 32 17 49
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Chapter 4 Discussion
Sections in this chapter have been adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47
Main findings
Offering financial incentives is an effective method for improving adherence among patients with psychotic
disorders who demonstrate poor adherence to LAI medication. In this study, the average baseline adherence
of 67% remained largely unchanged in the control group (an increase of 4%), whereas adherence in the
intervention group increased substantially to 85%. Alongside this, 21 patients in the intervention group
achieved adherence of at least 95%, compared with three in the control group. Patients in the intervention
group also reported a significantly better subjective quality of life. Once the incentives were discontinued
adherence levels did not appear to be maintained, with adherence in the intervention falling back to
baseline levels (60% at the 6-month follow-up and 68% at the 24-month follow-up). Adherence in the
control group was higher than the intervention group at both follow-up points; however, this difference
was not statistically significant.
The total cost per patient receiving the incentives is not significantly higher than treatment as usual.
The difference in costs between both groups was £598, which may take into account the increase in
the number of LAI medications received owing to improved adherence and the contacts with nurses
administering them. Even after the incentives were discontinued, the cost of the intervention group
remained higher than the control group (mean difference of £1406); however, this appeared to be as a
result of patients in the intervention group having longer mental health inpatient admissions than patients
in the control group.
The majority of patients and clinicians felt that the incentives were a positive experience and reported
numerous benefits from them. For patients, the incentives acted as a reminder or reward for their LAI
medication and the money that they received helped towards the costs of living, alleviating the financial
hardship experienced by those receiving state benefits. A large number of clinicians maintained the
view that financial incentives were a good idea before and after the study and reported the benefits
of the incentives on clinical management through improved adherence, contact, patient monitoring,
communication and trust. Clinicians also reported improvements in insight, mental health and social
functioning.
Negative experiences with the incentives differed between patients and their clinicians. One-third of
patients felt uncomfortable with the idea of being offered financial incentives or raised ethical concerns
over accepting them. On the other hand, clinicians who had negative experiences reported problems
in patient management as a result of the incentives such as increased drug and alcohol use, and the
monetisation of the therapeutic relationship, as well as disagreeing with using incentives on ethical
grounds.
In the majority of cases, the incentives stopping had little impact from the perspective of both patients and
clinicians. However, a small number of both clinicians and patients reported problems with adherence and
thus deterioration in mental health and financial problems as a result of no longer receiving the incentives.
Strengths and limitations
One of the strengths of this study was that it involved a large number of mental health teams across the
UK, from areas of differing social deprivation. Outcome data were available for the majority of patients,
131 out of 141 (93%), and statistically analysed for 123 patients (87%) at the end of the intervention. The
estimated treatment effect was also robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses at the end of intervention,
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and at the 6- and 24-month follow-up. A substantial number of patients and clinicians were interviewed
about their experiences both during the intervention and at the follow-up periods. Patient interviews were
available for 45 of the 78 patients (58%) allocated to the intervention group; clinicians were interviewed
for 73 of the 78 patients (94%) during the intervention period and for 59 of the 78 patients (76%) were
interviewed during the follow-up periods.
Nevertheless, the study does have some weaknesses. There were instances of protocol violations, including
of patients in the trial who did not have a diagnosis of schizophrenia or who had > 75% adherence at
baseline and were still included in the trial. The study was not blinded. It was impossible to blind patients
and clinicians to whether or not patients received financial incentives. It can be argued that the majority of
outcomes were collected from electronic databases, and therefore were objective, and that researchers
had no knowledge of patients’ allocation. However, systematic efforts could have been made to ensure
that researchers were blinded. Particularly, blinding should have been ensured when collecting patients’
ratings of subjective quality of life and assessments of patients’ clinical improvement rated by their
clinicians. Future research should seek to address this limitation in their design to keep the scientific rigour
as sound as possible.
Furthermore, all teams who participated in the trial consented to the practice of offering financial
incentives. Whether or not the incentives would be effective among teams who did not choose to
participate in the study is unclear, for example if negative attitudes towards using incentives may have
influenced any outcomes.
The study was powered to detect a statistically significant difference in adherence, the primary outcome.
However, it was not necessarily powered to identify significant differences in secondary outcomes.
While the intervention group still had a significantly better subjective quality of life, the advantage of the
intervention group in global clinical improvement, despite being marked, did not reach statistical
significance. The sample was clearly too small to test differences in rehospitalisation and other adverse
events that are rather rare.
While study retention was high during the intervention period, there was attrition at both follow-up
periods for a number of reasons. However, the reasons for unavailability were accounted for (e.g.
discharge, refusing medication, hospitalisation and imprisonment) and thus the data are not ‘missing at
random’. Furthermore, a number of clinicians were lost at follow-up periods for the clinician interviews and
the large majority of interviews were conducted at 6 months only; therefore, the longer-term impact of the
incentives may not be generalisable beyond the first 6 months.
The study was not fully powered to address costs, and the full extent of patient costs from a broader
societal perspective is unknown. However, the data collected for the effectiveness analysis did not indicate
differences in such societally relevant outcomes such as police arrests or taking up education/training
courses. Data on service use were collected from patient records within NHS trusts and any service contact
with NHS services outside of these trusts or with primary care services is unclear and may be dependent
on local information-sharing policies and practice. Furthermore, costs did not reflect the duration of
contact with mental health staff or the skill level (and thus cost) of each staff member.
The qualitative interviews and analyses also demonstrate weaknesses. Patients were selected from a
convenience sample; therefore, there may be differences in the characteristics of those who consented to
interview compared with those who declined. While the majority of experiences were positive, the
sampling method may have excluded those who may have had more negative experiences. For example,
those patients whose adherence and mental health had deteriorated once the incentives had stopped and
may not have had the motivation or capacity to agree to an interview. Moreover, all researchers involved in
the data collection and analysis were also part of the FIAT research team. This might have introduced a
bias in the way the interviews were conducted or in the analysis of the material.
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With regard to the clinician interviews, the way the questions were structured may have biased how the
responses were interpreted. There was little opportunity for further exploration if a clinician answered
‘no’ to a question; therefore, if there was no change in a particular outcome (e.g. therapeutic relationship)
it was difficult to understand why. The interviews themselves may, therefore, have been more receptive in
finding changes in behaviour during the intervention and follow-up periods. There is also the possibility
that the answers clinicians gave were merely speculative. For example, one clinician reported the same
outcome for five patients during the intervention period, which may have led to some data being
conflated. How clinicians believed patients spent their money was also speculative and any links that were
made between the incentives and changes in patient management or health may be subjective and not
reflect reality. Therefore, making causal attributions between the incentives and any changes must be
taken with caution. The interview schedules at the 6- and 24-month follow-ups differed slightly, with some
questions into the same aspect being worded differently at both time points and some questions being
asked at one time point only. This has two implications: first, the differences in the phrasing of the
question may be interpreted in dissimilar ways by clinicians and thus the responses given may have been
different; and second, the answers given to some questions reflect one time point only and cannot be
taken as a general answer for the long-term effects of the incentives stopping.
Comparisons against the literature
This is the first randomised controlled trial testing the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
financial incentives in improving adherence to antipsychotic medication. This adds to and extends the
findings of previous research on the use of incentives influencing health behaviours in patients with mental
illness, and small observational studies in which financial incentives were offered in secondary mental
health settings.
Despite the effectiveness of the incentives, levels of adherence were not maintained and fell back to
baseline once the incentives stopped. This finding is in line with studies included in a systematic review by
Burton and colleagues37 into the use of financial incentives in health behaviours among mental health
populations, which found that health behaviours had fallen back to baseline levels once the incentives had
stopped. However, around half of the studies included in the review found that health behaviours were
maintained even after the discontinuation of the incentives. However, such follow-up periods were shorter
than even the 6-month follow-up in this study; therefore, it is difficult to know whether or not the
longer-term effect of the incentives on health behaviour in these studies would be similar to that found in
the FIAT study.
There is some evidence to suggest that behaviours influenced by financial incentives may fall below
baseline levels once the incentives have been discontinued, so-called ‘crowding out’. The findings of this
study have found no support for this, which suggests that there may be no major adverse impact for
patients once the incentives have stopped and which is also substantiated by the majority of reports from
patients and clinicians involved in the study.
The results found in this study can also answer some of the issues and concerns raised by stakeholders in a
focus group study by Priebe and colleagues.4
Primarily, this study answers the concern of whether or not the incentives would perversely incentivise
patients to become intentionally non-adherent to qualify for the incentives or whether or not the
incentives would affect the therapeutic relationship or ‘challenges for evidence and experience’: financial
incentives were found to be an effective method in improving antipsychotic medication adherence and
there was little evidence that the practice perversely incentivised patients to become intentionally
non-adherent. The majority of clinicians felt that there was no effect on the therapeutic relationship.
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Concerning the value of antipsychotic medication, whether or not other
services may suffer financially if health-care budgets were spent on incentives,
how the incentives would be spent by patients and whether or not there
were government motives underlying the use of incentives or ‘wider concerns’
The incentives were spent in a variety of ways and patients enjoyed using the incentives towards some
form of rewarding expenditure but, for some, this included the occasional expenditure on drugs and/or
alcohol. Furthermore, offering financial incentives has been shown to be no more expensive that
routine care.
Concerning the practicalities involved in implementing the incentives and
how they can be incorporated as part of a clinician’s toolkit or ‘problems
requiring policies’
Despite the effectiveness and a defined structure of how to provide the incentives in routine clinical
practice, financial incentives have not been implemented since the study ended and thus have not become
part of the clinician’s toolkit.
Concerning whether or not offering financial incentives are coercive or whether
or not they are fair on others not receiving incentives or ‘inherent dilemmas’
The findings from this study overall cannot answer these questions in their entirety, as this was not the
original research question, although there is some evidence from the patient interviews that some felt the
practice of financial incentives may be coercive or unfair on others.
DISCUSSION
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
Sections in this chapter have been adapted from Priebe and colleagues.47
Implications for health care
Financial incentives are an effective method in improving adherence. They are more effective in patients
with psychosis than any other method that has so far been subjected to a similarly rigorous evaluation in a
randomised controlled trial. The improvement was substantial, although practically complete adherence
was achieved in only 28% of patients receiving the incentives.
Community Mental Health Teams and AOTs aim to follow up patients proactively in the community who
show poor adherence to medication and pose risks to themselves or others. In this study, on average, we
did not recruit more than two patients from each team who agreed to participate. The number of patients
with poor adherence is low and reflects the effectiveness of such teams in achieving adherence among this
clinical population. If the incentives scheme was to be implemented nationally, the number of patients
who will qualify for the scheme is difficult to predict as eligibility criteria for research purposes may differ
from clinical practice. If eligibility in clinical settings matched the criterion as set in this study, it is likely that
mental health teams will have one or two patients under the scheme at any time. With this in mind, the
incentives may be offered to fewer than 1800 patients in the NHS in England, which is a small proportion
of patients under secondary mental health care.
It is also important to note that offering financial incentives was part of a research trial and lasted for a
12-month period only; both patients and mental health staff were aware of this at the time of consent and
therefore the eventuality of the incentives being discontinued could have been prepared for. If financial
incentives are to be offered in routine clinical practice, the length of time that they would be provided for
and the method of discontinuation is difficult to answer as this may vary across teams.
Incentives are effective for as long as they are offered but there is no long-term benefit. Once the
incentives stop, adherence in patients who had received the incentives tends to return towards baseline
levels, and there is no significant difference to those patients who remained without incentives all the
time. On the other hand, there is no evidence of a substantial negative effect either. Patient and clinician
experiences are largely positive, both when the incentives are offered and afterwards. However, it should
be considered that a minority of patients may feel uneasy about some aspects of receiving financial
incentives and about the consequences of stopping them at some stage.
In summary, one may conclude that the study provided substantial evidence justifying the use of financial
incentives to improve poor adherence to antipsychotic maintenance medication in routine care. However,
in the absence of any evidence of who is likely to benefit from being offered financial incentives and
who is not, clinicians may want to consider carefully on a case-by-case basis who should receive them.
Recommendations for future research
This study looked at the effectiveness of offering financial incentives for LAI medication. Whether or not
offering financial incentives of variable value or employing more elaborate payment schedules (e.g. with
a reset component, previously shown superior to basic payment schedules) would be more effective in
improving LAI medication adherence or indeed have long-term effects remains unclear and may be
addressed by future research. Moreover, incentives were offered to patients of a lower socioeconomic
background and future research should consider whether or not offering incentives to those with a more
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favourable background would be effective. In this study, we focused on an intervention with a fixed time
scale of 1 year. In clinical practice, however, shorter or, in particular, longer periods may be considered,
and longer-term studies should evaluate how such different use may impact on adherence, patient
experiences and costs. Finally, the precise mechanisms of the effect of financial incentives are still poorly
understood. The qualitative evaluation in this study suggested that the effect goes beyond the mere
monetary value of the incentives. Identifying the psychological processes involved may help to utilise them
more effectively to improve therapeutic relationships, with or without offering financial incentives.
In addition, many patients with psychosis may be prescribed only oral antipsychotic medication and future
research could consider whether or not offering financial incentives would improve adherence in medication
in this form. Finally, the use of financial incentives may be utilised to promote other health-related
behaviours such as healthy lifestyle, sport activities and attendance at psychosocial intervention.
Implications for practice
l Clinicians may consider offering financial incentives as an effective method to improve adherence to
LAI medication in difficult-to-engage patients with psychotic disorders.
l However, once financial incentives are discontinued, it is likely that patients will return to their original
pattern of adherence.
l So far the optimal duration for the administration of financial incentives is unclear.
l Clinicians may expect patient experiences with financial incentives to be predominantly positive,
although both positive and negative attitudes can coexist.
l Careful consideration should be given to offering financial incentives to patients with substance abuse
problems, and those who might have objections to the financial incentive practice.
CONCLUSIONS
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Appendix 1 Case report form: end of intervention
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Collection Date    Participant ID          Team ID 
 
          
      dd mmm yy 
 
 
 
 
 
This booklet is not complete until all boxes are filled. 
For data entry, only enter information contained within the boxes. 
 
 
 
 
Patient Participants  
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CONTENT 
 
Some instructions for data collection and data entry: 
 
Please collect all data for the intervention period only. The first date of the intervention is the starting point for the 
intervention period and it is the 7 days after the randomisation day. (e.g. if the randomisation was on 1st April 
2010 the first day of the intervention will be on 8th April 2010. 
 
The intervention period end date is 12 months after the intervention start date and it is the last day of the 
intervention. (e.g. if the intervention start date was on 8th April 2010 the last day of the intervention (the 
intervention end date)  will be on 7th April 2011).   
 
‘ AT THE END OF THE INTERVENTION’ = data should be collected for the last day of the intervention (if’ 
the intervention end date’ was on 8 April 2011 data ‘at the end of the intervention’ will be collected for that 
day.) 
 
If a section or an item does not apply to the participant, please strike through and write 555 in the margins. An 
example might be if a participant has not been in hospital or on a CTO in the time period that we are interested in.  
 
For unknown data (such as medical records or depot cards that have been confirmed as having been lost, depot 
cards that could not be found after several visits), please strike through and record 333 in the margins. 
 
For missing data, i.e. items and/ or sections of the form that have not been completed and where no explanation is 
given by the researcher as to why this is the case, then please enter 888 in the database.  
Codes for missing data are inserted for each variable in blue colour. If there is no code for missing data no missing 
data is permitted for that variable. 
 
For text, please enter exactly as written on the data collection form, using lower case letters only.    
  
• Throughout the booklet: Compulsory questions are those in bold. Collect data for everyone for these 
questions. 
• The remaining questions will only be applicable to some patients. 
• If possible please contact the patient’s clinicians for data you cannot find in patient’s medical record. 
Note! When entering string variables please do not use any capital letters. 
Section Page 
1 Administrative Data 3 
2 Quality of Life Questionnaire 5 
3 Socio –Demographic Characteristics 8 
4 Accommodation 9 
5 Living Situation 10 
6 Education and Training 11 
7 Employment 12 
8 Benefits 13 
9 Adverse Events 15 
10 Psychiatric Diagnoses 17 
11 Depot Medication 18 
12 Oral Medication 22 
13 Received Depots 27 
14 Substance Misuse 31 
15 Service Use 33 
16 Inpatient Treatment 35 
17 Outpatient Treatment 41 
18 CTOs 32 
19 Clinical Global Impression (CGI) 43 
 Appendix 1     Common Psychiatric Medication Codes 44 
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1. Administrative Data 
VARIAB
LE 
NAME 
VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
intstart 
Intervention start date 
(7 days after 
randomisation) 
(e.g. if the randomisation 
was on Friday 1 April, the 
intervention will be 
considered to commence on 
Friday, 8 April.)   
dd mmm yy  
intdate  
Intervention end date 
(12 months after the 
intervention start date) 
(e.g. if the intervention start 
date was 8 April 2010, the 
intervention end date will 
be on 7 April 2011.) 
dd mmm yy  
recordda
te_t2 
Date of collection from 
medical record dd mmm yy  
datacol_t
2 Name of data collector 
1  = AF         6  = 
SW    9=NO’C 
2  = KB         7= 
other 
3 = CA         (pls 
specify 
4  = KY         below) 
5  = HM         8=LK 
 
datacols
p_t2 
If 7 above, please enter 
interviewer’s name  here:  
datasour
ce Source of data 
1=electronic medical record only 
2=paper notes only 
3=both electronic & paper notes 
4= electronic & clinician 
5=paper notes & clinician 
6= electronic & paper notes & clinician 
 
clinserv_
t2 
Clinical Service at the 
end of intervention 
                                                                   ,  
1=AOT  2=CMHT                                                    
teamid_t
2 
Team ID at the end of 
intervention                                    
mini_t2 MINI score at the end of intervention                                  .  
withdraw
al 
Has patient withdrawn     
consent 0=no 1=yes                                
protocolv
iol 
If in the intervention arm: 
Were the incentives 
consistently provided 
throughout intervention 
period? 
 
0=no  
1=yes  
555= not applicable                                                     
reason 
If no: 
What was the reason for 
protocol violation: 
1=Patient hospitalised and cc stopped with 
FI for the rest of the study 
2= CC stopped with FI during patient’s 
hospitalisation only  
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INTERVENTION PERIOD =  period between the intervention start date  
(inclusive) and the intervention end date (inclusive). 
 
3=  Patient imprisoned 
4= patient died 
5= Depots discontinued  
6= Depots discontinued and oral 
medication prescribed 
7= Clinician stopped FI without consulting 
the research team 
8= Patient transferred to a non-participating 
team 
9= Money for FI was not available in time 
10= Patient has new cc who did not 
consent to Fiat 
11= FI was provided by someone else (e.g. 
researcher) and FI was not always provided 
immediately after received depot 
555= not applicable 
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2. Quality of Life Questionnaire – FIAT End of Intervention 
Instructions for completing this together with the participant:  
 
The following questions are about your satisfaction with different aspects of your life and possible help you need in 
those areas.  We will use the satisfaction scale to answer the questions [show the response card ]. This is 
numbered from 1 (couldn’t be worse) to 7 (couldn’t be better).  Some questions may seem personal, so please tell 
me if you feel it is difficult to answer them. 
Please ask the following questions for each item: 
1. How satisfied are you with your (life domain or treatment aspect)
2. Do you need any additional help in this area? 
3. If so, what additional help do you need (please give a clue)?    
 
Instructions for data entry:  
For yes/ no answers, please enter ‘1’ for yes, and ‘0’ for no.  
For the string variable about additional or different help, please enter text using lower case only.  
 
qoldate_t2        Date of QoL assessment          dd mmm yy    
                                                                                                                     555= not applicable 
 
Please indicate the number that is most appropriate 
 
                     Couldn’t    Displeased   Mostly          Mixed        Mostly     Pleased   Couldn’t     
be worse                         Dissatisfied                   Satisfied                    be better 
 
1__________2__________3__________4__________5__________6__________7 
 
 
Domain 
 
Score 
 
Do you need additional/ 
different help in this area? 
 
 
What additional/different help do you need? 
Mental health 
(e.g. anxiety, 
depression, 
hallucination) 
 
 
888=missing 
mh1_t2 
 
Y / N     
888=missing 
mh2_t2 
 
888=missing 
mh3_t2 
Physical health 
(somatic health 
problems) 
 
888=missing 
phealth1_t2 
 
Y / N     
888=missing 
phealth2_t2 
 
888=missing 
phealth3_t2 
Job situation 
(including being 
unemployed or 
in education) 
     
 
888=missing 
jobsit1_t2 
  
Y / N    
888=missing 
jobsit2_t2 
 
888=missing 
jobsit3_t2 
 
Please indicate the number that is most appropriate 
 
                        Couldn’t    Displeased   Mostly          Mixed        Mostly     Pleased   Couldn’t     
be worse                         Dissatisfied                   Satisfied                    be better 
 
1__________2__________3__________4__________5__________6__________7 
 
Accommodation 
(living situation)  
 
 
 
888=missing 
acc1_t2 
 
Y / N    
888=missing 
acc2_t2 
 
888=missing 
acc3_t2 
        Did participant agree to complete the questionnaire?  0=no, 1=yes  
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Leisure activities 
(going out, movies, 
visiting friends and 
whilst at home) 
  
 
888=missing 
la1_t2 
 
Y / N    
888=missing 
la2_t2 
 
888=missing 
la3_t2 
Friendships 
(number & quality 
of contacts) 
    
 
888=missing 
friendship1_t2 
 
Y / N    
888=missing 
frieindship2_t2 
 
888=missing 
friendship3_t2 
 
 
888=missing 
rel1_t2 
 
Y / N    
888=missing 
rel2_t2 
 
888=missing 
rel3_t2 
Personal safety 
(how safe do you 
feel) 
 
 
888=missing 
safety1_t2 
 
Y / N    
888=missing 
safety2_t2 
 
888=missing 
safety3_t2 
 
Your medication  
(e.g. type of 
medication, 
dosage,  side-
effects) 
  
 
888=missing 
medic1_t2 
 
 
 
 
Y / N    
888=missing 
medic2_t2 
 
888=missing 
medic3_t2 
 
 
 
                         Couldn’t       Displeased    Mostly          Mixed        Mostly     Pleased   Couldn’t     
be worse                        Dissatisfied                   Satisfied                    be better 
 
1__________2__________3__________4__________5__________6__________7 
 
 
 
888=missing 
help1_t2 
Y / N    
888=missing 
help2_t2 
 
888=missing 
help3_t2 
Talks with mental 
health 
professionals 
(e.g. keyworker, 
doctor) 
 
888=missing 
talk1_t2 
Y / N    
888=missing 
talk2_t2 
888=missing 
talk3_t2 
 
qolcontact_t2 
How was the questionnaire 
completed ? 
1=Face-to -face contact 
2=Telephone 
555= Not applicable 
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3.  Patient demographics at the end of the intervention period 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE CODE                                                          DATA ENTRY 
 
 
marital_t2 
 
Marital status 
(at time of data collection) 
 
1 = Single 
2 = Married 
3 = Cohabiting                                              
4 = Widowed 
5 = Divorced 
children_t2 Does the participant have 
children? 
Y  = 1   
N  = 0                                               
children1_t2 Does the participant have 
children under the age of 18? 
Y  = 1   
N  = 0      555= not applicable            
children2_t2 Does the participant live with 
children under 18 in the same 
household? 
Y  = 1   
N = 0     555= not applicable               
 
 
carer_t2 
 
Named carer – Does the 
participant currently have a 
named informal carer?  
Y  = 1   
N  = 0                                                
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4.   Accommodation 
VARIAB
LE 
NAME 
VARIABLE                                                                                                                                 
DATA ENTRY 
accom_t
2 
Accommodation at the end of the intervention period 
(please enter code in the box on the right-hand side ):  
1 = Independent accommodation (flat or house owned or rented (privately or from housing association)           
2 = Sheltered /supported housing scheme (not 24 hours staffed) 
3 = Sheltered/supported  (24 hours staffed) 
4= B&B/hostel 
5= Homeless 
333= unknown                                                                             
                                                   
 
provider
_t2 
If sheltered or supported accommodation (‘2’ or ‘3’) please specify provider: 
(please enter code in the box on the right-hand side ): 
 
1 = Local authority (e.g. council, council funded/run, covered by benefits) 
2 = NHS (e.g. respite accommodation) 
3 = Voluntary Organisation (e.g. Mind, church) 
4 = Private Sector organisation (e.g. private health insurance, paid by patient or patient’s family) 
333= unknown 
555= not applicable                                              
 
If known, please provide the name of the provider, even if you are certain about the type of community 
accommodation.  
 
FOR PAPER RECORDS ONLY – NOT TO BE ENTERED ON TO DATABASE  
________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5. Current living situation at the end of the intervention period 
If participant lives in independent accommodation:  
 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE                                                                                                                                 
DATA ENTRY 
 
livingwith_t2 
 
What is the participant’s current living situation?  
 
1 = Living alone 
2 = Living with relatives (e.g. partner, parents, siblings, children or other relatives) 
3 = Living with others (e.g.friends or flat mates)                                                                                                     
555= not applicable                                                  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
adults_t2 
 
How many adults live in the household, including the client? 
555= not applicable                                                
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6. Education and Training 
 
VARIABLE  
NAME VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
edulevel_t
2 
Highest level of education  at 
the end of the intervention 
period? 
1= Left education prior to GCSE 
2= GCSE or equivalent 
3= A Level or equivalent 
4= NVQ or equivalent 
5= Diploma 
6= Degree 
333=unknown 
 
 
 
VARIABLE  
NAME VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
trainingint
_t2 
 
Any vocational or other trainings/workshops 
undertaken during the intervention period? 
 
1= Yes 
0= No 
 
 
If yes: 
trainingtype_t
2 
 
1= vocational course of 1 year or less  
2= vocational course longer than 1 year 
3= degree course – undergraduate 
4= degree course – postgraduate 
333= unknown 
555= not applicable                                                                                  
If known, please provide the name of the qualification or course being taken (e.g. “NVQ in .”, “BTEC in ..”, 
"apprenticeship in ") 
FOR PAPER RECORDS ONLY – NOT TO BE ENTERED ON TO DATABASE  
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
What further education or vocational training has the patient completed or doing at the 
 end of the intervention period?  
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7. Employment  
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE 
 
employment_
t2 
 
What was the participant’s employment status at the end of the intervention period? 
(please enter code as appropriate) 
1 = Paid employment (any) 
2 = Supported/sheltered employment (sheltered workshop, voluntary activities)1, 2, 3 
3 = Unemployed                                                                                                              
4 = Other (student, retired, housewife) 
333 = unknown                                                                                                                        
 
DATA ENTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
othermeploy_t2 
 
 
Other (please specify) 
555=not applicable 
 
If employed:  
 
 
 
occupation_t2 
 
Please state patients occupation 
555=not applicable 
 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
workhours_t2 1     = part time 
2     = full time 
333 = unknown  
555=not applicable 
                         
 
employday_t2 
How many days of employment the 
participant had during the intervention 
period? (if different employments (jobs) 
please record all employment days in 
total) 
333 = unknown 555=not applicable 
 
 
 
1 (Any occupational project, paid or unpaid, in which participants are brought into contact mainly with other people 
with mental health problems and staff members) 
1 (Clients are engaged in work activities in a sheltered setting and due to a variety of factors do not receive a 
w
1 (Clients are in competitive employment earning a wage or salary with support from a mental health professional, 
job coach or vocational specialist/ therapist) 
 
If sheltered or supported employment please provide the name of the provider organisation: 
FOR PAPER RECORDS ONLY – NOT TO BE ENTERED ON TO DATABASE  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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8. Benefits currently being received at the end of the intervention period  
 
VARIABLE 
NAME VARIABLE CODE 
DATA 
ENTRY 
 
 
benefits_t2 
Did the client receive any benefits 
at the end of the intervention 
period? y  = 1 
n  = 0       333=unknown 
 
 
 
What benefits the participant has been receiving at the end of the intervention period?  
 
attendanc_t2e Attendance allowance y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
childben_t2 Child benefit y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
cold_t2 Cold weather payment y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
counciltax_t2 Council Tax Benefit (discount) y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
socialpay_t2 Direct payments from Social 
Services 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
housingben_t2 Housing benefit y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
incomeben_t2 Income support/ Minimum 
income guarantee 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
incapacity_t2 Incapacity Benefit y  = 1   
n  = 0      
 
independent_t2 Independent living fund 
payments 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
invalidcare_t2 Invalid care allowance 
 
 
y  = 1   
n  = 0       
 
jsa_t2 Job Seekers Allowance  y  = 1   
n  = 0       
 
pensioncred_t2 Pension Credit y  = 1   
n  = 0       
 
disablement_t2 Severe Disablement Allowance y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
pension_t2 State Retirement (old age) 
Pension 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
VARIABLE 
NAME VARIABLE CODE 
DATA 
ENTRY 
taxcredit_t2 Work Tax Credit y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
dlac_t2 Disability Living Allowance Care 
Component  
 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
dlarate_t2 If yes for the Disability Living 
Allowance Care Component please 
provide rate: 
1= high rate 
2= mid rate 
3= low rate 
333= unknown 
555=not applicable 
 
dlam_t2 Disability Living Allowance Mobility 
Component  
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
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dlamrate_t2 If yes for the Disability Living 
Allowance Mobility Component please 
provide rate: 
1= high rate 
2= mid rate 
3= low rate 
333= unknown 
555=not applicable 
 
otherben_t2 Any other state benefit not listed? y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
 If yes, please specify:  
 
 
555=not applicable 
 
___________________ 
___________________ 
___________________ 
otherbensp_t2 
 
 
otherbencode
_t2 
 
 
financguard_t2 Does the participant have 
appointee ship at the end of the 
intervention period? 
y  = 1   
n  = 0    
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9. Adverse events during the intervention period 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
 
contactcrim_t2 
Has the participant had contact 
with the criminal justice service? 
y  = 1 
n  = 0  
If yes: (if no contacts with the criminal justice service please enter 0 for 
each question on this page). 
 
 
police_t2 
Number of contacts with the police? ( not including 
informal talks with policemen)  
 
policearrest_t2 
Number of contacts with the police not resulting in 
arrest?  
 
arest_t2 
Number of arrests? 
  
 
charges_t2 
 
Number of arrests resulting in charges?  
convictions_t2  
Number of charges resulting in conviction?  
 
Number of periods of: 
 
prison_t2 
 
Prison 
 
 
 
probation_t2 
 
Probation 
 
 
 
conviction_t2 
 
Conviction 
 
 
 
court_t2 
 
Court appearances 
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Imprisonment and release  
 
If participant was in prison please record dates of imprisonment and release during the intervention 
period: 
 
 
 
 
Violence and suicide during the intervention period 
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DATA ENTRY 
imprisonment1_t2 Date of Imprisonment 
555-n/a      
/ /  
release1_t2 Date of Release 
555-n/a      
/ /  
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DATA ENTRY 
imprisonment2_t2 Date of Imprisonment 
555-n/a      
/ /  
release2_t2 Date of Release 
555-n/a      
/ /  
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DATA ENTRY 
imprisonment3_t2 Date of Imprisonment 
555-n/a      
/ /  
release3_t2 Date of Release 
555-n/a      
/ /  
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE DATA ENTRY 
imprisonment4_t2 Date of Imprisonment 
555-n/a      
/ /  
release4_t2 Date of Release 
555-n/a      
/ /  
 
violence_t2 Number of incidents of physical violence? 
 
suicidthre_t2 Number of suicide threats? (if multiple threats 
on same day, score this as one instance)  
suicid_t2e Number of suicide attempts? 
 
suicideout_t2 If the participant had a suicide attempt what 
was the outcome? 
 
1=hospital treatment 
2=no health professional 
treatment needed (helped 
by a member of family or 
friend 
3=death  
333=unknown;  555=n/a 
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10. Psychiatric diagnoses at the end of the intervention period  
 
 
Current diagnosis/ diagnoses as recorded in medical records  
(please record ICD-10 code and date when diagnosis was given, where possible) 
 
diagnosis1_t2 
 
Primary diagnosis  
(in words)  
icd1_t2 
 ICD-10 code 
F .  
 
 
diadate1_t2 
 
Date when last time 
recorded:  
333=unknown 
/ /  
dd/mmm/ yy 
 
diagnosis2_t2 
 
Secondary diagnosis 
(in words) 
555=not applicable 
 
icd2_t2 
 
ICD-10 code 
555=not applicable 
F .  
 
diadate2_t2 
 
Date when last time recorded:  
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
/ /  
Dd/mmm/yy 
diagnosis3_t2 
 
Tertiary diagnosis 
(in words) 
555=not applicable 
 
code3_t2 
 
ICD-10 code 
 
555=not applicable 
F .  
 
diadate3_t2 
 
Date when last time recorded: 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
/ /  
dd/mmm yy 
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11. Psychiatric depot medication  
Please list all psychiatric depot medication prescribed during the intervention period. Please record prescribed 
dosages and any changes in dosage or frequency. Please start data record with the first day of intervention 
and forward for 12 months to the last day of intervention. 
 
Treatment cycle codes: 1 = 1/52     2 = 2/52 3 = 3/52     4 = 4/52      5 = 5/52     6 = 6/52 
 
Depot medication 1 
depot1name_t2 Generic name of depot 
(see Appendix 2) 
 
 
depot1code_t2 Depot code 
(see Appendix 2) 
M  
treatcyc1_t2 Treatment cycle code 
(as above) 
 
depotdose11_t2 Dose . mg 
depotstart1_t2 Start date if available 
333=unknown 
/ /  
DD/MMM/YY 
depotend1_t2 End date if applicable  
333=unknown 
/ /  
DD/MMM/YY 
 
Depot medication 2 
depot2name_t2 Generic name of depot 
(see Appendix 2)
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
 
 
depot2code Depot code 
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable 
M  
treatcyc2_t2 Treatment cycle code 
(as above) 
555=not applicable 
 
depotdose2_t2 Dose 
555=not applicable 
. mg 
depotsatrt2_t2 Start date if available 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
/ /  
DD/MMM/YY 
depotend2_t2 End date if applicable  
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
/ /  
DD/MMM/YY 
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12. Psychiatric oral medication during the intervention period 
 
Please start data record with the first day of intervention and forward for 12 months to the last 
day of intervention. 
 
 
If yes: 
 
Please fill in the form below, using the medication unit and medication frequency codes below and adding extra 
sheets where required.  Please complete for all regular oral psychiatric medication during the intervention period 
(excluding PRN). 
 
Medication unit codes 
1 mg 6 Inhalers 
2 microgram  7 Bottles 
3 g 8 Packs 
4 ml 9 Other – give details 
5 Tubs/tubes   
 
medication frequency codes 
1 Once daily 
2 Twice daily 
3 Three times daily 
4 Four times daily 
5 Once weekly 
6 Once per fortnight 
  
Oral medication 1 
oralname1_t2 Generic name  
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
 
 
oralcode1_t2 Medication code 
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable 
 
 
M  
oralunit1_t2 Medication Unit 
Code 555=not 
applicable 
333=unknown 
 
oraldose1_t2 Dose 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
oralfreq1_t2 Frequency Code  
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
 
VARIABLE 
DATE 
 
VARIABLE 
 
CODE 
 
DATA ENTRY 
oralmed_t2 Is the patient prescribed any regular oral psychiatric 
medication at the end of the intervention period 
1=yes 
0=no 
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Current PRN medication  
 
Please report any psychiatric PRN medication which is currently prescribed.  
Frequency codes for PRN medication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRN medication 1 
 
prnname1_t2 Generic name  
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable
333=unknown 
 
 
 
prncode1_t2 Medication code 
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable 
 
M  
prnunit1_t2 Medication Unit 
Code 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
prndose1_t2 Dose 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
.  
prnfreq1_t2 Frequency Code 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
 
PRN medication 2 
 
prnname2_t2 Generic name  
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
 
 
prncode2_t2 Medication code 
(see Appendix 2) 
555=not applicable 
M  
prnunit2_t2 Medication Unit 
Code 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
prndose_t22 Dose 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
.  
prnlfreq2_t2 Frequency Code 
555=not applicable 
333=unknown 
 
 
Code Frequency 
7 about three times a week 
8 about twice a week8 
9 about once a week9 
10 about once a fortnight10 
11 about once a month11 
12 other – give details12 
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13. Depot dates during the intervention period 
 
Please complete the following section by entering the recorded dates of depot injection 
Please start data record with the first day of intervention and forward for 12 months to the 
last day of intervention. 
Record both the date that the depot has been due and the date that the depot has been received. 
 
Variable 
name 
Due Date (dd/mmm/yy) Variable 
name 
Date Received (dd/mmm/yy) 
dep1d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep1r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep2d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep2r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep3d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep3r_t2 
 
 
 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep4d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep4_t2r 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep5d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep5r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep6d_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep6r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep7d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep7r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep8d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep8r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep9d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep9r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep10d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep10r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep11d_t2 
 
555=n/a / /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep11r_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep12d_t2 
 
 
555=n/a 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
dep12r_t2 
 
555=n/a 
 
/ /  
dd/                 mmm/                 yy 
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14. Substance misuse during the intervention period 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
 
VARIABLE 
 
CODE 
 
DATA ENTRY 
drugs Has the patient taken any recreational drugs 
during the intervention period 
 1=yes   
 0=no 
333= unknown        
 
 
 
If yes, please record all used drugs from the list below. 
If used drug is not specified please code questions below as 333=unknown.  
 
If no drugs have been used please code questions below as 555=not applicable. 
If only one drug from one (or each) class was used please complete the first row for that class and enter code 555 
(not applicable) for other possible drugs for that drug class. 
 
Which substances are recorded as having been used in the past 12 months?  
(please record all codes that apply) 
Class A 
1= Cocaine    
2= Crack                      
3= Crystal Meth 
4= Ecstasy 
5= Heroin 
6= LSD (acid) 
7= Magic Mushrooms 
8= Methadone 
9= Opium 
10= Other 
333=unknown (if you know that patient has taken a drug 
but you don’t know the name of a drug) 
555=not applicable 
 
VARIABLE NAME DATA ENTRY 
drugsclassa1_t2 
 
 
drugsclassa2_t2 
 
 
drugsclassa3_t2 
 
 
drugsclassa_t24  
drugsclassa5_t2   
drugsclassa6_t2 
 
 
If other, please specify 
555=not applicable 
otehrclassa_t2  
 
Class B 
11= Amphetamines (speed) 
12= Barbiturates 
13= Cannabis 
14= Codeine 
15 = Other  
333=unknown (if you know that patient has taken a drug 
but you don’t know the name of a drug) 
555=not applicable 
drugsclassb1_t2  
drugsclassb2_t2  
drugsclassb3_t2  
If other, please specify 
555=not applicable 
 
otherclassb_t2 
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Class C 
 
16= Ketamine 
17= Steroids  
18= Other 
333=unknown (if you know that patient has taken a drug 
but you don’t know the name of a drug) 
555=not applicable 
drugsclassc1_t2  
drugsclassc2_t2  
drugsclassc3_t2  
If other, please specify 
555=not applicable 
otherclassc_t2 
 
 
Legal substances 
 
19= Alcohol 
20= Over-the-counter drugs 
21= Other 
333=unknown (if you know that patient has taken a drug 
but you don’t know the name of a drug) 
555=not applicable 
 
legaldrugs1_t2 
 
 
legaldrugs2_t2 
 
 
legaldrugs3_t2 
 
If other, please specify 
555=not applicable 
 
otherlegal_t2 
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15. CMHT/AOT service use during the intervention period 
 
Please complete the following section as fully as possible. It may be best to talk to the patient’s care co-ordinator 
for some of the information. 
 
Please record information for NHS service use ONLY 
 
Please only record data relevant to contacts or DNAs during the intervention period.  
 
For average time spent per face-to-face contact if there is sufficient data on duration of contacts please calculate 
an average duration. If there is no data on duration please code 333=unknown. 
 
If name of professional is known but not his/her occupation please obtain data on occupation from his/her team 
members. 
 
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
 
team_t2 
 
Type of team 
1=AOT 
2=CMHT 
 
 
Staff member Number of 
accomplished face-
to-face contacts in 
service setting 
Number of 
accomplished 
face-to-face 
contacts in 
community 
 
Number of 
DNAs 
Average time spent per 
face-to-face contact  
in minutes 
333=unknown; 555n/a for 
all variables in this column 
Social worker  
sw_t2 
 
swcon_t2 
 
swdna_t2 
333;555    
swduration_t2 
Community psychiatric 
nurse 
 
cpn_t2 
 
cpnecon_t2 
 
cpndna_t2 
333;555    
cpnduration_t2 
Mental health support 
worker/ Community 
Outreach worker 
(i.e. Band ¾ Support staff) 
 
support_t2 
 
supportcon_t2 
 
supportdna_t2 
333;555    
supportduration_t2 
Psychiatrist  
psychia_t2 
 
psychiacon_t2 
 
psychiadna_t2 
333;555    
psychiaduraton_t2 
Psychologist  
psycholo_t2 
 
psycholocon_t2 
 
psycholodna_t2 
333;555    
psycholoduraiton_t2 
Occupational therapist  
ot_t2 
 
 
otcon_t2 
 
otdna_t2 
333;555    
otduratio_t2n 
GP (at clients home) n/a  
dphomecon_t2 
 
dphomedna_t2_
t2 
333;555    
gphomeduration 
Staff member Number of 
accomplished face-
to-face contacts in 
service setting 
Number of 
accomplished 
face-to-face 
contacts in 
community 
 
Number of 
DNAs 
Average time spent per 
face-to-face contact 
 
 
in minutes 
GP (at surgery)  
gpsurg_t2 
n/a  
 
gpsurgdna_t2 
333;555    
gpsurgduration_t2 
Individual 
counselling/therapy 
 
therapy_t2 
 
therapycon_t2 
 
therapydna_t2 
333;555    
therapyduration_t2 
Speech therapist  
speech_t2 
 
speechcon_t2 
 
speechdna_t2 
333;555    
speechduration_t2 
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Home support worker 
(helping with  cooking, 
cleaning, shopping) 
 
home_t2 
 
homecon_t2 
 
homedna_t2 
333;555    
homeduration_t2 
Vocational worker  
(employment worker) 
 
vo_t2c 
 
voccon_t2 
 
vocdna_t2 
333;555    
vocduration_t2 
Family support worker  
(helping family to sort out 
practical issues, house etc.) 
 
family_t2 
 
familycon_t2 
 
familydna_t2 
333;555    
familyduration_t2 
Student nurse  
student_t2 
 
studentcon_t2 
 
studentdna_t2 
333;555    
studentduration_t2 
Substance misuse worker  
substancew_t2 
 
substancewcon_
t2 
 
subsancewdna_t
2 
333;555    
substancewduration_t2 
Other (please describe)  
 
__________________ 
other1spec           555= not 
applicable 
 
other1_t2 
 
other1con_t2 
 
other1dna_t2 
333;555    
other1duration_t2 
Other (please describe) 
 
 
___________________ 
other2spec          555= not 
applicable 
 
other2_t2 
 
other2con_t2 
 
other2dna_t2 
555    
other2duration_t2 
Other (please describe) 
 
__________________ 
other3spec 
                               555= not 
applicable 
 
other3_t2 
 
other3com_t2 
 
other3dna_t2 
555         
other3duration_t2 
 
DOI: 10.3310/hta20700 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2016 VOL. 20 NO. 70
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Priebe et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
99
16. Inpatient treatment during the intervention period 
 
VARIABL
E NAME 
VARIABLE CODE DATA 
ENRY 
 
 
 
pasthosp12
_t2 
Has the participant had any (psychiatric and non-psychiatric) 
inpatient treatment during the intervention period? (if no, please 
go to section 17) 
 
y  = 1   
n  = 0   
     
 
 
 
Please specify length and type of inpatient treatment in the box below.  
 
Below is a list of service settings that you may come across to help you code services correctly.  
 
Please note down the name of the service in the Service Setting Code box so that the type of service can be 
established later on.  
 
If participant is transferred please record as a new admission and state ‘transfer’  as ‘Reason’.  
 
Names, addresses and postcodes must not be entered in the database, however.  
 
 
 
Service setting codes 
 
1 = Acute psychiatric ward 
 
2 = Psychiatric rehabilitation ward 
 
3 = Long-stay ward 
 
4 = Emergency/ Crisis Centre 
 
5 = Secure/ Semi-secure unit (non-forensic) 
 
6= Secure/ Semi-secure unit (forensic)  
 
7= PICU 
 
8 = General Medical Ward 
 
9 = Specialist assessment or treatment facility 
 
10 = Other (please note down code ‘8’ and the name of the service) 
 
11= Not sure 
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Psychiatric inpatient treatment 
 
 
  
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE MISSING DATA 
CODES 
DATA ENTRY 
admission1_t2 Date of Admission 555=not applicable    / /  
discharge1_t2 Date of Discharge 555=not applicable    / /  
legal1_t2 Legal Status  1 = Voluntary 
2 = Detained 
 
service1_t2 
 
Hospital: 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
wardname1_t2 Ward name 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
wardtype1_t2 Type of Ward 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
reason1_t2 Reason 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE MISSING DATA 
CODES 
DATA ENTRY 
admission2_t2 Date of Admission 555=not applicable    / /  
discharge2_t2 Date of Discharge 555=not applicable    / /  
legal2_t2 Legal Status  1 = Voluntary 
2 = Detained 
 
service2_t2 
 
Hospital: 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
wardname2_t2 Ward name 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
wardtype2_t2 Type of Ward 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
reason2_t2 Reason 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE MISSING DATA 
CODES 
DATA ENTRY 
admission3_t2 Date of Admission 555=not applicable    / /  
discharge3_t2 Date of Discharge 555=not applicable    / /  
legal3_t2 Legal Status  1 = Voluntary 
2 = Detained 
 
service3_t2 
 
Hospital: 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
wardname3_t2 Ward name 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
wardtype3_t2 Type of Ward 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
 
reason3_t2 Reason 555=not applicable    
333=unknown 
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General medical inpatient treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
   
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE MISSING DATA 
CODES 
DATA ENTRY 
genadmission1_t2 Date of 
Admission 
555=not applicable       / /  
gendischarge1_t2 Date of 
Discharge 
555=not applicable      / /  
genservice1_t2 
 
Hospital: 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genwardname1_t2 Ward name 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genwardtype1_t2 Type of Ward 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genreason1_t2 Reason 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE MISSING DATA 
CODES 
DATA ENTRY 
genadmission2_t2 Date of 
Admission 
555=not applicable       / /  
gendischarge2_t2 Date of 
Discharge 
555=not applicable      / /  
genservice2_t2 
 
Hospital: 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genwardname2_t2 Ward name 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genwardtype2_t2 Type of Ward 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genreason2_t2 Reason 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE MISSING DATA 
CODES 
DATA ENTRY 
genadmission3_t2 Date of 
Admission 
555=not applicable       / /  
gendischarge3_t2 Date of 
Discharge 
555=not applicable      / /  
genservice3_t2 
 
Hospital: 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genwardname3_t2 Ward name 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genwardtype3_t2 Type of Ward 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
 
genreason3_t2 Reason 555=not applicable     
333=unknown 
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17. Outpatient Hospital Treatment 
 
outpatient_t2 Has the participant had any non-psychiatric outpatient hospital 
treatment during the intervention period?  
(if no, please go to psychiatric outpatient hospital treatment question below) 
y  = 1  
n  = 0       
 
 
 
If yes, please list any use of outpatient hospital services during the intervention period. 
 Service Unit of Measurement 
Number of 
appointments 
attended 
hospout_t2 Other hospital outpatient visit 
 
Appointment 
555=not applicable      
 
a&eout_t2 
 
A&E Visit 
 
Attendance 
555=not applicable      
 
   
 
outhosppsych
_t2 
Has the participant had any psychiatric outpatient hospital 
treatment during the intervention period? 
If no, please go to section 18. 
If yes, please list any use of outpatient hospital services during the 
intervention period. 
y  = 1   
n  = 0      
 
 
dayhospout_t
2 
Day Hospital 
 
Day Attendance 
555=not applicable      
 
aepsych_t2 A&E psychiatric outpatient visit Attendance 
555=not applicable      
 
 If other, please specify:   
otherout _t2 
 
 
 
555=not applicable      
 
 
 
555=not applicable      
 
 
Name of Service 
For each of the services above, please record below in numerical order (1, 2, 3 etc.):  
a) type of service (as above) 
b) name of services (as recorded in the medical records) (e.g. Asthma clinic, family planning clinic, 
dermatology etc..) 
(FOR PAPER RECORDS ONLY – NOT TO BE ENTERED ON TO DATABASE):  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
DOI: 10.3310/hta20700 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2016 VOL. 20 NO. 70
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Priebe et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
103
18. Community Treatment Order (CTO) 
 
 
VARIABLE 
NAME 
VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
cto_t2 Was the participant on a CTO on the first day of 
the intervention period? 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
cto_t2 Was the participant put on a CTO during the 
intervention period? 
y  = 1   
n  = 0        
 
 
If yes:  
 
 
When was the participant on a CTO during the intervention period?  
Please include ongoing CTO at the time of randomisation but start with the first date of the intervention period. 
 
From (dd/mmm/yy) To (dd/mmm/yy) 
ctostart1_t2 
 
/ /  
555=not applicable      
ctoend1 / /  
555=not applicable      
ctoend2_t2 / /  
555=not applicable      
ctoend2 / /  
555=not applicable      
 
ctostart3_t2 
 
/ /  
555=not applicable      
ctoend3 / /  
555=not applicable      
 
 
APPENDIX 1
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
104
19. Clinical Global Impression (CGI) 
Reproduced from Guy W, editor. ECDEU Assessment Manual for Psychopharmacology. 1976. Rockville, MD, U.S. Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
 
VARIABLE  
NAME 
VARIABLE CODE DATA 
ENTRY 
cgisever 
 
 
Severity of illness  
 
Considering your total clinical 
experience with this particular 
population, how mentally ill is the 
patient at this time? 
 
0 = Not assessed  
1 = Normal, not at all ill  
2 = Borderline mentally ill  
3 = Mildly ill  
4 = Moderately ill  
5 = Markedly ill  
6 = Severely ill  
7 = Among the most extremely ill 
patients 
888= missing data 
 
cgiimp 
 
 
 
Global improvement 
  
Rate total improvement whether 
or not, in your judgement, it is due 
entirely to drug treatment. 
 
Compared to his condition at 
admission to the project, how 
much has he changed? 
0 = Not assessed  
1 = Very much improved  
2 = Much improved  
3 = Minimally improved  
4 = No change  
5 = Minimally worse  
6 = Much worse  
7 = Very much worse 
888= missing data 
 
DOI: 10.3310/hta20700 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2016 VOL. 20 NO. 70
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Priebe et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
105
CRF APPENDIX 1 Common Psychiatric Medication Codes 
A 
Abilify – aripiprazole Atypical antipsychotic  M001 
agomelatine Antidepressant  M002 
Allegron –nortriptyline tricyclic  M003 
alprazolam Benzodiazepine  M004 
amisulpride Atypical antipsychotic  M005 
amitriptyline HCl Tricyclic  M006 
Anafranil – clomipramine Tricyclic  M007 
Aricept – donepezil dementia drug  M008 
aripiprazole Atypical antipsychotic  M009 
Arpicolin – procyclidine Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M010 
Atomoxetine non-stimulant drug for ADHD M011 
 B 
benperidol Antipsychotic  M012 
Benquil – benperidol Antipsychotic  M013 
benzatropine mesilate Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M014 
benzhexol HCl – trihexyphenidyl Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M015 
benzatropine mesylate – benzatropine mesilate Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M016 
Biorphen – orphenadrine Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M017 
Broflex – trihexyphenidyl Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M018 
Buspar – buspirone Sleeping Pills M019 
buspirone HCl Sleeping Pills M020 
C 
Camcolit – lithium Lithium  M021 
Carbagen – carbamazepine Mood Stabiliser M022 
carbamazepine Mood Stabiliser M023 
chloral hydrate Mood Stabiliser M024 
chlordiazepoxide Benzodiazepine  M025 
chlorpromazine Antipsychotic  M026 
Cipralex – escitalopram SSRI  M027 
Cipramil – citalopram SSRI  M028 
Circadin – melatonin natural hormone, used for sleep  M029 
citalopram SSRI  M030 
clomethiazole Mood Stabiliser M031 
clomipramine Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M032 
clobazam Benzodiazepine Mood Stabiliser M034 
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Clopixol Acuphase – zuclopenthixol acetate Antipsychotic  M035 
Clopixol – zuclopenthixol diHCl Antipsychotic  M036 
clorazepate Benzodiazepine  M037 
clozapine Atypical antipsychotic  M038 
Concerta XL – methylphenidate stimulant drug for ADHD  M030 
Cymbalta – duloxetine SNRI Antidepressant.   M040 
D 
Dalmane – flurazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M041 
Denzapine – clozapine Antipsychotic  M042 
Depakote – valproic acid Mood Stabiliser M043 
Depixol –flupentixol Antipsychotic  M044 
dexamfetamine (dexamphetamine) stimulant drug for ADHD  M045 
Dexedrine (dexamfetamine) stimulant drug for ADHD  M046 
diazepam Benzodiazepine  M047 
diphenhydramine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M048 
Disipal – orphenadrine Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M049 
Dolmatil – sulpiride Antipsychotic  M050 
donepezil dementia drug  M051 
dosulepin Tricyclic  M052 
dothiepin – dosulepin Tricyclic  M053 
doxepin tricyclic  M054 
Dozic – haloperidol Antipsychotic  M055 
Dreemon – diphenhydramine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M056 
duloxetine SNRI antidepressant  M057 
E 
Ebixa – memantine dementia drug  M058 
Edronax – reboxetine NARI  M059 
Efexor – venlafaxine SNRI antidepressant  M060 
Efexor XL – venlafaxine modified release 
SNRI  
M061 
Epilim – valproate; sodium valproate Mood Stabiliser M062 
Equagesic – meprobamate Tranquiliser M063 
Equasym / Equasym XL – methylphenidate stimulant drug for ADHD  M064 
escitalopram SSRI (anti-depressant) M065 
Exelon – rivastigmine dementia drug  M066 
F 
Faverin – fluvoxamine SSRI (anti-depressant) M067 
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Fentazin – perphenazine Antipsychotic  M068 
Fluanxol – flupentixol Anti-psychotic/anti-depressant M069 
flunitrazepam Benzodiazepine (tranquiliser) M070 
fluoxetine SSRI (Anti-depressant) M071 
flupentixol (flupenthixol) Anti-psychotic/anti-depressant M072 
*flupentixol decanoate Antipsychotic DEPOT M073* 
fluphenazine discontinued antipsychotic M074 
*fluphenazine decanoate Antipsychotic DEPOT M075* 
flurazepam Sleeping Pill M076 
fluvoxamine maleate SSRI (anti-depressant) M077 
Foraven XL – venlafaxine modified release SNRI (anti-depressant) 
M078 
G 
galantamine dementia drug  M079 
Gamanil – lofepramine Tricyclic antidepressant.  No longer 
available under trade name. 
M080 
H 
Haldol – haloperidol Antipsychotic  M081 
haloperidol Antipsychotic  M082 
*haloperidol decanoate Anti-psychotic DEPOT M083* 
Heminevrin – clomethiazole Sleeping Pill M084 
I 
imipramine HCI Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M085 
Invega (paliperidone) antipsychotic (active metabolite of 
risperidone)  
M086 
isocarboxazid MAOI (anti-depressant) M087 
K 
Kemadrin – procyclidine Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M088 
L 
Lamictal – lamotrigine Mood Stabilsers M089 
lamotrigine Mood Stabiliser M090 
Largactil – chlorpromazine Antipsychotic  M091 
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levomepromazine Antipsychotic  M092 
liothyronine Thyroid drug. Specialist use for 
treatment resistant depression.  
M093 
Liskonum – lithium Lithium  M094 
lithium Lithium  M095 
lofepramine Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M096 
loprazolam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M097 
lorazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill M098 
lormetazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M099 
Lustral – sertraline SSRI (anti-depressant) M100 
Lyrica (pregabalin) anti-anxiety.   M101 
M 
Manerix –moclobemide Reversible MAOI (RIMA) (anti-
depressant) 
M101 
maprotiline HCl antidepressant – discontinued M102 
Medinex – diphenhydramine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M013 
melatonin natural hormone, used for sleep.  M104 
memantine dementia drug  M105 
meprobamate Sleeping pills M106 
methotrimeprazine – levomepromazine Antipsychotic  M107 
methylphenidate stimulant drug for ADHD  M108 
mianserin HCl Chemically similar to tricyclics (anti-
depressant) 
M109 
mirtazapine NaSSA (anti-depressant) M110 
moclobemide Reversible MAOI (RIMA) (anti-
depressant) 
M111 
*Modecate – fluphenazine decanoate Anti-psychotic DEPOT M112* 
Moditen –fluphenazine discontinued antipsychotic M113 
Mogadon – nitrazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M114 
Molipaxin –trazodone Tricyclic-related (anti-depressant) M115 
Motival – fluphenazine + nortriptyline compound drug – discontinued M116 
N 
Nardil –phenelzine MAOI (anti-depressant) M117 
Neulactil – pericyazine Antipsychotic  M118 
Night-calm – diphenhydramine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M119 
Nightime – promethazine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M120 
nitrazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M121 
nortriptyline Tricyclic see (anti-depressants) M123 
Nozinan – levomepromazine Antipsychotic  M124 
Nytol – diphenhydramine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M125 
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O 
olanzapine Atypical antipsychotic  M126 
Orap – pimozide Antipsychotic  M127 
orphenadrine HCl Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M128 
Oxactin – fluoxetine SSRI (anti-depressant) M128 
oxazepam Benzodiazepine (sleeping pill) M129 
P 
paliperidone Atypical antipsychotic (active 
metabolite of risperidone) 
M130 
Panadol Night – diphenhydramine + paracetamol antihistamine with painkiller used as 
sleeping pill  
M131 
paroxetine HCl SSRI (anti-depressant) M132 
pericyazine Antipsychotic  M133 
perphenazine Antipsychotic  M134 
phenelzine MAOI (anti-depressant) M135 
Phenergan – promethazine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M136 
pimozide Antipsychotic  M137 
*Piportil – pipotiazine palmitate Anti-psychotic DEPOT M138* 
*pipothiazine palmitate – pipotiazine Anti-psychotic DEPOT M139* 
*pipotiazine Anti-psychotic DEPOT M140* 
pregabalin anti anxiety.   M141 
Priadel –lithium Lithium  M142 
prochlorperazine Antipsychotic  M143 
procyclidine HCl Anti-Parkinson’s drug  M144 
promazine HCl Antipsychotic  M145 
propranolol beta blocker, sometimes given for the 
physical symptoms of anxiety (not a 
psychiatric drug)  
M146 
promethazine anti-histamine used as sleeping pill  M147 
Prothiaden – dothiepin Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M148 
Prozac – fIuoxetine SSRI (anti-depressant) M149 
Q 
quetiapine                   Atypical antipsychotic  M150 
R 
reboxetine NARI (anti-depressant) M151 
Reminyl – galantamine dementia drug  M152 
Remnos – nitrazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M153 
Risperdal – Consta Antipsychotic  M154 
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Risperdal – risperidone Atypical antipsychotic  M155 
Ritalin – methylphenidate stimulant drug for ADHD  M156 
rivastigmine dementia drug  M157 
Rohypnol – flunitrazepam (taken off market) Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M158 
S 
Serdolect – sertindole Atypical antipsychotic  M159 
Serenace – haloperidol Antipsychotic  M160 
Seroquel – quetiapine Atypical antipsychotic  M161 
sertindole Atypical antipsychotic  M162 
sertraline SSRI (anti-depressant) M163 
Seroxat – paroxetine SSRI (anti-depressant) M164 
Sinepen – doxepin Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M165 
Solian – amisulpiride Atypical antipsychotic  M166 
Sominex – promethazine antihistamine used as sleeping pill  M167 
Somnite – nitrazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M168 
Stelazine – trifluoperazine Antipsychotic  M169 
Stemetil – prochlorperazine Antipsychotic  M170 
Stilnoct – zolpidem hemitartrate Sleeping pill M171 
Strattera – atomoxetine non-stimulant drug for ADHD  M172 
sulpiride Antipsychotic  M173 
Sulpitil – sulpiride Antipsychotic  M174 
Sulpor – sulpiride Antipsychotic  M175 
Surmontil – trimipramine Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M176 
T 
Tegretol – carbamazepine Mood Stabiliser M177 
temazepam Benzodiazepine sleeping pill  M178 
Teril retard – carbamazepine Mood Stabiliser M179 
thioridazine Antipsychotic  M180 
Tifaxin XL – venlafaxine modified release SNRI (anti-depressant) 
M181 
Tofranil – imipramine Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M182 
Tranxene – clorazepate Benzodiazepine (sleeping pill) M183 
tranylcypromine MAOI (anti-depressant) M184 
trazodone HCl Tricyclic-related (anti-depressant) M185 
triclofos sodium Sleeping Pill M186 
trifluoperazine Antipsychotic  M187 
trimipramine Tricyclic (anti-depressant) M188 
Triptafen – amitriptyline + perphenazine Combination/compound drug (anti-
depressant) 
M189 
tryptophan Amino acid (anti-depressant) M190 
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V 
Valdoxan (agomelatine) Antidepressant (new 2009).  M191 
valproate (semisodium valproate) Mood Stabiliser M192 
valproic acid Mood Stabiliser M193 
Venaxx XL – venlafaxine modified release SNRI (anti-depressant) 
M194 
venlafaxine SSRI related antidepressant  M195 
Venlalic XL – venlafaxine modified release SNRI (anti-depressant) 
M196 
W 
Welldorm – chloral hydrate Sleeping Pills M197 
X 
Xanax – alprazolam Benzodiazepine (Sleeping pills) M198 
Z 
zaleplon (Sleeping pills) M199 
Zaponex (clozapine) Atypical antipsychotic  M200 
Zimovane – zopiclone (Sleeping pills) M201 
Zispin –mirtazapine NaSSA (anti-depressant) M202 
zolpidem tartrate (Sleeping pills) M203 
Zoleptil - zotepine Atypical antipsychotic  M204 
zopiclone (Sleeping pills) M205 
zotepine Atypical antipsychotic  M206 
zuclopenthixol acetate Antipsychotic  M207 
*zuclopenthixol decanoate Anti-psychotic DEPOT M208* 
zuclopenthixol diHCl Antipsychotic  M209 
Zyprexa - olanzapine Atypical antipsychotic  M210 
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Appendix 2 Clinician interview
DATA COLLECTION FROM INTERVENTION TEAMS 
SIX MONTHS FOLLOW-UP 
 
Please ask questions below of keyworkers/clinical teams for each patient in the intervention group, for the period of 
six months after the end of the intervention. For a patient who receives depots in a depot clinic and has no keyworker 
consider collecting data from the CPNs who administer the depots in the depot clinic. If a patient has no keyworker 
please ask the team Consultant Psychiatrist to answer the questions. 
 
Key workers with more than one patient in the FIAT study should be interviewed only once but one form should be 
completed for each patient. Please indicate the ID numbers of all his/her patients in the FIAT study in the appropriate 
box below. 
For all questions where a clinician with more than one study patient indicates an effect please ask and note the number 
of patients for whom the effect applies. 
 
 
 
DOI: 10.3310/hta20700 HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2016 VOL. 20 NO. 70
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Priebe et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
113
  
VARIABL
E NAME VARIABLE CODE DATA ENTRY 
idc_6m Clinician Participant ID     (Site code+ number)  
profession_
6m Professional role  
 1= Consultant Psychiatrist             
  2= Patient’s Care Coordinator 
 3= CPN in depot clinic 
 4= Team manager 
 
profession1
_6m 
Did two clinicians attend 
the interview? 0 = no, 1 = yes  
profession2
_6m 
If two clinicians attended the 
interview what was the 
professional role of the other 
clinician? 
1= Consultant Psychiatrist             
  2= Patient’s Care Coordinator 
 3= CPN in depot clinic 
 4= Team manager 
 
id Patient(s) ID number(s)   
recorddate_
6m Date of assessment dd mm yy   
idteam ID team     
time_6m Time point of data assessment 
1=6 months                 3=18 months 
2=12 months  
interviewe_
6mr  Data collector 
1  = AF     4  = KY        7=other  
2  = KB     5  = HM       8=LK  
3 = CA      6  = SW       9=NO’C 
 
how_6m How was data collected? 
1= face-to-face interview 
2= telephone interview 
3=email 
 
interviewers
pe_6m 
If 7 above, 
please specify:  
clinserv 
_6m 
Clinical 
Service 
                 1=AOT 
                 2=CMHT 
 
 
reasons_6m 
If interview  
was not 
conducted give 
reason: 
                 1=clinician(s) refused 
                 2=clinician too busy 
                 3= clinician on sick-leave 
or AL 
                 4= clinician DNA >2x 
                 5=  researcher missed to 
organise it 
                 6= intervention stopped 
before end of the 
intervention period  
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QUESTION 
0=no 1=yes 
 
0. Have you continued using financial incentives with this patient? 
 
ficon_6m 
ficon1_6m 
If yes, please explain …………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9. If yes: Do you know how the money received as incentives was used during last six months? 
 
moneyuse_6m 
moneyuse1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..………………………………………………………………  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
0.A. If answer to question 0 is ‘yes’: Have you offered financial incentives to other patients? 
 
fiother_6m 
fiother1_6m 
If yes, please explain …………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
1. If answer to question 0 is ‘no’: Has the patient asked for the financial incentive after end of the 
intervention period?   
 
fiask_6m 
fiask1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain …………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Has the patient become intentionally non-adherent during last six months to qualify again for being offered 
financial incentives? 
 
nonad_6m 
nonadh1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..……………………………….……………………….………  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………… 
 
3. Have there been any other problems with the patients due to discontinuing the financial incentives during last 
six months? 
 
problem_
6m 
problem1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..…………………………………………………………..……  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
 
 
4. Did using financial incentives during the intervention period influence the quality of the therapeutic 
relationship in the last six months (after financial incentives stopped)?   
 
relation_
6m 
relation1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..……………………………………………….………………  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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7. Has any other patient become intentionally non-adherent to qualify for being offered  
    financial incentives during last six months? 
 
nonadh_6
m 
 
If yes, number of patients 
 
nonadhno_
6m 
nonadh1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..………………………………………………………………  
 
8.  Has there been any other impact of offering financial incentives for this patient (e.g. relationship with family 
members, drug use, self-care) or in the team (e.g. more time for other patients, communication between team  
members, atmosphere in the team) during last six months? 
 
impact_6
m 
impact1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Any other comments 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. Did offering financial incentives to the patient have any other influence on the treatment of the patient (apart 
from effects on adherence and the therapeutic relationship)?  (e.g.  
attending of a day hospital, patient’s contacts with a GP, etc.) in the last six months? 
 
treatment_
6m 
treatment1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain……………………………………………………..………………………………………………………….……  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………… 
 
6. Has any other patient on depot medication also asked to be offered financial incentives during last six 
months?   
 
otherp_6m 
If yes, number of patients   
otherpno_6
m 
otherp1_6m 
 
If yes, please explain …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix 3 Patient interview: end of intervention
Interview question guide
Introductory remarks
1. Hello. I would like to start by thanking you for coming and taking part in this research on financial
incentives. We really appreciate your involvement. Just to let you know, there are no right or wrong
answers to any of these questions and you do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish
to answer and you can leave the interview at any time you want.
Establishing rapport
1. First experiences with mental health: So, to start off I would just like to ask you a few questions
about your first experiences with mental health services. When did you first come into contact with
mental health services? What effect did this have on you at the time, for instance, did it affect your day
to day life?
2. Family and peer support: Okay, so can I ask you what effect this had on you in terms of your family
and friends or your children? Were they supportive at the time? Did you feel excluded or discriminated
in your local community or did you get support at the time?
Health and identity
1. Health: Now, just moving on to some broader questions, I just want to talk to you about your health in
general. How healthy do you feel at the moment? Both in terms of your physical and psychological
health. Do you feel that you have much control over both your physical and psychological health? What
things in your life do you think would improve your health in general? Do you think health is something
that is easy to change in general or is it something that you can’t do much about? (Maybe some
probing is needed here like “Could you explain that a bit further?”).
2. Identity: Okay, so again, I’d just like to ask you a really broad question. How would you define
yourself? If you had to describe yourself to someone else what would be the most important things to
mention? In other words, what do you see as the most important thing in defining who you are?
Depot and medication
1. Medication and health care experiences: Okay, so now I just want to talk to you about your health
care experiences so far. I’m really interested to know about how you feel about the service that you
receive. Do you have a good relationship with the team and your care co-ordinator? What are your
experiences with taking medication? What are the psychological and physical effects of taking the
medication, if any at all?
2. Experience with FIAT: Okay, that’s great. So now I’d like to talk to you about being part of the FIAT
study. What were your initial thoughts when you were asked to take part in the study? Was it
something you wanted to do? Why did you want to/or not want to? Did you talk to friends or family
about it and what was their opinion in you taking part? Did getting the money when you were given
the medication affect your relationship with your care co-ordinator, or not at all? If so, in what way did
it affect the relationship? Did your experience with receiving £15 for your depot change over the year
that you participated in the study? If so, how so?
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3. Financial issues: During the trial, did you feel that you wanted or needed more money than the £15
that was given? In general, what did you use the money for? Did you feel at any point during the
12 months that you were becoming dependent or reliant on getting the money from your care
co-ordinator? How have you coped since the 12 months have ended and you haven’t received any
more money? Has this been something that has been easy or difficult to adapt to?
4. Post-intervention experiences: What happened in the aftermath of the study, when you didn’t
receive £15 for getting your depot? Was this something that was difficult or easy to adapt to? Can you
explain why? Are you still receiving your medication? Do you feel that you have benefited positively or
negatively from being part of the study? Can you explain why? Has being part of the study affected
how much control you feel that you have now over your health and health care, or not at all. (That
last question is quite a leading question, so might be best left out)
5. Ethical issues: Did you feel in any way that you had to take part in this study or that you had to
continue with the study when you did not want to? If so, can you explain a bit further for me?
Speaking in general, do you think there are any ethical issues with conducting a study like this, where
patients receive money when they get their depot medication, if any at all? Can you explain a
bit further?
Wrapping-up questions
1. Quality of life: Okay, so we are now coming towards the end of the interview. I just have one or two
more questions for you. In general, how would you describe your quality of life to me, as it is now, for
example in terms of stress, work, family and taking your medication?
2. Future plans: What are your plans for the future? Has being part of the trial affected your plans for
the future, if at all? Do you intend to keep taking your medication, or is it something that you plan to
stop in the future?
Closing remarks
1. Well, I have come to the end of my questions. Is there anything that you have said that you would like
to withdraw or is there anything that you would like to add further? Anything that might be important
to you, for example, that I might have missed? Okay, well, once again, thank you for taking part in
the study. If you have any questions or queries about taking part please talk to your care co-ordinator
and I can be in touch. We really appreciate your time and participation.
End of interview.
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Appendix 4 Patient interview: 24-month
follow-up
Interview question guide
Introductory remarks
Thank you: Hello. I would like to start by thanking you for coming and taking part in this research on
financial incentives. We really appreciate your involvement.
Financial incentives interview: I would now like to ask you about your experience with
financial incentives.
Recording and confidentiality: There are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions and you
do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer and you can leave the interview at
any time you want.
Also, if you don’t mind, I will record the interview, but all you say here will remain fully confidential.
Experience with FIAT
How the incentives influenced adherence to treatment?
l About a year and a half ago you were getting £15 every time you had your depot. How did you feel
about that?
l And how do you feel now the money has stopped?
l Before you started receiving the money, how did you feel about taking your medication?
l Do you think receiving money influenced you taking your medication?
l Do you think receiving the money affected your attitude to having your depot?
l Now that the money has stopped, has that had any influence on you taking your medication?
How the possibility improved adherence affected outcomes?
l Did receiving money for taking your medication have an effect on your life in any way?
l Now that the money has stopped, have any of those things you described changed?
l Did receiving money for medication affect your mental health?
l Now that the money has stopped, have any of those things you described changed?
l Did receiving money for medication affect how often you went into hospital?
l Now that the money has stopped, have any of those things you described changed?
l Did receiving money for medication affect your relationship with your family or friends?
l Now that the money has stopped, have any of those things you described changed?
Effects on their attitude to treatment
l Did receiving money for taking your medication affect your relationship with your care co-ordinator or
clinician, or not at all?
l Now that the money has stopped, have any of those things you described changed?
l Did receiving money for taking your medication affect your attitude to mental health services?
l Now that the money has stopped, have any of those things you described changed?
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How patients experienced the long-term practice and its role in the overall
treatment received in community mental health care?
l What is your opinion about receiving financial incentives to take medication?
l Did your experience with receiving £15 for your depot change over the year that you participated in
the study?
l In theory, do you think that paying patients to take their medication should happen again in
your team?
l Should it be rolled out nationwide?
l Should it just be for patients who miss a lot of depot appointments – or should it be for all patients?
Closing remarks
Well, I have come to the end of my questions. Is there anything that you have said that you would like to
withdraw or is there anything that you would like to add further?
Anything that might be important to you, for example, that I might have missed? Thank you for taking
part in the study. If you have any questions or queries about taking part please talk to your care
co-ordinator and I can be in touch.
We really appreciate your time and participation.
End of interview.
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Appendix 5 End-of-study information
Dear FIAT research participant,
A few years ago, you took part in a research project where you were offered £15 for your depot injection,
called the FIAT research project (‘financial incentives for adherence to treatment’). Thank you again for
taking part; now the research has finished, we thought we would let you know what we found out.
The research was carried out with patients who missed a lot of their depot appointments. We wanted to
see whether paying people a small amount for each depot injection could reduce the number of missed
depot appointments. Patients in some mental health teams across the country were given £15 every time
they had their depot, for one year. Patients in other mental health teams continued to receive their depot
as normal without being paid. We found that the £15 helped patients turn up on time for their depot
appointments, compared to patients not receiving the money. However, when the money stopped after
one year, we found that people started to miss their depot appointments again.
We also invited patients to take part in an interview to talk about how they felt about receiving the
money. Many people felt that the money helped them in many ways such as being a reminder for their
depot appointment, or they could use the money to help out with the costs of everyday living. Some
people talked about how felt the money was a reward for them having their depot on time and used the
money to treat themselves to something. On the other hand, some people did not feel comfortable with
receiving money for their medication. Once the money had stopped, most people felt that this did not
affect them but some did feel that their attendance to depot appointments and their mental health had
got worse.
We also interviewed mental health staff involved in the study to find out what they thought about using
the £15. Many thought that using money was a good idea and felt that the money helped patients turn
up to more depots, and they noticed that their patient’s mental health and their relationship with them
had improved also. On the other hand, some staff felt that the money was a bad idea because it didn’t
work, or that their relationship with patients became all about the money. Some staff believed that
patients were spending the money on drugs/alcohol which made their mental health worse and working
with them more difficult.
Overall, offering money did help people turn up to depot appointments more often but this does not last
once the money stops. Many patients or staff felt that the money was a good idea but some felt
uncomfortable with the money or thought that it was not a good idea. Offering small amounts of money
to help people turn up on time for their depot injections may not work for everyone.
If you have any more questions about the research, please call XXXXXXXX and ask to speak to XXXXXXX.
We hope that you enjoyed being part of the research project. We very much enjoyed having you on board
and are grateful for your participation!
Best wishes
The FIAT team
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